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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this thesis is to re-examine the relationship between corporate strategy and 
business unit strategy. Past research has often failed to deconstruct the notion of corporate effects 
to properly assess the role of corporate strategy in the behaviour and performance of business 
units. As a result, conflicting findings have led to researchers disagreeing on the significance of 
corporate effects and corporate strategy. Through this thesis, I have taken steps to clarify the 
misunderstood significance of corporate strategy to business-unit-level strategy and 
performance. This dissertation has drawn on the literature from agency theory, information 
processing theory, and upper echelons theory, as well as the economic logic that underlies value 
creation in corporations. Through this dissertation, I deconstruct the notion of corporate effects 
to theoretically redefine the role of controls as the mediator between corporate strategy and 
business unit strategy to respond to the research question, “How does corporate strategy 
influence business unit performance?” In addition, I deconstruct business unit effects to examine 
the impact of business strategy on business unit performance. Finally, I consider business unit 
strategy to be an exogenous factor.  
To explore the effect of corporate strategy on business-unit-level strategy and 
performance, I conducted a quantitative analysis of data corresponding to over 2,500 business 
units from 193 corporations. Building on a proprietary dataset made accessible for this research, 
I tested the theoretical model for this thesis using previously collected data from each of the 
studied business units and the corporate headquarters of their corporate parents. The dataset 
comprises objective measures of business unit financial performance, objective characteristics of 
corporate headquarters and structure, and more subjective and behavioural data based on surveys 
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that focus on control mechanisms to which business units are subject and the strategic orientation 
they pursue. The quantitative analysis was undertaken after performing steps for validation of the 
measures used and in compliance with measures and techniques used in past research. 
I find support in my analysis for a partial mediating role of controls in the relationship 
between corporate strategy and business-unit-level strategy. The results from the analysis 
demonstrate that the strategic orientations of business units are endogenous to the corporate 
strategy through the mechanism of controls to which each business unit is subject. I also find 
support for the moderating effect of certain factors at the corporate level, such as size of 
corporate headquarters, number of business units managed by the corporation, and the corporate 
CEO’s background in the relationship between corporate strategy and controls.  
The findings of this thesis re-establish the role of corporate strategy in our understanding 
of business-unit-level strategy and performance. Contrary to past research, I have theorized 
business-unit-level strategy to be endogenous to corporate strategy. I have also developed the 
controls construct and have measured it for each business unit studied in order to test my 
theoretical model. My findings in this thesis take a step towards enhancing our understanding of 
how corporate strategy influences strategy and performance at the business unit level.  
Keywords: Corporate Strategy, Business Unit Strategy, Corporate Controls, Business Unit 
Performance  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
During the past two centuries, the world of business has witnessed a gradual change 
where the domination of small and family-owned businesses has been replaced by corporations 
with multiple businesses in different product markets. The corporations that have evolved follow 
different logics that justify their operations in multiple businesses. This trend has become even 
more dominant during the past century, and in some markets the majority of firms pursue 
diversification of one kind or another (Rumelt, 1974). While the trend of diversification is more 
evident in some geographical locations, it has gradually become a trend in most countries.  
During the latter half of the 20th century, diversification as a strategy grew significantly 
in the majority of industrialized countries (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990). For instance, from 1950 to 
1974, the percentage of U.S. firms on the Fortune 500 list that pursued diversification strategies 
grew from 30.1% to 63% (Rumelt, 1974, 1982). Studying a sample of 44,288 U.S. firms between 
1984 and 1997, Denis, Denis, and Yost (2002) reported an increase in the rate of diversification 
of 29% to 45%. Firms that diversified achieved this objective through their own organic growth 
or through mergers and acquisitions — a trend that became more dominant during the last 
quarter of the past century (Porter, 1987). Despite the reversal trend of deconglomeration and 
divestiture during the 1970s and 1980s (Hoskisson and Turk, 1990; Ravencraft and Scherer, 
1987), diversification still remains the dominant logic among most large businesses in the 
industrialized world (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990; Denis, Denis, and Yost, 2002). 
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The aforementioned trends in diversification have also resulted in significant changes to 
the traditional ways in which businesses are managed. Unlike in the past, when a firm was 
operating in a single product market, corporations are now facing issues that arise from multiple 
product markets that have industry-specific idiosyncrasies. From an agency theory perspective, 
complexities inherent in the separation of ownership and control have become even more 
complicated as multiple layers of principals have emerged due to diversification at the corporate 
level.  
The main question in corporations has become, “How can the corporation ensure that its 
business units operate in a manner that creates the highest value for the corporation and its 
shareholders as a whole?” To respond to this question, researchers have conducted extensive 
conceptual and empirical research, and corporations have designed and employed various 
mechanisms to realize the economic expectations associated with the logic of pursuing a 
corporate-level strategy of different levels of diversification.  
Reviewing the literature that focuses on corporate strategy, I was intrigued to see whether 
and how the issue of corporate strategy would be addressed in practical terms within 
corporations. My main interest was drawn to instances where business units failed to deliver the 
value that was expected by their corporate parents — a phenomenon that requires an examination 
of the control mechanisms put in place by corporate headquarters.   
While many of the institutions that face financial challenges are diversified, I found that 
there was little attention placed on the issue of corporate controls and the corporate parent– 
business unit relationship. There is very little research by scholars and practitioners that 
addresses the issue of corporate controls within the context of corporate strategy from any 
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dimension other than that of CEO compensation. Instead, most emphasis has been placed on 
business unit CEOs and strategies pursued by business units. This has inspired me to conduct 
research on the role that corporate controls play in the creation of value (i.e., exceeding the 
aggregate performance of business units, if they operate independent from the corporation) in the 
relationship between corporations and their business units.  
Most past research focusing on the corporate parent–business unit relationship has 
limited itself to the broad influence of corporate effects (e.g., McGahan and Porter, 1997) and 
business unit effects. In reality, corporate effects include corporate strategy, corporate structure, 
corporate controls and corporate rewards. What has not been considered in the research on 
corporate effects is the possibility of countervailing, neutralizing, or negating effects among 
strategy, structure, controls, and rewards at the corporate level. In addition, this research has used 
business-unit-level effects without disaggregating at least the effect of business-unit-level 
strategy. Moreover, little has been done to understand the relationship between strategy at the 
corporate parent and business unit levels.  
The aim of this dissertation is to unpack from the concept of corporate effects the impact 
of corporate strategy and corporate controls; to unpack business unit strategy from the concept of 
business effects; and to re-examine the relationship between corporate strategy and business unit 
strategy and, ultimately, business unit performance. Therefore, this dissertation makes an attempt 
to provide a more clear understanding of the antecedents of business unit performance. My 
review of the existing literature has led me to conclude that the notion of corporate controls has 
largely been understudied in the performance of business units. The objective of this dissertation 
is to re-establish the relationship between corporate strategy and business strategy through 
theorizing the role of corporate controls as a mediating factor. In doing so, this dissertation 
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challenges business-unit-level strategy as an exogenous variable and emphasizes the influence of 
corporate strategy on the performance of business units in diversified firms. Consequently, this 
dissertation challenges conclusions drawn from previous empirical findings on the basis of their 
ambiguity in defining corporate effects and their theoretical representation of business unit 
effects in the presence of a corporate parent.  
 
1.2 Overview 
The influences of corporate-level factors or corporate effects on the performance of 
business units and corporations have generated much interest among researchers during the past 
several decades. However, much of past literature has fallen short of deconstructing corporate 
effects and understanding their constituent parts and roles. This has led research findings to 
examine the relationship between corporate effects and various business unit levels and 
corporate-level factors.  
In this dissertation, I aim to take a step towards the deconstruction of corporate effects 
and business unit effects. The broad definitions that exist for corporate effects often omit that 
different constituents of corporate effects may counter one another and that their misalignment 
may have an attenuating influence on the measurement of corporate effects. As a result, findings 
based on corporate effects may lead to misinterpretations based on small observed effects. 
Therefore, I make the attempt to avoid such misinterpretations and focus on corporate strategy 
and corporate controls as two constituents of the corporate effects variable.  
My review of past literature on corporate strategy points to yet another shortcoming. 
Similar to corporate-level analysis, business-level analysis suffers from undermining the role of 
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business unit strategy and instead focusing on business or segment effects when comparing 
corporate-level and business-unit-level influences on the performance of business units (e.g., 
McGahan and Porter 1997). Consequently, a solid understanding of the influence of business 
unit strategy compared to corporate strategy on business unit performance still remains out of 
reach. In this dissertation, I build on the existing literature to distinguish business unit strategy as 
a constituent of business effects and to measure its influence on business unit performance.  
Corporate strategy has been considered an important research topic in the area of 
strategic management, and its relationship to performance has been a focus of interest for 
academics and practitioners alike (Palepu, 1985). When focusing on corporate strategy, most 
researchers have tended to show a higher degree of interest in corporate diversification. Much of 
this interest has been generated as the result of the observation that many American businesses 
have engaged in multiple lines of business (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1989; Ravencraft and 
Scherer, 1987). Some researchers have found the tendency of organizations to engage in multiple 
lines of business to have interesting practical and theoretical implications (Michel and Hambrick, 
1992). The interest in corporate strategy and corporate effects has resulted in many researchers 
investigating the influence of corporate effects and corporate strategy on the performance of 
single business units as well as corporations’ overall performance. However, the findings of past 
research in this area have generally demonstrated conflicting results. The range of propositions 
and findings from previous research includes corporate effects being a significant determinant of 
performance in business units (Rumelt, 1974; Bowman and Helfat, 2001), and corporate effects 
having little to no significant influence at all (Rumelt, 1982; McGahan and Porter, 1997). As a 
result of these findings, corporate influences on the performance of business units remains a 
controversial area for research and one in which very little consensus among researchers exists.  
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Past research has mentioned methodological differences as the significant contributing 
factor to the existing differences in findings that have related corporate strategy and/or corporate 
effects to business unit performance (Bowman and Helfat, 2003). Also, little has been done to 
provide a better understanding of the differences that exist between business unit performance 
and overall corporate performance, either theoretically or in practice. This has resulted in 
differences in the conceptual perception of performance in strategic management research.  
Another shortcoming in past research on corporate effects/strategy has been a lack of 
depth in studying the mechanism through which corporate effects/strategy gets translated into 
performance — either corporate performance or business unit performance. Most research that 
has investigated the relationship between corporate-level factors and performance (e.g., Gort, 
1962; Arnould, 1969; Rumelt, 1974, 1982; McGahan and Porter, 1997, 1999) has done little to 
unpack corporate strategy from corporate effects and to investigate the link between corporate 
strategy and business-level strategy. Instead, much attention has been focused on how corporate-
level effects lead to business-level or corporate-level performance. As a result, corporate strategy 
has remained overlooked and, when referred to, business-level strategy and corporate-level 
strategy has been implicitly assumed as mutually independent, with business-level effects and 
strategy treated as an exogenous variable.  
Research analyzing studies using variance decomposition techniques (Bowman and 
Helfat, 2001) has also fallen short of explaining the antecedents of performance when corporate 
effects exist. In addition, and more importantly, research has fallen short of unpacking corporate 
effects, leading to a theoretical omission of the causal relationship between corporate strategy 
and business-level strategy (e.g., McGahan and Porter, 1997; Rumelt, 1982). Consequently, 
while past findings have attempted to understand the significance of the role of corporate effects 
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in business unit and corporate-level performance, the effect of corporate strategy on business unit 
performance still remains underappreciated.  
Drawing on literature from agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), the upper 
echelons perspective (Michel and Hambrick, 1994), and the notion of information processing 
capacity (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990), this dissertation aims to unpack what has been previously 
studied as corporate effects and shed new light on the link between corporate strategy and the 
performance of business units. In particular, this dissertation attempts to provide an answer to the 
following research question, “How does corporate strategy influence business unit 
performance?” In doing so, a reassessment of the relationship between corporate strategy and 
business strategy is undertaken. An important contribution of this dissertation is to unpack what 
is commonly referred to as “corporate effects” and emphasize the role of controls from corporate 
headquarters on strategic orientation at the business unit level. The findings of this dissertation 
address the constraints that are associated with corporate strategy and how such constraints 
influence corporate controls that are exercised and, subsequently, the strategic direction of the 
business units of corporations. Afterwards, this dissertation proceeds with the link between 
business-level strategy and each business unit’s subsequent performance, establishing the 
indirect effect of corporate strategy on business unit performance. The theoretical model that has 
been proposed in this dissertation and which is tested empirically is illustrated in Figure 1.1. This 
model will be briefly explained in the remaining sections of this chapter. 
 
 
 Figure 1.1: Schematic Representation of the 
 
1.3 Level of Analysis 
Much of the literature in the area of corporate 
corporate effects influence business performance (e.g.,
Porter, 1997; Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990; Bowman and Helfat, 2001). Therefore, much of past 
research applies a multilevel approach when conducting the analysis. The main reason for 
applying a multilevel approach is ofte
within the effects at the corporate level, without proper deconstruction of the effects
2006; Misangyi, Elms, Greckhamer, and Lepine, 2006)
multilevel analysis has been used. However, this 
that it is based on its conceptualization of the relationship between corporate strategy and 
business unit strategy.  
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Proposed Theoretical Model
effects/strategy has focused on whether 
 Rumelt, 1974, 1982, 1991; McGahan and 
n based on considering business effects to be partly nested 
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There are three dependent variables of interest that are included in this dissertation: 
corporate controls, business-level strategy, and business-level performance. All of the dependent 
variables of this dissertation are analyzed at the business level. The independent variable of this 
dissertation — corporate strategy — is measured at the level of the corporation and is also used 
for analysis of its effect at the business level. Therefore, in contrast to previous studies, this study 
focuses its level of analysis at two levels: the corporate level and the business level. Corporate 
strategy and three moderator variables are measured at the corporate level, while corporate 
controls are measured for each business unit and based on the responses of managers at each 
business unit. Business unit performance and business unit strategy are also measured at the 
business unit level.  
 
1.4 Corporate Strategy 
The independent and exogenous variable of interest in this study is corporate strategy. 
The main objective of the research being proposed is to establish the relationship between 
corporate strategy and the strategic orientation and performance of business units. The concept of 
corporate strategy as a construct and the variables that represent it in the theoretical model are 
introduced in Chapter 2.  
In Chapter 2, the literature on corporate diversification and its theoretical underpinnings 
is reviewed extensively and the contrasts between various theoretical perspectives are illustrated. 
This review contains the trends in diversification among firms and within the literature of 
strategy and the incentives and motives that exist for firms to diversify. Then, the literature on 
related and unrelated diversification as two of the major categories of corporate strategy is 
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reviewed. Chapter 2 concludes with reviewing the literature that has focused on the relationship 
between diversification and performance.  
 
1.5 Corporate Controls 
The corporate headquarters is responsible for ensuring that performance of individual 
business units aggregates to the highest overall performance for the corporation and that 
decisions and actions at the business unit level are aligned with the best interests of the 
corporation. Therefore, the design and implementation of controls on business units to achieve 
this objective also forms an important responsibility for corporate headquarters. Corporations 
design control mechanisms to ensure that the strategic direction and operational output of 
business units is in line with those of the corporation’s objectives and that expected synergies, if 
any, are realized.  
In Chapter 3, I focus on controls as one of the main constructs of interest in this 
dissertation. First, I conduct a review of the different types of controls that can be employed by 
corporations. In line with past research (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990, 1994), controls are 
distinguished on the basis of their reliance on accounting measures and/or subjective criteria. 
Building on theoretical conceptualizations in past research and on the literature that makes the 
distinction between the nature of expected generated values in related and unrelated 
diversification, and considering resource constraints, it is argued that related diversified firms 
and unrelated diversified firms differ in how they control their business units; related diversified 
corporations are expected to rely on both strategic controls and financial controls with more of 
an emphasis on strategic, while unrelated diversified corporations are expected to put stronger 
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emphasis on implementing financial controls as their primary control mechanism. Although 
similarities with past research exist on these propositions, and the conceptualization of controls 
as endogenous to corporate strategy is not entirely new, factors that moderate the relationship 
between corporate strategy and controls have either not been included explicitly, or have been 
neglected entirely in past research. Three of these factors that are related to the ability of 
corporate headquarters to process information are size of headquarters, relative experience of the 
corporate CEO, and the number of business units controlled by the corporation (Hoskisson, Hitt, 
and Hill, 1991; Hoskisson, Hill, and Kim, 1993).  
 
1.5.1 Size of Headquarters 
Chapter 3 of this dissertation focuses on the controls of corporations and their 
relationship to the strategic direction that is taken at the corporate level. In order for corporations 
to effectively monitor the actions and performances of their business units, the corporate 
headquarters should possess effective monitoring capabilities. However, when the number of 
staff at corporate headquarters is limited, the ability of a corporation to allocate the appropriate 
amount of time and attention to each business unit will diminish. Consequently, corporate 
headquarters will resort to less time-consuming and less demanding mechanisms, which will in 
turn influence the type of controls that can be implemented (Hoskisson, Hill, and Kim, 1993). 
Thus, in the relationship between corporate strategy and corporate controls, the moderating role 
of the size (i.e., number of staff) of corporate headquarters has been included in the theoretical 
model that is proposed. Past research has mostly focused on the size of the board of directors, 
theorizing the role of board size on the ability of the board to be vigilant (Kroll, Walters, and 
Wright, 2008). Since the responsibility to process information relevant to business units resides 
12 
 
significantly with the staff of the corporate headquarters and not with the board of directors, this 
dissertation takes a different approach from past studies and uses the size of staff at corporate 
headquarters. By doing so, this dissertation accounts for the effect of the size of the corporate 
headquarters on its ability to remain vigilant as the moderator of the relationship between 
corporate strategy with the controls that are put in place for each business unit. This is more 
appropriate than the size of the board, because the responsibility of monitoring business units 
and processing information relevant to their operations rests mainly with the corporate staff, not 
with the board of directors. 
 
1.5.2 Relative Experience of the Corporate CEO 
In a corporation, the ultimate responsibility for decision-making rests with the 
corporation’s top management and, above all, its CEO (Adner and Helfat, 2003). The upper 
echelons perspective emphasizes the role of the CEO’s cognitive capacity in delivering 
organizational outcomes (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). The ability of the corporate CEO to be 
effective in evaluating the quality of decisions and actions of business units and to make 
appropriate decisions regarding these decisions and actions rests with his or her level of 
knowledge and expertise with respect to each business unit and the industry in which the 
business unit operates. Without necessary expertise and/or knowledge, the corporate CEO will be 
forced to make his/her evaluations and decisions on the basis of quantitative factors such as 
accounting and financial indicators (Kroll, Walters, and Wright, 2008) without regard for 
subjective, qualitative indicators. Therefore, the ability of corporations to control their business 
units will depend on the level of expertise of the corporate CEO relative to each business unit. In 
this dissertation, the relative expertise of the corporate CEO has been theorized as a moderating 
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variable. The moderating role of the corporate CEO’s experience is discussed in detail in Chapter 
3.  
 
1.5.3 Number of Business Units and Headquarters’ Effectiveness  
Besides differences in the size of the corporate headquarters and CEO expertise, there is 
another factor that influences the ability of managers to effectively monitor and control all the 
operations within business units. The greater the number of business units, the more time and 
information processing capacity is required at the corporate level in order to effectively control 
them. Therefore, given the level of information processing capacity that has been developed 
within corporate headquarters, a larger number of business units means that less attention can be 
dedicated to monitor each individual business unit (Hoskisson, Hitt, and Hill, 1991). The 
moderating role of the number of business units on the relationship between corporate strategy 
and corporate controls is discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
1.6 Business Unit Strategy 
Chapter 4 of this dissertation investigates the relationship between strategies that are 
pursued by business units and the controls that are put in place by their corporate parent. Prior 
research has mostly used business unit effects and considered business strategy to be an 
exogenous variable (e.g., McGahan and Porter, 1997) and independent from either corporate 
effects or corporate strategy. Therefore, little has been done to understand how controls influence 
the strategy that is pursued by business units. This dissertation draws on agency theory to 
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propose that the type of controls that are designed and implemented by corporations has a 
significant role in determining the strategies that business units pursue.  
In Chapter 4, different categorizations of business strategy and their relationship to 
exploration and exploitation are discussed. Then, drawing on agency theory, it is argued that 
business unit executives conform to the corporate controls that they are subject to and pursue 
strategies that align with these corporate control systems.  
 
1.7 Performance 
The objective of economic enterprise is to create economic value for its principals. Firms 
that yield the highest economic value in the short term and long term are considered to be those 
with the highest performance. Therefore, performance has become a very important construct in 
the literature of strategic management. There is extensive literature in the area of strategic 
management that has established the relationship between corporate effects and business unit 
performance (e.g., Bowman and Helfat, 2001) or business unit strategy and business unit 
performance (e.g., Thornhill and White, 2007). These findings have often used either financial 
indicators or, sometimes, composite measures that entail different dimensions of business unit 
performance. In this dissertation, each dimension of performance is utilized as a unique 
construct. Chapter 5, which focuses on performance, examines the existing literature on 
performance and mainly focuses on two dimensions: financial performance and growth in market 
share. Then, it draws from literature on “fit” (Rowe and Wright, 1997; White, 1986) to introduce 
the importance of fit between controls and business-unit-level strategy to achieve desirable 
performance at the business unit level.  
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 1.7.1 Financial Performance 
Financial performance is considered to be the simplest of performance measures that are 
employed by researchers and practitioners in evaluating whether a business unit is achieving its 
desirable objectives. In Chapter 5, a review of the validity and types of measurements of 
financial performance is provided. 
 
 1.7.2 Growth in Market Share 
Unlike financial measures as the only way to measure financial performance, there are a 
variety of methods that have been used to measure market performance. Understanding and 
assessing market performance often uses both subjective and objective criteria, which requires 
greater depth on the part of corporate directors. Market performance has also been found to be 
associated with strategic directions that are not necessarily associated with short-term financial 
performance. Growth in market share represents one dimension of market performance in past 
research. This research has used growth in sales of a business unit as a proxy to measure its 
growth in market share (e.g., White, 1986), and this dissertation takes a similar approach. 
Chapter 5 of this dissertation discusses the variety of market performance measures that have 
been adopted in past research and examines the relationship between growth in market share and 
the strategy that is pursued by business units.  
 
 1.7.3 Fit Between Business Strategy and Controls 
In order for business strategy to be successfully executed and to yield desirable 
subsequent performance, there is the need for a “fit” to exist between different organizational 
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factors (Rowe and Wright, 1997; White, 1986). As such, business units that have a better fit 
between their strategic direction and the requirements inherent within the corporate controls that 
they consider they are subject to are expected to be more successful performers. Chapter 5 also 
examines the concept of “fit” in past literature and argues for its extension to the interaction 
between corporate controls and business-level strategy, and its subsequent interactive effect on 
business units’ growth in sales and financial performance.  
 
1.8 Methodology and Data 
To test the hypotheses that are presented in this dissertation, existing methodological 
approaches for the measurement of constructs have been used, and several steps have been taken 
in proposing the development and implementation of methods for the measurement of certain 
constructs. In Chapter 6, the variables corresponding to each construct and the measures that 
operationalize those variables are discussed.  
This dissertation relies on quantitative methods. For some variables, pre-existing 
quantified and validated content analysis approaches are used (e.g., Thornhill and White, 2007). 
The required panel data for this dissertation was collected from data that has been archived by 
the Industrial Development and Renovation Organization of Iran (IDRO) from Iranian 
corporations that either operate under IDRO’s umbrella or subscribe to its services and licenses. 
IDRO, which operates as a government-owned industrial hub, has overseen the operations of all 
Iranian industrial facilities since its inception in 1967. The data used for this dissertation includes 
archived data on 193 corporations and their 2,704 business units between the years 1999 and 
2004. The analysis of the data is conducted through the use of regression analysis. 
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1.9 Summary 
The early research on corporate diversification dates back five decades (e.g., Gort, 1962; 
Arnould, 1969), but the significance of corporate strategy to the performance of business units 
still remains an issue on which there is little consensus among researchers. Past research has 
reported a wide range of conclusions for this relationship and debate still continues (e.g., Rumelt, 
1974, 1982; McGahan and Porter, 1997; Bowman and Helfat, 2001). Some of these differences 
have been attributed to the use of different measures, or underdeveloped methodological 
approaches (Montgomery, 1982; Palepu, 1985). But for the most part, past research has failed to 
unpack corporate effects and properly establish the relationship between corporate strategy and 
business unit strategy and performance.  
In this dissertation, the theoretical foundations of corporate strategy have been revisited. 
In unpacking corporate effects, drawing from the literature on agency theory, and signifying the 
bounded rationality resulting from information processing capacity, corporate controls are 
emphasized as an important variable that has often been omitted in the existing theoretical 
models. Accordingly, this dissertation provides several conceptual and methodological 
contributions to the literature on corporate strategy.  
First, the model in this dissertation represents corporate controls as a mediating variable 
in the relationship between corporate strategy and business unit strategy. Second, it introduces 
the business unit strategy of wholly owned business units as a factor that is endogenous to 
controls, and not as the exogenous independent variable that has been assumed in past research 
(e.g., McGahan and Porter, 1997; Bowman and Helfat, 2001).  
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The research also provides several methodological contributions. First, it introduces a 
method for the transformation of the measure of diversification into a continuous variable that 
entails both the dimension of related diversification and that of unrelated diversification. Second, 
drawing on agency theory as the cornerstone for corporate controls, it employs a method for 
measuring strategic controls with a stronger connection to theory. The method for measuring 
financial controls that are more objective follows a similar approach to methods employed in 
past research.  
This research also has implications for practice. These implications provide corporations 
with a better understanding of prerequisites to implement strategic and financial controls that 
should exist within corporate headquarters. Furthermore, this dissertation emphasizes the need to 
pay attention to the fit between corporate controls and their business unit factors.  
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CHAPTER 2: CORPORATE STRATEGY 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The scope of diversification has been of interest to researchers in strategic management. 
With the growth of organizations and the emergence of multiproduct firms, multilevel strategic 
issues have also become prominent. During the latter half of the 20th century, the dominance of 
businesses that operated within one single product market has evolved into the dominance of 
larger businesses operating in multiple industries. Many of the former businesses experienced 
institutional and environmental pressures as well as internal incentives to diversify their product 
and service offerings from a single industry to multiple industries. Consequently, by the end of 
the past century, the majority of U.S. firms and those in other industrialized nations were 
involved in some kind of diversification (Rumelt, 1974; Berry, 1975; Chang and Choi, 1988; 
Channon, 1973; Chenall, 1979; Denis, Denis, and Yost, 2002; Dyas and Thanheiser, 1976; 
Franko, 1974; McDougall and Round, 1984; Suzuki, 1980; Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990); this trend 
was even faster among top-performing firms (Rumelt, 1982).  
With the emergence of diversified firms, the complexities in their management in order to 
achieve higher performance became evident. The difference in economic logic for value creation 
in diversified firms (Teece, 1980, 1982) required understanding strategy at the corporate level, 
which was different from that at the business unit level. While earlier studies tended to neglect 
the role of strategy at the corporate level, focusing on diversification per se (e.g., Gort, 1962; 
Arnould, 1969), later studies focused on different diversification strategies and their influence on 
performance at both the corporate level and the business unit level (Rumelt, 1974, 1982, 1991).  
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Past literature in strategic management has made a distinction between corporate-level 
and business-unit-level strategy (Bowman and Helfat, 2001). This distinction has often been 
attributed to the focus of interest. While the primary focus in business unit strategy is to achieve 
success among a group of competitors in a product market through the allocation of resources 
and other strategic decisions (Barney, 2002; Dundas and Richardson, 1980), corporate strategy 
deals with the questions of what, and how many, product markets a firm should be operating in 
(Grant, 1995). It also deals with the following question: How does a firm manage the business 
units operating in multiple product markets to achieve overall success (Dundas and Richardson, 
1980)? Corporate strategy has been defined as actions that are taken by firms in order to achieve 
competitive advantage through managing a diverse group of businesses that compete in different 
industries and product markets (Grant, 1995; Hitt, Hoskisson, Ireland, Rowe, and Sheppard, 
2006). Just as with the diversified firm’s business-level strategies, corporate strategy is expected 
to help the firm earn above-average returns by creating value; the extra value created exceeds the 
costs associated with having a corporate head office. In other words, corporate strategy can be 
considered to be the choice between pursuing different types of growth through diversification 
(Collis and Montgomery, 1998) to synergistically create more value than the combined value of 
all business units if each business unit was a standalone business. 
Past research at the corporate level of the firm has focused on diversification. This focus 
was further sharpened when diversification became a major trend worldwide (Berry, 1975; 
Chang and Choi, 1988; Channon, 1973; Chenall, 1979; Dyas and Thanheiser, 1976; Franko, 
1974; Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990; McDougall and Round, 1984; Rumelt, 1974; Suzuki, 1980). 
The interest in diversification among researchers became particularly strong in the 1970s and 
1980s, when firms showed more interest in entering multiple product markets. For example, 
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from the 1950s until the mid-1970s, the percentage of firms on the Fortune 500 list that pursued 
some type of diversification strategy grew from 30.1% to 63% (Rumelt, 1974, 1982), a trend that 
persisted as the past century came to an end (Denis, Denis, and Yost, 2002). While the latter half 
of the 1970s and most of the 1980s witnessed trends towards firms exiting from unrelated 
product markets through divestiture (Hoskisson and Turk, 1990; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; 
Williams, Paez, and Sanders, 1988), most of the larger firms remained quite diversified 
(Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990).  
In this chapter, the aim is to introduce corporate strategy as a construct of interest within 
the proposed theoretical model of this dissertation. To achieve this purpose, a review is 
conducted of the existing literature on corporate effects, diversification, and the different 
diversification corporate strategies that can be pursued by corporations. Furthermore, the 
findings in past research that have investigated the relationship between corporate effects, 
corporate strategy, and business unit performance are reviewed and the conflicting results are 
discussed.  
 
2.2 Diversification 
Diversification is pursued by firms to increase performance through simultaneous 
operation in multiple product or service markets. Research on firm diversification has been at the 
heart of scholarly work focusing on the corporate level. Generally, diversification research has 
fallen into one of two streams, industrial organization and strategic management; the latter 
focuses mostly on the impact of diversification on profitability (Palepu, 1985). This interest in 
diversification has resulted in extensive research being conducted on the link between 
22 
 
diversification and performance at the business unit level and corporate level alike (e.g., Gort, 
1962; Arnould, 1969, Markham, 1973; Rumelt, 1974, 1982, 1991; Berry, 1975; Christensen and 
Montgomery, 1981; Bettis and Hall, 1981; Montgomery, 1982; Palepu, 1985; Schmalansee, 
1985; Lubatkin, 1987; Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988; Amit and Livant, 1988; Ramanujam 
and Varadarajan, 1989; Rumelt, 1991; McGahan and Porter, 1997, 1998; Bowman and Helfat, 
2001). Such research has focused on diversification, corporate effects, and corporate strategy to 
understand their effect on business unit and corporate-level performance. As a result of the use of 
different independent variables, the findings of such studies have resulted in conflicting results 
ranging from showing a significant effect (e.g., Rumelt, 1974, 1982; Christensen and 
Montgomery, 1981; Montgomery, 1982; Bowman and Helfat, 2001) to showing a trivial or 
insignificant effect (e.g., Gort, 1962; Arnould, 1969; Markham, 1973; Berry, 1975; Lubatkin, 
1987; McGahan and Porter, 1997, 1998).  
Unfortunately, corporate effects and corporate strategy have remained undistinguished in 
research, and their inclusion within an integrated theoretical model has been overlooked. 
Corporate effects include various dimensions that stem from the corporate level. Such 
dimensions could include corporate controls, HR practices, corporate structure, management 
preferences, and compensation and reward mechanisms, in addition to corporate strategy, which 
is mainly concerned with how a corporation chooses to diversify. Most existing literature has 
chosen to focus on corporate effects — as a broad construct — when investigating the 
relationship between corporate-level and business-level factors in corporations. Consequently, 
there is a need for research to deconstruct and unpack corporate effects in corporations in order 
to better explain the link between corporate strategy and business unit performance.  
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Corporate strategy involves the choice that firms make to pursue diversification into 
related product markets or into product markets that are unrelated to one another. A main 
distinguishing factor in the pursuit of different corporate strategies is the need for firms to 
acquire new skills, techniques, and facilities (Ansoff, 1965). Without the necessary resources, the 
economic feasibility of each type of corporate strategy is in doubt (Penrose, 1959; Teece, 1982; 
Wernerfelt, 1984). Financial assets, either considered as tangible (Porter, 1985) or intangible 
(Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1988), are considered by some researchers as an important resource 
that facilitates diversification (Porter, 1985; Jensen, 1986; Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1988).  
The easy redeployment of financial assets provides a higher degree of flexibility in 
diversifying into different product markets. When financial assets are not the main available 
resource that a firm possesses, it is often excess capacity that drives diversification (Porter, 
1985). Lower flexibility in mobility and redeployment of such resources as excess capacities 
plays a constraining role in the ability of firms to diversify. Firms that rely on their physical and 
non-financial assets for diversification are often more successful when diversifying into product 
markets that have some degree of relatedness to their existing product markets, particularly in the 
area of production technology (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990). 
 
2.3 Theoretical Perspectives on Diversification 
Research on diversification is based on diverse theoretical underpinnings. Some of these 
fundamental theoretical differences have resulted in differences in the conceptualization of the 
topic and inferences that have been drawn from empirical findings. Research on diversification 
mainly agrees that under conditions of perfect competition, firms are unlikely to pursue 
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diversification (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990). When firms are assumed to exist within markets with 
relatively homogeneous factor markets (Scherer, 1980), only very limited diversification can be 
expected (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990).  
Based on past literature on diversification, Hoskisson and Hitt (1990) have identified 
three main theoretical perspectives that have influenced research in the area of corporate 
strategy. The first perspective focuses on firms as single product entities, the second looks into 
market imperfections and firm idiosyncrasies, and the third investigates the role of personal 
incentives and interests in the choice of diversification.  
 The first approach assumes firms to be single-product firms operating in homogeneous 
factor markets (Scherer, 1980). This approach, which is derived from neoclassical economic 
assumptions and the structure–conduct–performance paradigm, considers firm performance to be 
largely dependent on market actions rather than firm actions (Schmalansee, 1989). These 
assumptions leave little incentive for diversification (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990). The limited role 
that managers are assumed to have in the success or failure of firms is not much different from 
the assumptions in population ecology (Bourgeois, 1984; Hitt and Tyler, 1989; Hoskisson and 
Hitt, 1990). Also, based on assumptions in neoclassical economics where resource mobility is 
not limited, firms are assumed to have unlimited access to resources they need, which leaves 
little justification for diversification to acquire resources. Under such assumptions, leasing 
resources is more in accordance with this perspective (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990).  
A second perspective, which has been driven largely by the dominance of markets by 
multi-product firms (Karnani and Wernerfelt, 1985), assumes that idiosyncrasies and 
imperfections within markets and firms that cause firm heterogeneity (Barney, 1986). This 
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approach also gives rise to the concept of fit from contingency theory (Venkatraman, 1989) and 
emphasizes the role of managerial decisions in a firm’s subsequent performance (Hoskisson and 
Hitt, 1990). Since this theoretical perspective assumes resources to not be as perfectly mobile 
(Wernerfelt, 1984), the accessibility of resources will not become possible in some cases unless 
they are acquired. Consequently, the role of managers in making the decision is significant, even 
in the presence of market influences that exist to some extent (Hitt and Tyler, 1989).  
Rooted in agency theory and the pursuit of self-interest by managers of firms (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), the third theoretical perspective has focused on the personal incentives of 
managers to grow firms through diversification. The literature based on this theoretical 
perspective, while assuming that market imperfections exist, mostly studies governance 
mechanisms that are designed and implemented by firms’ owners to ensure that the owners 
suffer minimize losses as a result of managers’ actions.   
 
2.4 Corporate Strategy: Types of Diversification 
Firms pursue diversification in different ways. Firms diversify from single-product firms 
to limited diversification, related diversification, or unrelated diversification (Barney, 2002). 
Perhaps the most widely accepted categorization for diversified firms has been presented by 
Rumelt (1974). Rumelt’s classification places diversified firms under one of these groups: 
unrelated, related linked, related constrained, and vertically integrated. Also, based on this 
classification, firms with low levels of diversification fall into the “single business” type, where 
more than 95% of the firm’s revenues are generated from one business, or the “dominant 
business” type, where a single business constitutes between 70% and 95% of a firm’s revenues. 
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Combined, these are described and recognized as limited diversified firms, and while they have 
been of interest to researchers who have studied strategy at the business unit level, they have 
been of little interest to corporate strategy researchers.  
The second level of diversification that concerns firms is the moderate level of 
diversification that has been categorized as related constrained and related linked (Hitt, Ireland, 
Hoskisson, Rowe, and Sheppard, 2006). When less than 70% of a firm’s revenue comes from its 
dominant business and many technological, product, and/or distribution linkages exist among all 
businesses of the firm, then the firm is considered to be following a related constrained 
diversification strategy. On the other hand, when the technological, product, and/or distribution 
linkages among businesses are limited, then the firm is considered to be pursuing a hybrid 
strategy between related and unrelated diversification — or, as Rumelt (1974) has stated, a 
related linked diversification strategy (Hitt, Ireland, Hoskisson, Rowe, and Sheppard, 2006).  
The highest level of diversification belongs to firms when less than 70% of total revenues 
come from the corporation’s dominant business unit and linkages between business units are 
non-existent (Rumelt, 1974). While existing trends indicate that the number of firms following 
this unrelated diversification strategy is declining, there are still successful examples of firms 
operating as highly diversified firms (Hitt, Ireland, Hoskisson, Rowe, and Sheppard, 2006).  
The emphasis of this dissertation is mainly placed on two types of diversification, also 
known as corporate strategies: related diversification and unrelated diversification. After 
defining these concepts, I review the literature on related and unrelated diversification. Then, 
comparative studies of the strategic direction of corporations with regards to the extent of 
relatedness among their business units are reviewed and analyzed.  
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2.4.1 Related Diversification 
Firms that have diversified into multiple businesses are considered to be pursuing a 
related diversification strategy when any one of their business units accounts for less than 70% 
of all the revenues and when linkages between business units in terms of production, technology, 
or distribution exist (Rumelt, 1974). Related diversification has often been considered a 
corporate strategy that enables firms to better exploit a core set of capabilities in order to achieve 
higher performance through creating economies of scope (Teece, 1982; Palepu, 1985). Several 
researchers have considered this to be the primary advantage that firms gain through 
diversification (Rumelt, 1974; Salter and Weinhold, 1978). Firms that pursue a related 
diversification corporate strategy intend to benefit from the created economies of scope and 
subsequent revenue and cost advantages. Such economies of scope are often created through 
synergies that can be made through sharing knowledge across products and markets (sales 
synergy) or skills possessed by management across business units (management synergies) 
(Ansoff, 1965; Hoskisson, 1987), as well as optimizing the utilization of facilities and capacities 
(Hill, Hitt, and Hoskisson, 1992). A similarity between the operations and markets of business 
units allow for the skills and knowledge of managers at one business unit to be redeployed in 
resolving issues and enhancing performance in others (Salter and Weinhold, 1978).  
The ability to redeploy resources from one business unit to another depends on two 
dimensions of relatedness within a corporation: operational relatedness and corporate relatedness 
(Hitt, Ireland, and Hoskisson, 2004). Operational relatedness exists within a corporation when 
business units are able to share activities among themselves. When skills and knowledge are the 
resources shared across business units, then corporate relatedness exists. Corporations that 
pursue a related diversification strategy tend to build on the aforementioned two dimensions of 
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relatedness in their growth. Subsequently, this allows corporations with related diversification to 
better respond to the needs of their business units and to economize on the costs of developing 
skills and on the time required to effectively respond to those needs.  
Pursuing related diversification is often supported by capabilities that exist within a 
firm’s core businesses. Factors like excess capacity in tangible resources such as the sales force 
have been suggested to be strong drivers of related diversification (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990). 
However, not all resources support related diversification to the same degree. Resources with 
more flexibility in their redeployment can be better utilized and exploited when a firm pursues 
diversification. In particular, when a firm pursues a strategy of related diversification, tangible 
resources can more easily be shared than financial assets to support interrelationships between 
production, sales, marketing, technological, and procurement activities across businesses (Porter, 
1987).  
Support in pursuing related diversification is not limited only to tangible resources. It has 
also been suggested that intangible resources play an important role in inducing related 
diversification (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990). Rumelt’s (1974) research found intangible 
knowledge-based core competencies to be the most common basis for diversification in related 
constrained firms. Porter (1985: p. 351) summarized the distinctive essence between tangible and 
intangible resources as based on “whether an activity is shared in some way on an ongoing basis, 
and whether know-how is shared between essentially separate activities.” While intangible 
resources have been favoured by researchers as significant contributors to related diversification, 
their flexibility in being utilized has been the issue of some debate.  
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There is a consensus in the literature of corporate strategy that not all skills can be 
equally transferred across business units. Some skills and intangible resources are considered to 
be more mobile when it comes to redeployment. For instance, marketing and customer skills 
have been found to be more flexible to transfer, and to yield better results when a firm pursues 
some degree of diversification (Capon, Hulert, Farley, and Martin, 1988). However, as Markides 
and Williamson (1996) have suggested, the mobility of many resources and skills can be 
overestimated and many of them can end up being “trapped” in business units without being 
utilized elsewhere.  
When a firm pursues a diversification strategy where business units are highly related 
(related constrained), its main objective is to ensure that practices, skills, and resources that are 
core to its business units are shared appropriately and that their diffusion supports the firm’s 
network of internal interdependencies (Michel and Hambrick, 1992). Subsequently, the 
corporate-level management of the firm faces a situation of reciprocal interdependence 
(Thompson, 1967), where gathering essential information and resources and disseminating them 
becomes the main focus (Michel and Hambrick, 1992).  
However, the existence of relationships among the businesses of a related diversified firm 
will not necessarily result in the creation of synergies and economies of scope. In order for firms 
to achieve economies of scope when pursuing related diversification, it is necessary for business 
units to cooperate with each other (Hitt, Hill, and Hoskisson, 1992). The economic justification 
for related diversification is not realized completely unless firms coordinate shared operations 
and monitor the interrelationships of their otherwise independent business units to ensure the 
creation and persistence of economies of scope (Porter, 1985). Therefore, based on earlier 
findings (Sloan, 1963; Berg, 1973; Pitts, 1977), some researchers have suggested a degree of 
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centralization to be necessary in order for firms to achieve their expected benefits from related 
diversification (Child, 1984). Such centralization is often encouraged for activities that are 
common and shared across business units and which form the basis of interdependences within 
the firm (Mintzberg, 1983; Hitt, Hill, and Hoskisson, 1992). Moreover, to make sure that 
effective interrelationships between business units exist and are maintained, corporations employ 
strategic control mechanisms, which are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.  
 
2.4.2  Unrelated Diversification 
A firm is pursuing unrelated diversification when any one business unit accounts for less 
than 70% of a firm’s revenues and no linkages exist among business units (Rumelt, 1974). 
Business units of unrelated diversified firms feel the least interdependence and share practically 
none of their resources (Michel and Hambrick, 1992). Some researchers have suggested that the 
business units of unrelated diversified firms have a “pooled interdependence” (Thompson, 1967), 
where direct effects on one another are minimal (Michel and Hambrick, 1992). Therefore, the 
business units of firms pursuing unrelated diversification can be considered as independent from 
one another (Hoskisson, 1987).  
Firms that pursue unrelated diversification are often confined to financial capital and 
liquid assets as the main resource to persist in their growth. Unlike related diversified firms that 
can benefit from sharing their resources across their multiple connected businesses, a lack of 
commonality among resources means that unrelated diversified firms should primarily rely on 
more financial resources. Some researchers have suggested that short-term liquid assets and 
long-term debt capacity are the most common resources exploited by unrelated diversified firms 
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(Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1988). Similar propositions by other researchers have also 
emphasized the significance of financial assets and free cash flows in firms’ ability to pursue 
unrelated diversification (Penrose, 1959; Jensen, 1986).  
The advantages of pursuing unrelated diversification have been debated by several 
researchers. While compliance to imposed regulatory pressures was a main driver in the 1960s 
and 1970s for firms to diversify into unrelated product markets (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990), 
advantages such as capturing market power (Palepu, 1985) and/or reducing risk (Lubatkin and 
O’Neil, 1987) have been proposed as other supporting logics to pursue unrelated diversification. 
However, there has been a general consensus that, unlike firms that pursue related 
diversification, firms that have diversified into unrelated businesses do not seek to benefit from 
the economies of scope that are created as a result of interrelationships among business units 
(Hoskisson, 1987). Since each business unit of an unrelated diversified firm operates as a 
standalone business and does not share any linkages with other business units, the expectation of 
synergies is quite unrealistic. Consequently, financial markets in many cases have failed to 
recognize unrelated diversification as beneficial (Lubatkin and O’Neil, 1987), which has resulted 
in a lower allocation of capital to unrelated diversified firms (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990).  
However, unrelated diversified firms are often considered to benefit from other 
advantages that result from their multi-business approach. Some researchers have suggested 
“governance economies” to be the source of success in firms that pursue unrelated diversification 
(Williamson, 1975; Dundas and Richardson, 1982; Jones and Hill, 1988; Hitt, Hill, and 
Hoskisson, 1992). Economies of governance are often created as a result of unrelated diversified 
firms’ access to financial and other liquid assets, which enables them to allocate financial 
resources more efficiently across business units and to ensure that their performances meet those 
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of their competition in their relevant product markets. Therefore, the more successful unrelated 
diversified firms are those that focus their attention on creating and operating internal capital 
markets and the efficient allocation of capital to their business units (Hoskisson, 1987).  
In unrelated diversified firms, the mutual independence of business units from one 
another and the lack of cooperative linkages among them indicate that an approach to controlling 
business units that is different than that for related diversified firms is required at the corporate 
level. Much of the focus on successful unrelated diversified firms has been placed on 
establishing internal “market-like resource allocation mechanisms,” which are often 
accompanied by financial controls in the evaluation of business units’ performances (Hoskisson, 
1987).  Unrelated diversified firms, similar to holding companies, have been found to give 
considerable autonomy to their business units, avoid “horizontal strategies” (Porter, 1985) that 
seek coordination between business units, and refrain from direct intervention (Michel and 
Hambrick, 1992). Instead, they mostly focus their attention on the allocation of financial 
resources among their business units in more efficient ways than traditional holding companies 
typically do (Dundas and Richardson, 1982). Conversely, emphasizing the integration of 
operations at the business unit level and limiting the autonomy of business units has been found 
to result in poor performance and inefficiency of the internal capital market in unrelated 
diversified firms (Lorsch and Allen, 1973).  
 
2.5 Diversification and Performance 
Most scholarly work on diversification has been focused on its link with firm 
performance, both at the corporate and business unit levels. This focus has been in line with the 
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predominant interest in the literature of strategic management, which focuses on the performance 
consequences of firms’ strategic decisions and actions. Much of the past literature has used 
various theoretical lenses to investigate and find empirical support for the linkage between 
industry influences, idiosyncratic business factors, top management cognitive abilities, and 
corporate effects on the performance of single business units and corporations (Bowman and 
Helfat, 2001).  
While support for some of these theoretical perspectives has been strong, others have met 
more conflicting results. The link between corporate strategy and performance has been one such 
area and there is yet to be substantive support for corporate strategy’s effect on the performance 
of the firm at the corporate level. This has resulted in a general confusion regarding the nature of 
the diversification–performance relationship (Reed and Luffman, 1986). Subsequently, some 
have pointed to the uselessness of research in this area, considering it a waste of time (Bowman 
and Helfat, 2001). However, most past literature suggests moderate diversification (i.e., related) 
to be more optimal than unrelated diversification (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990).  
A stream of research that has studied the link between diversification and performance 
has built on the structure–conduct–performance paradigm of the industrial organization 
literature, which assumes industry effects and market factors to be primarily responsible for 
business unit performance (Schmalansee, 1985). The theoretical perspective that favours 
industrial organization economics posits that diversification can positively influence corporate or 
business unit performance through increasing market power (Markham, 1973). Based on this 
theoretical perspective, some theorists have proposed cross-subsidization, raising barriers to 
entry, predatory pricing, and reciprocity in buying and selling as competitive practices that can 
be exercised as the result of market power gained subsequent to pursuing diversification (Palepu, 
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1985). Furthermore, it has been argued that more diversified firms are better able to conceal the 
profitability of their business units from competitors as the result of “information loss” that 
occurs during consolidated reporting, increasing chances of extracting supernormal profits 
(Palepu, 1985). However, most of the literature that is rooted in the industrial organization 
economics perspective assumes the homogeneity of firms and factor markets as well as relative 
market perfection, resulting in very similar substitute products. The limited role of resource 
heterogeneity in this Industrial Organization (I/O) perspective leaves little rational incentive for 
firms to diversify into other product markets, as their performance is very unlikely to be 
positively affected (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990). 
Contrary to the industrial organization perspective, there is a theoretical approach that 
assumes heterogeneity to drive firms to pursue diversification. Based on this theoretical 
perspective, firms can achieve supernormal profitability when they build on their core 
competencies to grow or acquire external resources through the acquisition of other businesses 
(Barney, 1986; Peteraf, 1993). Proponents of this theoretical perspective posit that firms are able 
to achieve higher levels of performance through exploiting synergies that are created as a result 
of economies of scope. Therefore, most literature from this perspective assumes that firms 
pursue diversification to maximize firm value (Salter and Weinhold, 1978) through organic 
growth or acquiring firms with some degree of relatedness to reap synergistic efficiencies 
(Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990) that can result in market power over competitors (Bradley, Desai, and 
Kim, 1983; Eckbo, 1985).  
The theoretical work on the link between diversification and performance at the corporate 
and business unit levels has been followed by much empirical research (e.g., Amit and Livnat, 
1988; Bettis and Hall, 1981; Christensen and Montgomery, 1981; Montgomery, 1985; Rumelt, 
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1974, 1982, 1991; Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988; Hill, Hitt, and Hoskisson, 1992; McGahan 
and Porter, 1997, 1999; Bowman and Helfat, 2001). The conflicting results in past research have 
led to an unresolved debate on whether corporate strategy does in fact matter in determining 
corporate and business unit performance (Ramanujam and Varadarajan, 1989). Based on the 
literature of industrial organization, early studies by Gort (1962), Arnould (1969), and Markham 
(1973) have found no significant support for the cross-sectional relationship between total 
diversification and corporate performance. The non-significant cross-sectional analysis was also 
supported by a later study conducted by Palepu (1985). Subsequent findings by Rumelt (1991) 
and later by McGahan and Porter (1997, 1999) suggested business-unit-level factors to be the 
strongest predictor of business unit performance, followed by influences from industry. Such 
findings have led many other researchers to postulate corporate effects, including corporate 
strategy, to be very insignificant to non-existent (Carroll, 1993; Ghemawat and Ricart Costa, 
1993; Hoskisson, Hill, and Kim, 1993; Ghemawat, 1994). The literature in finance has also 
found personal portfolio diversification to be more related to value creation than diversification 
pursued by firms at the corporate level (Reid, 1968; Watson and Mansinghka, 1971; Watson, 
Smith, and Sherives, 1972; Melicher and Rush, 1973; Smith and Watson, 1977).    
Conversely, many empirical studies have found diversification and other corporate 
effects to significantly influence business unit performance. One of the earliest and most cited 
studies (Rumelt, 1974) found significant performance differences across seven of the nine 
diversification strategy categories that were identified. Later research also found subsequent 
performance for firms with different levels of diversification to be more or less different (Bettis 
and Hall, 1981; Stubbart, 1983; Montgomery and Singh, 1984; Palepu, 1985; Hoskisson, 1987; 
Lubatkin and Rogers, 1987; Lubatkin and O’Neil, 1987; Varadarajan and Ramanujam, 1987; 
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Barton, 1988; Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988), lending further support to Rumelt’s (1974, 
1982) findings. Later, Bowman and Helfat (2001) found significant support for the influence of 
corporate effects on firms’ subsequent performance. However, they came short of unpacking 
corporate effects to truly test for the significance of corporate strategy on business unit 
performance.  
 
2.6 Corporate Strategy and Performance 
While there is a large body of literature that argues for and against the role of corporate 
effects on business unit and corporate-level performance, the corporate strategy pursued has also 
been discussed as an influencing factor on business unit performance. In some cases, related 
diversified firms have been suggested to perform better than unrelated diversified firms (Rumelt, 
1974, 1982; Christensen and Montgomery, 1981; Palepu, 1985). Rumelt (1974) conducted a 
study on differences in performance across firms pursuing constrained diversification strategies 
(dominant constrained and related constrained) and those pursuing less constrained 
diversification strategies (e.g., related linked, single business, unrelated businesses). His findings 
showed that firms pursuing more constrained diversification strategies outperformed firms 
pursuing the other types — findings that were also confirmed in subsequent studies by other 
researchers (e.g., Bettis and Hall, 1981; Hoskisson, 1987; Lubatkin and O’Neil, 1987; 
Montgomery and Singh, 1984; Palepu, 1985; Stubbart, 1983; Varadarajan and Ramanujam, 
1987; Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988). These results have also been found to hold for firms’ 
profit performance and their risk and return in the market (Barton, 1988; Lubatkin and O’Neil, 
1987; Lubatkin and Rogers, 1987; Montgomery and Singh, 1984).  
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The superiority in performance of related diversified firms has been found not to be 
limited to cross-sectional points in time, but also to be present over extended time periods. For 
example, Palepu (1985) found that corporations following related diversification achieved 
significantly higher performance over extended periods of time than unrelated diversified 
corporations. However, to achieve this higher level of performance, diversification most likely 
needs to be achieved through means of organic growth. Diversification through acquisition can 
create value for the acquiring firm only if the target and acquiring firms share common “private 
and uniquely” or “inimitable” value cash flows (Barney, 1988; Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990). It is 
commonly assumed by strategy researchers that acquisitions take place by firms in order to 
maximize their own value (Salter and Weinhold, 1978) through creating synergies that arise as a 
result of efficiencies achieved through combining their own resources and those of the acquired 
firms (Hoskisson and Hitt, 190). Synergies that result from efficiencies provide firms with the 
ability to exert market power over their direct and indirect competitors (Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 
1983; Eckbo, 1985; Hoskisson and Hitt, 1900). Hence, this position assumes an acquisition to 
yield above-average performance when it results in some form of relatedness.  
Firms that diversify through the acquisition of other firms, even when the acquired firm is 
operating in a related field, often fail to benefit from the same levels of higher performance as 
firms who have diversified as the result of organic growth (Singh and Montgomery, 1987). This 
position has been disputed by some researchers who have noted difficulties associated with 
transferring and combining resources and capabilities within different parts of the firm, citing 
them as “trapped” within firm structure (Markides and Williamson, 1996).  
Despite the existence of a relatively large body of literature that emphasizes the 
superiority of related diversification over unrelated diversification in regards to performance, 
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there are studies that have disagreed with this conclusion. For instance, studies conducted by 
Michel and Shaked (1984), Johnson and Thomas (1987), and Lubatkin (1987) have not found a 
significant difference in performance for firms that pursue related or unrelated diversification. As 
a result, a consensus on this issue is yet to be achieved on the basis of existing empirical 
evidence.  
Later research has shown significant progress in regards to making the distinction 
between related and unrelated diversification, and also in distinguishing between the levels of 
diversification that are pursued by firms. However, Rumelt’s (1974, 1982) studies, although 
making the distinction between different types of diversification, used cross-sectional data and 
often employed dichotomous measures and failed to recognize differences in the levels of 
diversification pursued by firms. Likewise, Palepu’s (1985) study, while accounting for the level 
of diversification and extending the timeframe to account for growth in performance, overlooked 
corporations’ internal structure or controls. This shortcoming is also evident in the works of 
those who have argued against (McGahan and Porter, 1997, 1998) or for (Helfat and Bowman, 
2003) the significance of corporate effects on performance. This has resulted in the role of 
“controls” being understudied in empirical research that has focused on the relationship between 
corporate strategy and performance at the corporate and business unit level.  
 
2.7 Summary 
Corporate strategy focuses on the orientation that firms can take in pursuing 
diversification into other product markets as well as the manner in which such orientation 
influences their value-creation mechanism. Despite a variety of categorical approaches that have 
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been proposed in the past to determine the types of corporate strategy, the dominant approach 
has been to understand diversification strategies as related and unrelated diversification. While 
both these approaches are similar in that they require firms’ presence in multiple product 
markets, they differ significantly on the logic of how they create value. Where related 
diversification relies largely on the creation and extraction of synergistic value that results from 
the interrelationships of business units, unrelated diversification follows the dominant logic that 
exists at undiversified businesses, where each business unit is responsible for its own 
performance and the aggregate performance of the business is not synergistic in nature.  
Past research has made attempts to understand how influences from the corporate level 
affect the performance of business units. Such research has studied the relationships between 
diversification, corporate effects, and corporate strategy with the performances of business units 
and the corporation. However, such research mainly falls short of establishing the quality of the 
relationship between corporate strategy and business unit performance and, more specifically, 
the mechanism through which corporate strategy influences business unit strategy. Moreover, 
corporate effects need to be deconstructed so that the aforementioned relationship can be truly 
understood.  
In this chapter, the theoretical foundations for corporate strategy, as a construct of interest 
in the theoretical model that is proposed, have been established. To achieve this objective, a 
review of the literature in the area of diversification and corporate strategy has been conducted 
and the contrasts between findings and propositions have been identified. In the following 
chapters, the relationship between corporate strategy and other constructs that are included in the 
model are discussed and corresponding hypotheses are proposed.  
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CHAPTER 3: CONTROLS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Although the effect of corporate strategy on business unit and corporate performance and 
vice versa has been of interest to many strategic management researchers, the effect that 
strategies at the corporate level might have on the strategic orientation of business units and their 
subsequent success or failure in the execution of those strategies has not been investigated in 
depth. A main objective of this dissertation is to understand whether business unit strategy is 
influenced and constrained by corporate strategy and to provide empirical evidence to support 
the hypotheses that point to the existence of such an effect. Therefore, the role of controls as 
perhaps the most important mechanism that connects a business unit to its corporate parent is of 
particular interest.  
With separation of ownership and management in the modern organization (Smith, 
1776), several theoretical perspectives have emerged that have focused on the relationship 
between principals and agents. According to agency theory, the principal–agent relationship is 
formed when one party acts on behalf of the other (Shapiro, 2004). Therefore, agency theory has 
a special interest in understanding the causes and consequences of the incongruence in goals that 
arises between the goals of agents and those of principal owners (Barney and Hesterly, 1996). 
Agency theory assumes that individuals are self-interested, risk-averse, bounded by rationality, 
and exploitative of existing information asymmetries to their advantage, at the expense of 
principal owners, in order to maximize their own — the managers’ — utility (Eisenhardt, 1988, 
1989; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Williamson, 1988). Therefore, to ensure that decisions made and 
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actions taken by executives (agents) do not diverge from those that yield the highest performance 
and prioritize the interests of principal owners, monitoring mechanisms should be put in place to 
monitor both the behaviour of executives and the outcomes of their actions at the business unit 
level (Eisenhardt, 1988, 1989). A logical consequence of agency theory is the design and 
implementation of control mechanisms to ensure alignment in the interests of principals and 
agents (Carpenter and Sanders, 2002) and to transfer potential negative consequences of agency 
problems from owners to decision makers (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In 
corporations, agents (i.e., CEOs of wholly owned business units) whose performances and 
behaviours are or are not perceived to be in the best interests of the corporation will be 
compensated or punished by existing control mechanisms. Such mechanisms may target 
financial benefits or continuation of tenure (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Differences in corporate strategy pursued by firms have resulted in different sources for 
the creation of value at the corporate level. For example, firms that pursue a corporate strategy of 
related diversification have been suggested to extract their value mostly from economies of 
scope, whereas the governance of economies has been proposed as the main source for value 
creation within unrelated diversified corporations (Hill, Hitt, and Hoskisson, 1992). The 
distinctions inherent in each type of corporate strategy require controls that can properly 
distinguish between sources of value creation and can ensure that the interests of the principals 
are met.  
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3.2 Types of Corporate Controls 
Controls are mechanisms that are put in place by the corporate headquarters in order to 
evaluate the performance of business units and ensure that the decisions made and actions taken 
by business unit senior executives are aligned with the best interests of the corporation. 
Corporate headquarters might use financial controls, strategic controls, or a hybrid of strategic 
and financial controls for this purpose. However, while different types of controls are generally 
employed for the same objective, they employ distinctive processes and have implications that 
could be quite different.  
 
3.2.1 Financial Controls 
Financial controls are considered to be those that rely primarily on financial and 
accounting evaluations of firm performance, regardless of the processes through which such 
performance has been achieved. Such performance, which is generally reported through annual 
and quarterly reports, consists of such indicators as return on assets (ROA), return on 
investments (ROI), and earnings per share (EPS) (for holding companies). The generic nature of 
such controls makes them applicable to a wide array of businesses and they can be employed 
with or without limited knowledge or expertise regarding the business when they are the sole 
method of performance evaluation.   
Since financial controls rely heavily on accounting information, any internal actions, 
decisions, or external factors that could affect the bottom line negatively at a given time could 
result in firm performance being perceived as inferior when financial controls are the only source 
of performance evaluation. Moreover, since financial controls rest on indicators that are updated 
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and presented annually or at the end of each quarter, comparisons are made on an annual or 
quarterly basis. Executives of businesses that are controlled on the basis of financials are more 
constrained in making decisions that have expected results beyond financial milestones. When 
corporations rely only on financial controls and do not take into consideration the strategic and 
long-term implications of decisions made at the business unit level, the justification of decisions 
with negative impacts on financial and accounting indicators becomes irrelevant, and business 
unit senior executives receive better assessments when their decisions are associated with the 
least negative short-term financial performance. Consequently, the tendency of such business 
unit managers is to avoid actions or decisions with prospects that diverge from any of the 
financial and accounting milestones.  
Financial controls are usually employed as the sole control mechanism when the 
corporate headquarters is incapable of putting in place strategic controls due to a lack of 
resources or expertise, or when environmental conditions and industry characteristics represent 
high levels of stability, where minimal strategic decisions at the business unit level are required. 
The generic nature of financial controls and the similarity of assessment of financial and 
accounting indicators across different types of businesses provide the corporate headquarters 
with the ability to evaluate each business unit within the context of its industry, with limited 
knowledge about the nature of the business and without requiring it to monitor actions or 
decisions that have led to such performance.  
The generic nature of financial controls and the transferability of the knowledge required 
to implement such controls across different businesses implies that a lower level of information 
processing capacity at the corporate headquarters will be required. Executives at the corporate 
headquarters will be able to readily employ and redeploy the same controlling capabilities to 
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make assessments of business-level performance, which will allow for more unused information 
processing capacity to be allocated elsewhere. Also, the absence of relevant knowledge or 
expertise will not be considered a problem when financial controls are the only method of 
monitoring business unit performance.  
While financial controls seem to allow more flexibility for the business unit executives to 
make strategic decisions and take actions in accordance with what they perceive to be best for 
the success of their business unit, they are also associated with implicit constraints to make 
decisions that satisfy the financial expectations of the corporate headquarters from one quarter to 
another. Under such controls, it would be difficult to justify decisions of investments that are 
expected to yield results only in the long run. Therefore, the initial perception of latitude under 
financial controls would diminish under the pressures and expectations of the corporate 
headquarters.  
 
3.2.2 Strategic Controls 
Strategic controls are those that focus on the quality of the decisions made and the long-
term strategic implications of any actions taken (Rowe and Wright, 1997). Strategic controls are 
qualitative, subjective, and evaluative. They also focus on the effect that decisions and actions at 
the business unit level have on other business units and the fit of strategic decisions of each 
business unit with the strategies of the corporation as a whole. The relationships between 
business units and the quality and nature of those relationships are other dimensions of business 
unit performance that are included in the strategic evaluation of performance for each business 
unit.  
45 
 
When implementing strategic controls, corporations often hesitate to completely neglect 
the financial performance of business units. In most instances, strategic and financial controls are 
often implemented simultaneously, which enables the corporate headquarters to take the strategic 
implications of business unit performance in its evaluations into consideration. However, when 
both strategic controls and financial controls are implemented, the emphasis should be on 
strategic controls, since strategic actions may not necessarily have short-term positive influence 
on the financial performance of a business unit.  
However, implementing strategic controls, unlike financial controls, requires the 
corporate headquarters to possess considerable knowledge and expertise in the field in which the 
business unit is operating (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1994). Such expertise is required for conducting 
in-depth analysis of the actions and strategic decisions made by executives at the business unit 
level and to understand the implications that such actions and decisions might carry. Unless such 
expertise exists, the qualitative monitoring of processes and the actions of businesses are unlikely 
to yield valuable results, and therefore strategic controls will not be put in place properly and the 
corporate headquarters will be forced to rely on the immediate financial implications of business 
unit actions.  
When corporations diversify, an important intent of implementing strategic controls is to 
monitor the interrelationships of different business units and to ensure that the economies of 
scope that are expected from synergies between business units are realized. However, such 
interrelationships can often affect business units’ short-term financial performance. Putting in 
place strategic controls enables corporations to integrate the strategic implications of business 
unit actions into their performance evaluation and ensure business unit executives that the 
potential lower subsequent financial performance may be justifiable by their strategic actions. 
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 Therefore, executives at the business unit level will be more likely to have latitude in 
pursuing strategies that ensure higher long-term business performance and will be less pressured 
to make decisions solely on their short-term performance outcomes. However, their latitude in 
strategic decision making will also be limited by strategic decisions that are made at the 
corporate level, and they might be forced to make decisions that would contribute more to the 
performance of other business units of the corporation and, as a result, the corporation as a 
whole.  
Similar to other types of diagnostic control systems, strategic controls are developed and 
implemented to allow for effective resource allocation, define goals, provide motivation,  
establish guidelines for correct action, allow for ex-post evaluation, and free scarce management 
attention (Simons, 1994). Financial controls employ objective measures and assessments of 
performance, while strategic controls rely on more qualitative and subjective evaluations. The 
distinctive embodiment of strategic controls in organizations can often involve frequent meetings 
between the business unit manager and the corporate staff in order to further facilitate the 
corporate headquarters’ understanding of the decisions that are made at the business unit level. 
As such, business units that are more subject to strategic controls can be expected to become 
subject to evaluation methods that encourage interrelationships between them and other business 
units of their corporate parent and to exercise greater autonomy in their actions (Vancil, 1979; 
White, 1986). Consequently, a positive attitude towards taking risky actions such as R&D 
spending can also be expected to characterize strategically controlled business units. 
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3.3 Controls and Diversification Strategy 
As mentioned previously, corporations employ different types of controls in order to 
ensure that their business units perform in accordance with the best interests of the corporation 
and its shareholders. Corporations that pursue different strategies create value through 
mechanisms that are different. Economies of scope, which are fundamental to achieving superior 
performance in related diversified corporations, become non-existent when firms pursue 
unrelated diversification. Therefore, differences also exist in the control mechanisms that are put 
in place in corporations pursuing different corporate-level strategies. 
As mentioned earlier, corporations that pursue related diversification seek to benefit from 
synergies that evolve as a result of shared practices or inputs that exist between business units, 
which in turn results in economies of scope and market power over competitors (Bradley, Desai, 
and Kim, 1983; Eckbo, 1985). The realization of performance that is expected to be associated 
with related diversification requires corporate headquarters to exercise controls over business 
units to ensure that coordination among them is retained and that their interdependencies on 
common functions remain intact (Mintzberg, 1983). Therefore, the performance of business units 
in such corporations needs to be evaluated based not only on their individual profitability, but 
also on their alignment with other business units of the corporation and their contribution to the 
overall corporate performance. As a result, the evaluation of performance of such business units, 
in most cases, is not solely based on objective financial evaluation measures, but also on 
subjective methods that allow for business units’ performances to be more fairly evaluated (Kerr, 
1985).  
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Hence, to realize benefits from related diversification, besides simple financial controls, 
the corporate headquarters of corporations also rely on more complex controls that consider 
more thoroughly the strategic implications of actions of the business units, thus minimizing 
value-destroying internal competition among business units and emphasizing corporate 
synergistic value creation in performance assessments. Since in related diversified corporations 
performance is enhanced through synergies created from the relationships of several business 
units, the strategic control and monitoring of the firm not only encompasses strategic decisions 
and actions taken in each individual business unit, but also relationships between business units, 
to ensure that necessary conditions for creating and maintaining synergies are met.  
 Furthermore, it has been suggested that the corporate headquarters of related diversified 
corporations primarily rely more on strategic controls instead of only financial controls 
(Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1989). However, employing strategic controls will not be beneficial 
for corporations unless they result in superior financial performance. Therefore, in related 
diversified corporations, strategic controls need to be accompanied with appropriate financial 
controls to ensure that strategic performance will eventually yield desirable financial results.  
While strategic controls require in-depth monitoring of decisions and actions taken by 
each business unit, the relatedness of activities or resources of business units of related 
diversified corporations means that the corporate headquarters possesses a higher competency in 
redeploying existing knowledge or expertise that relates one business to another business unit for 
control purposes. As a result, the depth of knowledge in one area can be redeployed and utilized 
for monitoring another area of activity. 
49 
 
Employing strategic controls requires a more in-depth understanding and monitoring of 
decisions within each business unit in order to act as a mechanism to prevent intra-corporation 
competition between various business units.  
Unlike firms that pursue related diversification, unrelated diversified firms do not seek to 
benefit from economies of scope. The non-existence of operational synergies between business 
units (Palepu, 1985) means that such firms are unable to transfer their expertise and knowledge 
from one business unit to another and, therefore, each business unit is responsible for its own 
performance. Consequently, to monitor each of the business units thoroughly, a separate set of 
skills and know-how is required. Moreover, because each business unit in an unrelated 
diversified corporation does not share resources or activities with other business units of the 
corporation, unlike in the case of related diversified corporations, its performance is not expected 
to have a direct or indirect positive or negative effect on any other business unit of the 
corporation. As a result, its contribution to the overall performance of the corporation will be its 
own individual performance. Therefore, the strategic monitoring of business units in such 
corporations is based solely on strategic actions and decisions that yield optimal performance for 
the same business unit. Hence, most unrelated diversified firms follow control structures similar 
to what has been proposed in Williamson’s (1975) M-form, where divisional performance 
receives the main emphasis (Hoskisson, 1987). This approach has resulted in firms pursuing 
unrelated diversification to employ stock-market-like resource-allocation mechanisms, such as 
transfer pricing, and to primarily rely on simple financial controls and divisional incentives in 
order to ensure and maintain the performance of each business unit (Hoskisson, 1987).  
The methods for control in unrelated diversified firms mostly rely on highly quantitative 
systems and rarely scrutinize actions and decisions qualitatively (Dundas and Richardson, 1982; 
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Michel and Hambrick, 1992). Past research has found that successful cases of implementation of 
financial controls have often been accompanied by considerable autonomy in managing 
operations at each divisional unit (Dundas and Richardson, 1982).  
With an increase in the diversity of business that an unrelated diversified firm is engaged 
in, the expertise and capability of corporate headquarters to exercise monitoring requirements 
that are sufficient for strategic control is stretched. In an unrelated diversified corporation, when 
the range of activities pursued by different business units exceeds the range of expertise 
possessed by the corporate CEO and corporate staff, its ability to process information regarding 
the strategic actions of each business unit and to make appropriate decisions is stretched beyond 
the capacity of the corporate headquarters to process information. Consequently, the benefits of 
establishing and exercising strategic controls suffer tremendously.  
Since the CEO of the corporation serves as the ultimate decision maker, their lack of 
necessary know-how or expertise to effectively oversee strategic controls leads them to depend 
on controlling and monitoring mechanisms that rely on such requirements to a lesser degree. As 
a result, the performance of business units is more likely to be assessed based on their quarterly 
and/or annual financial and accounting performance reports. Furthermore, increasing the number 
of unrelated business units that need to be controlled suggests that the corporate CEO needs to 
spend more of his or her available information processing capacity to remain effective. Under 
such circumstances, the tendency is to employ financial and accounting controls instead of 
strategic controls (Hill and Hoskisson, 1987). As a result, the performance of such business units 
is more likely to be assessed based on their quarterly and/or annual financial and accounting 
performance reports. Hence: 
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Hypothesis 1: Corporations that pursue related diversification are likely to put a 
stronger emphasis on strategic controls versus financial controls as their primary 
mechanism of controlling their business units. Conversely, corporations that 
pursue unrelated diversification are likely to put a stronger emphasis on financial 
controls versus strategic controls as their primary mechanism of controlling their 
business units.   
 
3.4 Corporate Headquarters 
Diversification has been suggested to have major impacts on a firm’s performance, 
investment in R&D, commitment of business-level management to innovation, risk taking of 
business unit executives, and interrelationships between business units (Hoskisson, 1987; 
Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1989; Hitt, Hoskisson, and Ireland, 1991; Hill, Hitt, and Hoskisson, 
1992). To realize the benefits that are associated with such impacts, corporations need to put in 
place controls that are designed at the headquarters of the corporation (Rowe and Wright, 1997). 
With the emergence of diversified firms that have adopted the M-form structure, a main 
advantage has been the ability of the diversified firm to centralize financial and decision control 
mechanisms within a corporate headquarters (Williamson, 1975).  
The role of the corporate headquarters — i.e., the corporate CEO and corporate staff — is 
mainly to oversee the operations of business units and ensure that their performance yields 
results that are aligned with the best interests of the corporation, thus providing grounds for the 
highest overall corporate-level performance to be achieved. Therefore, corporate headquarters 
are mainly focused on designing and implementing control mechanisms that ensure that 
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corporate objectives are realized. However, while the ability of the corporate headquarters to 
implement controls is influenced by the corporation’s strategic orientation (i.e., related 
diversification versus unrelated diversification), this relationship is also moderated by other 
factors that are rooted in the capacity of the corporate headquarters to process information.  
  
3.4.1 Information Processing Capacity 
The ability of the corporate headquarters to appropriately exercise its responsibility in 
monitoring and controlling the decisions and actions taken by business units rests on the ability 
of the corporate staff to process the information that relates to each business unit (Hill and 
Hoskisson, 1987). The limitations arising from the bounded rationality of individuals that work 
in the corporate office (Simon, 1957), in turn, result in the information processing capability of 
the corporate headquarters being limited (March and Simon, 1958). Subsequently, there is a limit 
to the amount of information that can be successfully monitored at the corporate level. There are, 
however, several factors that can influence the ability of those within a corporate office to be 
effective at processing information. Such factors include the size of the corporate office, the 
related expertise of the corporate CEO, and the number of businesses that are owned by the 
corporation.  
 
3.4.2 Size of Corporate Headquarters 
The responsibility of monitoring performance at the business unit level and controlling 
actions and decisions made by business unit executives is held within the domain of the 
corporate headquarters (Rowe and Wright, 1997). The ability of the corporate headquarters to 
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properly monitor the performance of business units is tied to the aggregate ability of individuals 
at the corporate headquarters to receive, process, and analyze information coming from each 
business unit. Any limitation in this regard means that the corporation will be less capable of 
making in-depth assessments of actions taken or decisions made by senior managers at business 
units (March and Simon, 1958).  
When the corporation headquarters’ staff have limitations in evaluating the quality of 
strategic decisions at the business unit level, it is more inclined to put in place controls that have 
lower requirements for monitoring activity. The ability of the corporate headquarters to handle 
the strategic control of business units is tied to the aggregate capability of individuals and the 
synergies they create through their internal interactions. Therefore, corporate headquarters that 
are smaller in size will likely be capable of processing less information, if all other things are 
equal.  
As mentioned previously, the ability of the corporate headquarters to process information 
related to each business unit plays an important role in its ability to implement controls on the 
business unit. When this ability is limited, the corporate headquarters will have to rely on types 
of controls that are more conformable to its resources. For corporations that pursue unrelated 
diversification, their capacity to process information about each of their business units will be 
further engaged with the addition of each new business unit. Unless a corporate headquarters 
takes actions to create additional capacity for monitoring business units, it will be limited to 
implementing financial controls as the corporation increases in diversity.  
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Figure 3.1: Based on Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) 
 
Related diversified corporations encounter similar obstacles in implementing their 
preferred strategic controls as the number of their business units increases. However, existing 
interrelationships between business units in related diversified corporations mean that the 
capacity of corporate headquarters to process information will diminish at an exponential rate 
compared to that of unrelated diversified corporations (see Figure 3.1). To process the 
information relevant to their business units, corporate headquarters rely on the capabilities and 
performance of their (corporate headquarters’) staff, which may or may not be organized into 
specialized units. While organizational differences in corporate headquarters may influence the 
capacity to process information, the number of staff, regardless of task specialization, still plays 
an important role in defining the extent to which a corporate headquarters can competently and 
effectively process information. Therefore, under conditions resulting from related 
diversification where more information must be processed, corporations with more staff in their 
headquarters will be in a position of advantage in terms of available information processing 
capacity; a larger number of staff in headquarters allows them to better emphasize strategic 
controls. Hence: 
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Hypothesis 2: The size of the corporate office (i.e., the number of corporate 
staff) moderates the relationship between corporate strategy and corporate 
controls; under the condition of a larger corporate office, there will be a 
stronger effect between a corporate strategy of related diversification and the 
emphasis on strategic controls, while under the condition of smaller corporate 
offices there will be a weaker effect.  
 
3.4.3 Relevant Expertise of the Corporate CEO 
As previously mentioned, the corporate CEO’s ability to process and analyze information 
related to the corporation’s business units is an important determinant of their ability to 
implement strategic controls, since the ultimate decision-making authority lies with the corporate 
CEO. Therefore, under different conditions of the expertise and related knowledge of the 
corporate CEO, the impact of corporate-level strategy on corporate-level controls will be 
different.  
When a corporate CEO possesses prior expertise, knowledge, or experience in areas 
identical or similar to those of certain business units, they have a higher capability than those 
CEOs without such a background to understand and evaluate information regarding decisions 
made or actions taken by senior executives at the business unit level. This will put such a CEO in 
a better position to make qualitative assessments of business-level performance and make 
appropriate decisions, and will in turn increase the ability to implement and exercise strategic 
control. In contrast, a corporate CEO without any relevant background on their corporation’s 
business units will find it more difficult to properly evaluate the quality of decisions made by 
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business unit managers and their impact on the business units’ and corporation’s competitiveness 
and long-term performance. Therefore, they will tend to rely on types of controls that are less 
demanding in terms of strategic expertise and are more financial in nature.  
As argued before, the expertise that the corporate CEO possesses and the quality of 
vigilance that they can provide moderate the ability of the corporation to emphasize strategic 
controls when related diversification is pursued as the corporate-level strategy. In other words, 
the more qualified the CEO is, the more likely the pursuit of related diversification will lead to a 
stronger emphasis on implementing and exercising strategic controls. Likewise, even when a 
corporation is pursuing related diversification, the lack of or deficiency of relevant expertise by 
the corporate CEO will attenuate the corporation’s emphasis on strategic controls. Consequently, 
pursuing related diversification will be less effective in increasing the emphasis and maintenance 
of exercising strategic controls by corporate headquarters and there will be less emphasis on 
strategic controls and more reliance on financial controls. Therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The corporate CEO’s relevance of past experience relative to a 
business unit moderates the relationship between corporate strategy and 
corporate controls; in the presence of a corporate CEO who possesses relevant 
expertise related to a business unit, there will be a stronger relationship between 
related diversification and emphasis on strategic control.  
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3.4.4 Number of Business Units and Headquarters’ Effectiveness 
The number of business units owned by a corporation also moderates the effect of 
corporate strategy on the monitoring and control mechanism emphasized for the business units. 
Past research has suggested that the information processing capability of corporations is a 
constant factor in the short term and that the effectiveness of a corporate headquarters to monitor 
and control each business unit will decrease as the number of business units increases. Therefore, 
it has been suggested that corporations with a larger number of business units tend to rely on less 
demanding financial controls (Rowe and Wright, 1997).  
Corporate headquarters are not unlimited in their capacity to process information. With 
the increase in the number of business units in corporations, whether they are related or 
unrelated, corporations experience a shortage of information processing capacity unless they take 
steps to address this issue. Therefore, when pursuing related diversification, the ability of 
corporations to emphasize strategic control will be affected when they grow the number of their 
business units. With a larger number of business units, corporations will fail to effectively 
exercise strategic controls unless they take appropriate steps to increase the information 
processing capacity of their corporate headquarters. Therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The number of business units owned by a corporation moderates 
the relationship between corporate strategy and corporate controls; the positive 
relationship between related diversification and emphasizing strategic controls 
will be weaker when the number of business units is greater.  
 
58 
 
3.5 Summary 
Controls are important mechanisms that enable corporations to ensure that their economic 
justifications for existence are being realized through alignment between action at the business 
unit level and corporate objectives. Therefore, understanding the relationship between corporate 
strategy and controls is very important for understanding the effect that corporate strategy has on 
the performance of business units. Corporate controls have often been considered to fall into one 
of two categories: the more qualitative strategic controls, and the more objective and quantitative 
financial controls (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1987). 
Corporations that pursue related diversification are those that expect to benefit from the 
economic value that is created as a result of synergies that exist between their various business 
units. In order for such objectives to be realized, the role of the corporate headquarters is to 
ensure that the interrelationships between business units are maintained and that overall 
performance is achieved. Therefore, the assessment of the performance of business units in such 
corporations should be based not only on their standalone financial performance, but on the 
degree to which they fit into the overall strategy of the corporation.  
Consequently, this dissertation has hypothesized that related diversified corporations are 
more likely to rely on strategic controls in addition to financial controls. In contrast, since 
business units in unrelated diversified corporations are not expected to create synergies, the 
corporate headquarters will tend to rely on financial controls. Therefore, this dissertation has 
argued that in such corporations, financial controls are more likely to be the primary mechanism 
of control. 
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On the other hand, the ability of a corporate headquarters in implementing any control 
mechanisms relies on its ability to process information. Therefore, this dissertation has argued 
for the moderating roles of the size of the corporate headquarters, the related expertise of the 
CEO, and the number of business units owned by the corporation, on the relationship between 
corporation strategy and corporate controls. 
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CHAPTER 4: BUSINESS STRATEGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Understanding strategy at the level of business units has been the centre of much research 
in strategy literature. This interest has resulted in attempts by strategic management scholars to 
identify and propose different typological perspectives in order to better distinguish between 
strategies pursued by different businesses. Since the initial presentation of Miles and Snow’s 
(1978) prospector, defender, analyzer, and reactor strategy categories, several other strategy 
typologies have been presented, the most widely accepted and cited of them being Porter’s 
(1980) generic strategies of cost leadership, product differentiation, and focus. Also, taking a 
more process-oriented approach, March (1991) and Levinthal and March (1993) proposed a new 
typology for the strategic approach of firms: exploration and exploitation. There have been 
several attempts made by researchers in the past to focus on similarities and distinctions that 
exist between these strategy typologies. Also, some researchers have conducted empirical 
research to find the relationship between these strategy typologies and firm performance (Uotila, 
Maula, Keil, and Zahra, 2009; Thornhill and White, 2007).  
Discounting some exceptions (Hill, 1988), there is a general consensus on the idea that 
“cost leadership” and “product differentiation” (Porter, 1980) are strategies at different ends of a 
continuum and that firms trying to pursue both simultaneously will end up in a stuck-in-the-
middle position where performance is lowest — a consensus that has been further supported by 
empirical findings on strategy purity (Thornhill and White, 2007). On the other hand, researchers 
focusing on exploration and exploitation have found the simultaneous pursuance of exploration 
and exploitation to be associated with higher performance (Uotila, Maula, Keil, and Zahra, 2009) 
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and that these two approaches could be considered to be orthogonal and not necessarily two ends 
of a continuum (Gupta, Smith, and Shalley, 2006).  
While there is an extensive body of research on business-level strategy, the connection 
between strategy at the corporate level and business unit level still remains unclear. Most past 
research has failed to either deconstruct business effects to distinguish business strategy, or to 
consider how business unit strategy is developed in the context of a corporation. Moreover, past 
research that has studied the influence of business unit strategy and corporate-level strategy on 
business unit performance has either simply identified business unit strategy as an exogenous 
(i.e., independent) variable, or has focused on corporate effects and business unit effects, without 
deconstructing either properly. Consequently, corporate effects have been understood to have a 
homogeneous influence across all business units. This has further clouded the understanding of 
the effect that corporate strategy might have on the strategy pursued by each individual business 
unit.  
This chapter aims to take a more in-depth look into strategies that are pursued at the 
business unit level. Furthermore, based on existing literature related to agency theory, this 
chapter will explore and establish the link between business unit strategy and corporate controls 
as its antecedent. In this chapter, while noting the differences between March’s (1991) notion of 
exploration and exploitation, and Porter’s (1980) generic strategies, their similarities will be 
emphasized as different strategic directions that business units can pursue. The proposed 
theoretical arguments in this chapter will posit business unit strategy not to be an independent 
factor, but one endogenous to controls that are put in place by the corporate headquarters.  
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4.2 Business-level Strategy 
Business-level strategy refers to the competitive actions pursued by business units in 
order to create differences in the competitive position of one business relative to its direct or 
indirect competitors (Porter, 1988). To achieve this objective, businesses have to make a series 
of decisions regarding their resource-allocation procedures in order to improve the competitive 
position of their business unit within their relative product market (Dundas and Richardson, 
1980). Such decisions mostly revolve around performing certain activities differently, or 
performing activities that are fundamentally different, relative to other competitors (Porter, 
1996). Making decisions and executing them requires a degree of deliberation on the part of 
business unit managers and a willingness to create unique value through executing well on 
primary and support activities throughout the value chain. In corporations with multiple business 
units, these decisions and actions are often made at the level of the business unit, and the main 
concern at the corporate headquarters is to ensure that the results are aligned with the best 
interests of the business unit and the corporation.  
The concept of business-level strategy is one that gained prominence during the 1960s 
through the works of Learned, Christensen, Andrews and Guth (1965) and Andrews (1965). 
Since then, the body of literature on the subject has grown tremendously, turning it arguably into 
one of the most attractive topics in management literature. This interest has resulted in many 
scholars pursuing classifications and categorizations of different strategies that can be pursued at 
the level of a business unit and linking them to the success or failure of firms. While some 
studies have found a strong connection between performance and strategy (e.g., Thornhill and 
White, 2007), it has been suggested that business-level strategy is not effective unless a fit 
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between the strategies, external environmental conditions, and internal resources and capabilities 
of the business unit exists (Hitt et al., 2006; White, 1986).   
Much past research has considered strategy as categorical, where each business unit’s 
strategy could be considered to fall into one of the typology categories (Thornhill and White, 
2007). In 1978, Miles and Snow suggested organization strategies to fall into the three main 
domains of administrative, entrepreneurial, and technical. Based on these three domains, Miles 
and Snow proposed four strategy typologies: a) prospector strategy, through which organizations 
add to or change the products and services they offer; b) defender strategy, which refers to 
maintaining a relatively stable subset of services; c) analyzer strategy, which represents 
maintaining a stable subset while making periodical switches to new areas; and d) reactor 
strategy, which was defined as lacking a consistent strategy (Shortell and Zajac, 1990). An 
important conceptual position in Miles and Snow’s (1978) typology is the assumption that firms 
are unable to be successful at simultaneously pursuing both the prospector and defender 
strategies and that strategic inconsistency results in firms following the reactor strategy typology, 
where performance is expected to be the lowest. However, Miles and Snow (1978) contend that 
firms will be able to switch their strategy from prospector to defender and vice versa according 
to their perception of the strategy that results in their best interests.  
 
4.2.1 Generic Strategy Typologies 
Porter (1980) proposed three generic strategies of which two (cost leadership and product 
differentiation) targeted a broad market scope and the other (focus) corresponded to low target 
market breadth. While it has been suggested that the integration of cost leadership and product 
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differentiation strategies is possible to an extent (Porter, 1985, 1998) and sometimes even 
necessary (Hill, 1988), the inherent limiting factors associated with each strategy often result in 
business units pursuing variants of one of the two strategic directions. Porter (1980) has 
suggested that cost leadership and product differentiation draw on assets and capabilities that are 
contradictory and that this makes it very difficult to pursue both simultaneously at the business 
unit level. Where cost leadership strategy “requires aggressive construction of efficient-scale 
facilities, vigorous pursuit of cost reduction from experience, tight cost and overhead control, 
avoidance of marginal customer accounts, and cost minimization in areas like R&D, service 
sales force, and advertising” (Porter 1980: p. 35), product differentiation inherently faces trade-
offs with cost reduction in most areas. Most conceptual literature including the works of Porter 
(1980, 1985) suggest that firms that attempt to pursue both cost leadership and differentiation 
simultaneously will find themselves in a “stuck-in-the-middle” position where lower 
performance is to be expected (Thornhill and White, 2007). 
There have been conflicting findings in empirical research focusing on the link between 
generic strategies and firm performance; some studies have found total commitment to one of the 
generic strategies (purity) to be a source of higher performance, and some have found similar 
results for hybrid strategies (Thornhill and White, 2007). Most theories have argued for strategic 
purity to be associated with higher firm performance. There has been empirical support for this 
claim when it comes to Porter’s proposed typologies. Thornhill and White (2007) found that in 
three different industry types, firms that pursued strategic purity outperformed, or at least 
equalled in performance, firms that followed a hybrid strategy. Some researchers have found that 
the complexity of hybrid strategies and the difficulty of setting priorities when pursuing hybrid 
strategies results in confusion and loss of direction, which in turn explains lower performance 
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findings attributed to them (March, 1991; Treacy and Wiersema, 1995). This is a complexity that 
some researchers have suggested to be manageable only through the adoption of matrix-like 
structures that are both costly and difficult to manage (Miles and Snow, 1978). 
 
4.2.2 Similarities and Distinctions of Strategy Typologies 
There are broad similarities in general between most strategy typologies that have been 
proposed by strategy researchers (Campbell-Hunt, 2000; Thornhill and White, 2007). For 
example, “the central elements of an operational excellence, exploitation, defender, or cost 
leadership strategy are cost, efficiency, reliability, refinement, and execution” (Thornhill and 
White, 2007). However, the typologies that place more emphasis on learning or innovation such 
as product leadership/customer intimacy (Tracey and Wiersema, 1997), exploration (March, 
1991), prospector (Miles and Snow, 1978), and differentiation/non-price buyer value (Porter, 
1980) have less convergence, while still sharing significant commonalities (Thornhill and White, 
2007).  
A major distinction between different typologies could be made on their position on 
hybrid strategies or the ability of the same firm — at the business unit level — to pursue 
distinctive strategy typologies. There is more similarity between typologies presented by more 
process-oriented theorists such as March (1991) and Miles and Snow (1978), who have 
considered the possibility of firms pursuing exploration and exploitation in sequence (March, 
1991), or the analyzer type firms, which sequentially pursues prospector and defender strategies 
(Miles and Snow, 1978). Process-oriented theories, however, note the scarcity of resources and 
limitations in firms’ capabilities as factors impeding them in pursuing hybrid strategies. An 
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important point in Miles and Snow’s (1978) approach is that they argue for balance through a 
combination of the capabilities of two of the strategy typologies (prospector and defender) to 
achieve the state where the analyzer strategy can be successfully pursued. However, Miles and 
Snow (1978) have acknowledged the need for management’s close vigilance to maintain the 
“delicate balance” that is required for firms to pursue the analyzer strategy type (Thornhill and 
White, 2007). While the analyzer strategy type requires the firm to simultaneously possess the 
capabilities of prospector and defender firms, Miles and Snow (1978) hesitate to argue for the 
simultaneous pursuance of prospector and defender typologies, proposing only the sequential 
approach to be feasible.  
Several researchers have pointed to the similarities between Miles and Snow’s (1978) 
proposed strategies and other strategy typologies. Other than Thornhill and White (2007), who 
have suggested similarities between prospector strategy (Miles and Snow, 1978), differentiation 
strategy (Porter, 1980), and exploration (March, 1991) and defender strategy (Miles and Snow, 
1978), cost leadership (Porter, 1980), and exploitation (March, 1991), Menguc and Auh (2007) 
have also suggested that firms pursuing a prospector strategy are also pursuing exploration, while 
firms pursuing a defender strategy are also pursuing exploitation.  
While there are similarities between different strategy typologies, they should not be 
assumed to be entirely the same. Some of the differences between strategy categorizations have 
revealed themselves through conflicting empirical findings. For example, while purity in 
pursuing Porter’s generic strategies has been found to be associated with higher performance for 
standalone business units (Thronhill and White, 2007), maintaining a balance between 
exploration and exploitation has been found to have a similar effect for some types of businesses 
(Uotila, Maula, Keil, and Zahra, 2009). The latter findings further emphasize previous theoretical 
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propositions of the essential co-dependence of exploration and exploitation for one another, 
despite their competition for scarce resources within organizations (March, 1963). Therefore, 
while maintaining a degree of balance between exploration and exploitation, corporate business 
units need to determine their intensity in following each approach. For instance, they need to 
make decisions to either allocate resources more intensely to exploitative approaches resulting in 
pursuing strategies of an operational excellence nature, or to maintain a more balanced approach, 
taking a more creative path that could be more costly but could result in subsequent 
differentiation from other competitors.  
 
4.2.3 Operational Excellence 
As mentioned earlier, a group of proposed typologies for business-level strategy can be 
categorized under those that emphasize operational excellence in the business unit. Despite some 
differences, strategic approaches such as cost leadership (Porter, 1980), defender (Miles and 
Snow, 1978), and exploitation (March, 1963, 1991) can be considered to fit under the same 
theoretical umbrella.  
For the purpose of this dissertation, the emphasis has been placed on decisions made or 
actions taken at the business unit level that are more in line with Porter’s (1980) cost leadership 
strategy. Firms that pursue such a strategy are those that have a heavier emphasis on actions and 
decisions that exploit the business unit’s existing resources and capabilities in order to achieve a 
better competitive position relative to their rivals.  
Firms that pursue exploitation to a higher degree and spend less of their resources on 
exploration (i.e., cost leaders) are those that emphasize efficiency, reliability, refinement, and 
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execution (Thornhill and White, 2007). This emphasis results in developing capabilities that 
allow business units to produce and market their comparable products at efficiency levels higher 
than their direct competitors (Porter, 1990). However, an excessive emphasis on exploitation 
could result in the obsolescence of a business unit (March, 1991), while it should maintain a 
certain degree of exploration to maintain competitive product quality in order to survive (Porter, 
1990; Hill, 1988).  
 
4.2.4 Product Leadership 
Another group of business strategy typologies are those that emphasize achieving 
superior performance through offering products or services to the market that are superior to 
those of competitors. Product differentiators (Porter, 1980) and prospectors (Miles and Snow, 
1978) are those that explore (March, 1991; Menguc and Auh, 2007) new ways to provide 
superior products or services with more value to their customers (Porter, 1980). However, 
businesses that pursue exploration often pursue exploitation to some degree in order to extract 
rents that are generated as the result of their endeavours. Therefore, product leaders are also 
those that take a more balanced approach when pursuing exploratory and exploitative strategies 
(Gupta, Smith, and Shalley, 2003).  
Exploration of new possibilities is often associated with experimentation and taking risks 
(March, 1991), which in turn can result in concerted learning, innovation, and acquisition of new 
sources of knowledge that are valuable (Baum, Li, and Usher, 2000; Gupta, Smith, and Shalley, 
2006). The inherent risks that are associated with the exploratory activities necessary for product 
leadership mean that higher costs and lower levels of efficiency will follow. The payoffs of 
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pursuing exploration are often uncertain and results are yielded over extended periods of time 
(Uotila et al., 2009). However, when successful, exploration can yield substantial competitive 
advantages that provide opportunities for exploitation (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). This allow 
firms to better encounter dynamism within their industries (Uotila et al., 2009), which is 
particularly suited for businesses within high-technology industries (Brown and Eisenhardt, 
1997).  
 
4.3 Agency and Business Strategy 
Strategic directions in businesses largely rely on the decisions that are made by the 
executives in charge. In most businesses, this responsibility falls on the shoulders of the business 
unit CEOs. In corporations, the corporate headquarters’ objective is to ensure that each business 
unit’s strategic direction serves the best interests of the corporations. Therefore, control 
mechanisms are put in place to ensure that the business unit achieves the objectives that are 
desired by the corporation, and to compensate the business unit executives in charge on that 
basis. While this approach has strong roots in the literature of agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989), it can also result in outcomes that are contrary to the 
expectations of corporations. Failure to exercise appropriate control mechanisms can result in 
business unit CEOs taking strategic directions and making decisions that do not necessarily serve 
the best interests of the corporation. Therefore, the self-interest of the agent can also influence 
the strategy pursued by business units.  
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4.4 Business Strategy and Business Effects in Corporate Strategy Literature 
While understanding the role of business strategy in business unit performance is 
essential and has been of some interest to researchers, there is very little evidence that it has been 
properly investigated in past research, and most researchers have focused on business effects 
instead (e.g., McGahan and Porter, 1997; Bowman and Helfat, 2001). Also, where business 
strategy has been the focus, corporate-level influences other than controls have been included 
(e.g., White, 1986). While business strategy focuses on the strategic orientation of a business unit 
— namely, cost leadership or product differentiation — business effects include other explained 
or unexplained factors as well. Some of these include business unit structure, control systems, 
and reward systems. Therefore, to understand the influence of business strategy in business unit 
performance, similar to the confusion surrounding the notions of corporate effects and corporate 
strategy, there is the need to deconstruct the business effects variable and to distinguish business 
strategy as one of its constituents.  
The main reason for this gap resides in the limitations in acquiring empirical evidence 
that simultaneously includes corporate-level and business-level factors. In addition, the task to 
deconstruct either corporate effects and/or business effects often requires access to empirical 
evidence that goes beyond data available in many publicly available sources. As a result, the 
literature on strategic management lacks studies that focus on corporate strategy and business 
strategy and often resorts to comparing the influence of corporate effects and business effects 
and treating business effects exogenously.  
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4.5 Corporate Controls and Business Strategy 
As mentioned previously, there is a wide consensus among strategic management 
researchers that business strategies that focus on capturing broader markets tend to vary along 
the two generic types of product differentiation and cost leadership (Thornhill and White, 2007). 
Also, as discussed earlier, the fundamental capabilities and resources that are required to pursue 
any such strategies are assumed to be different to such a degree that it is believed that the 
simultaneous pursuit of both strategies is not likely and that any attempt to join practices 
corresponding to each type of strategy will result in firms ending up in a situation where they 
will be “stuck in the middle,” failing to reap the performance advantages associated with any of 
the strategies (Porter, 1980; Miles and Snow, 1978; Thornhill and White, 2007).  
However, while the choice of business-level strategy has been attributed to many factors 
such as industry effects, firm capabilities, and other idiosyncratic specifications, the effects 
carried over from the parent corporation have often been neglected. This has resulted in some 
research findings linking the performance of business units to strategies without considering the 
precedence of corporate effect through implemented controls, and ruling out the significance of 
corporate strategy or arguing for the effect to be extremely small (i.e., Bowman and Helfat, 
2001; Schmalansee, 1985; McGahan and Porter, 1997).  
Operational excellence strategies are those that focus on reducing all costs that relate to 
the production or any other processes that a business unit is engaged with in order to increase 
firm utility through an increase in the difference between the market value and production value 
of the end product (Porter, 1990). Successful pursuance of a cost leadership strategy requires the 
business to eliminate costs that are considered to be unnecessary and insignificant to the basic 
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utility that the product is meant to provide the end user. Therefore, a cost leadership strategy is 
often considered to be associated with a cost-cutting approach and increasing efficiencies in 
production or any other process that exists before the product reaches the market (Thornhill and 
White, 2007). Businesses that pursue cost leadership strategies are often capable of passing on a 
portion of costs saved to the end users, which in turn enables them to capture larger segments of 
the market that are more driven by price in making a product or service-selection decision. To 
maintain the ability to reduce costs and remain competitive in the market, businesses tend to 
build on the economies of scale that result from their larger market segments and which allow 
them to reduce the costs of their own inputs (Hill, 1988). Also, such businesses tend to show 
interest in innovation that would allow them to modify or alter their processes in such a manner 
that results in lower costs of production and the maintenance of their position in the market as a 
cost leader.  
On the other hand, product leaders tend to create and capture value through producing 
products or offering services that are distinctive when compared to other similar products or 
services offered by their competitors in the market (Porter, 1980, 1990). Pursuing a product 
differentiation strategy requires firms to create and develop distinctive features for their products 
and services and to protect that distinctiveness through any existing mechanisms, or to explore 
paths that lead to new distinctive features (March, 1991; Porter, 1980). To remain competitive in 
the market, product differentiators tend to rely on their ability to innovate or incorporate 
innovations into their products or services. Therefore, such companies will be more likely to 
actively invest in R&D, knowledge acquisition, and any other type of investment that would 
support their product distinctiveness in one way or another.  
73 
 
The economic logic behind the product differentiation strategy allows firms to exploit the 
additional value created for customers through charging a premium based on end users’ 
willingness to pay more for that additional value (Porter, 1980). Therefore, unlike cost leaders, 
product differentiators tend not to be overly concerned with controlling their costs of production 
but instead focus on their ability to create additional value and offering it to the market. To 
pursue a product differentiation strategy successfully, incurring costs and making investments 
that enable the firm to pursue and maintain an innovative mode through the exploration of new 
opportunities is critical (Uotila et al., 2009). The inability of a product differentiator to maintain 
its product or service distinctiveness or to create or find new ways to achieve another distinctive 
position means that its offered product or service will start losing value, which will result in 
lower competitiveness and subsequent lower performance (March, 1991).  
In a multi-business firm, the corporate-level performance is prioritized over business unit 
performance and therefore the CEO of each business unit is expected to make decisions or take 
strategic actions that are in accordance with expectations at the corporate level. This expectation 
at the corporate level is often driven by the individual performance of the business unit or, in 
some cases, the contribution that the business unit makes to the overall corporate performance. 
Corporate headquarters often make attempts to monitor the performance of senior managers at 
their business units and design and implement mechanisms to ensure that expectations at the 
corporate level are fulfilled by business unit managers or that the direction of decisions or 
actions at the business unit level is aligned with such expectations. Control mechanisms 
employed by corporate headquarters can entail compensation, limiting or extending latitude in 
decision making, or in some cases removal of senior business unit managers from their positions. 
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Therefore, strategic decisions and actions at the level of business units are influenced by control 
mechanisms that have been put in place by the corporate headquarters. Consequently: 
 
Hypothesis 5: The influence of corporate strategy on business strategy is 
mediated through corporate controls.  
 
The adoption of strategic controls requires the corporate headquarters to have qualitative 
and in-depth assessments of the performance of the business unit CEO in order to properly 
analyze decisions and actions and understand the underlying reasons behind each of them (Rowe 
and Wright, 1997). Also, to implement strategic control mechanisms, the corporate headquarters 
needs to consider the long-term impact of each decision and action and evaluate the effect of 
each such action or decision on firm competitiveness and long-term performance. When a 
business unit is subject to strategic monitoring and control from the corporate headquarters, 
decisions or actions made at the business unit level are evaluated based on the different aspects 
of their performance. This means that the business unit CEO will not be evaluated simply on the 
basis of decisions or actions with immediate effect, but also based on the impact of those 
decisions or actions on the business unit’s long-term performance and the effect that they may 
have on the competitiveness of the business unit in its industry. However, this could also mean 
that in some cases a business unit may not be considered as a simple profit or loss centre but as 
part of the corporation that contributes to overall corporate performance through strategic actions 
such as cross-subsidizing other business units and/or R&D activities.  
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The nature of strategic controls allows business unit managers to make decisions or take 
actions that could ensure firm competitiveness without the fear of potential variations in short-
term performance affecting their own individual interests (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1994). As 
mentioned previously, success in certain types of strategy such as product differentiation is very 
unlikely unless the business is committed to making investments that lead to innovation or 
distinctiveness of products or services compared to competitors. However, such investments that 
seem critically necessary to the success of such a strategy will often appear to have negative 
short-term effects on financial reports, as their objectives tend to take time before becoming 
realized. While costs such as R&D, capital investment, and hiring a highly skilled and 
knowledgeable workforce can negatively impact business units’ immediate financial 
performance, executives of strategically controlled business units are more inclined to make such 
decisions if they are certain of their long-term returns. The in-depth and qualitative monitoring 
mechanism of strategic controls allows business unit managers to provide justifications for their 
strategic decisions and actions without risking their personal individual interests. Similarly, they 
will be able to make decisions to pursue cost leadership strategies should they see that this 
strategy best fits with their business units’ highest long-term performance.  
While strategic controls provide the senior management of business units with the 
latitude of choice to pick the best strategies that they see for business unit long-term and short-
term performance, they also constrain the possibility of decisions that are not aligned with 
overall corporate objectives to be made. The compensation mechanisms that are based on 
strategic controls often seek to ensure business unit performance according to corporate 
expectations through creating an alignment between the individual interests of the business unit’s 
senior management and those of the corporation (Eisenhardt, 1985). The detailed and in-depth 
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monitoring that is complementary to strategic controls allows for business unit senior 
management to go beyond merely superficial financial and accounting indicators to justify 
actions or decisions in the business unit without compromising their own interests.  
On the other hand, business units that are subject to financial controls are those where the 
corporate headquarters does not have the necessary means or capabilities to conduct qualitative 
and in-depth analysis of the decisions and actions by the senior management business units or 
those that belong to industries where the lack of environmental dynamism and static conditions 
calls for very little, if any, strategic enactment (Hill and Hoskisson, 1987). When a corporate 
headquarters fails or is unwilling to make qualitative assessments of the decisions or actions of 
business unit senior managers and their underlying justifications, strategic implications, or long-
term effects, and instead relies on numbers of financial indicators and accounting measures, then 
the performance of the business unit senior management will be evaluated mostly on the basis of 
immediate and short-term proxies of firm performance. In that case, senior management will be 
evaluated on accounting measures that are incapable of demonstrating the strategic position of 
the firm and how the firm will be performing over a more extended time period. Therefore, 
business unit senior managers will be under pressure from corporate headquarters to make 
decisions for actions that comply with the expectations of evaluation measures at the corporate 
level.  
As mentioned before, financial controls are often associated with the evaluation of 
financial and accounting indicators compared to existing averages of the industry and historical 
performance of the business unit. When financial controls are the dominant form of control that 
is employed by a corporate headquarters, it is very likely that the senior management of a 
business unit makes decisions that have the least negative impact on the performance measures 
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that are most immediately affected as a result. The accounting and financial indicators that are 
ordinarily the primary reference for financial controls are most positively affected when 
decisions prior to the time of the report result in the elimination of costs and an increase in sales. 
On the other hand, decisions that increase costs in the short run, regardless of their long-term 
effects, will be displayed negatively on conventional financial reports.  
When a senior manager is evaluated and subsequently compensated on the basis of 
financial indicators, he or she will be receiving incentives to make decisions that avoid 
investments with long-run payoffs in order to minimize damaging self-interest (Eisenhardt, 
1985). Therefore, investments in R&D, capital, or knowledge acquisition through different 
mechanisms that attenuate business units’ short-term financial performance will most likely be 
avoided. Moreover, corporate headquarters that tend to rely on financial controls do not have the 
means or desire to implement strategic controls that would provide justification for any such 
investment. Conversely, these business unit senior managers are encouraged to pursue strategies 
that are associated with cost control, cost cutting, quality control, efficient production, or any 
such strategy that would positively affect business unit performance in the short term.  
As mentioned previously, cost leadership strategy is often considered to be an operational 
excellence strategy, associated with cost control, refinement, or any type of process innovation 
that would increase efficiency (Porter, 1980; March, 1991). Business units that are controlled 
through financial controls are often constrained from pursuing product differentiation strategies, 
since they require significant investments in innovation, where returns are not necessarily 
observable over shorter periods of time. However, as mentioned before, strategies that are similar 
to cost leadership are more likely to be aligned with managerial preferences and corporate 
expectations. Hence: 
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Hypothesis 6: Business units that are subject to a stronger emphasis on strategic 
controls are more likely to pursue product leadership strategies than business 
units that are subject to a stronger emphasis on financial controls, while 
business units that are subject to a stronger emphasis on financial controls are 
more likely to pursue operational excellence strategies than business units that 
are subject to a stronger emphasis on strategic controls.  
  
4.6 Summary 
Business strategy is perhaps the most central topic to the literature in the area of strategic 
management, as it has been directly linked to performance, which is considered the focus of 
interest of this area. To understand business strategy as a construct, many different 
categorizations have been presented with differences in their economic theoretical foundations. 
Most of these categorizations converge on similarities in their focus, which often fall into one of 
two categories: operational excellence and product leadership.  
The link between corporate strategy and business strategy has also been of interest to 
researchers, although little consensus has been reached on its nature. While a degree of 
ambiguity exists around the relationship, the relative significance of each level of strategy on the 
performance of business units has been studied and often suggests that business unit strategy is 
the more effective of the two in determining business unit performance. However, the role of 
controls in linking the two levels of strategy has largely been ignored.  
This chapter contends that the business unit strategy of wholly owned business units is 
endogenous to strategies at the corporate level through the mediation of corporate controls. 
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Drawing on the literature of agency theory, the arguments and hypotheses in this chapter suggest 
that the exercise of strategic controls by corporations results in a higher tendency on the part of 
business units to pursue product leadership strategies, while the exercise of financial controls by 
corporate headquarters triggers the tendency in business units to pursue strategies of operational 
excellence.  
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CHAPTER 5: BUSINESS UNIT PERFORMANCE 
 
5.1 Introduction 
One of the aims of strategic management is to explore and understand the foundations of 
business units’ superior performance over competitors within their related product markets. 
Therefore, performance has revealed itself as perhaps the most significant and ultimate 
dependent variable in most scholarly work in this area (Glick, Washburn, and Miller, 2005; 
Rowe and Morrow, 1999). Corporations and businesses alike seek to maximize their 
performance and fulfil the economic justification for their existence. However, to measure 
performance as a dependent variable there is a need to fully appreciate it as a unique construct, or 
perhaps multiple interdependent constructs. This chapter’s aim is to provide a better 
understanding of the construct of performance in order to properly establish its relationship with 
business-level strategy. Also, drawing on past literature, in this section the role of controls that 
are put in place by corporate headquarters in business units’ performance is investigated and 
corresponding relationships are hypothesized.  
Although performance has perhaps been the most widely accepted dependent variable in 
the strategy literature, there is yet to be consensus among researchers on its nature. Many 
conceptualizations of performance, although similar on the surface, differ in terms of time 
horizon, stability, types of returns, focus on absolute versus expected versus relative returns, unit 
of analysis, attributions to the firm versus industry versus luck, and so on (Glick, Washburn, and 
Miller, 2005). However, theoretical perspectives that dominate the field of strategic management 
(Barney, 1991; Porter, 1980) still emphasize performance as businesses’ ultimate objective and 
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therefore it is still considered to be the “time test” of the success or failure of strategies that are 
pursued (Schendel and Hofer, 1979).  
In what follows, the attempt is made to provide a clearer theoretical understanding of 
performance as a construct of interest in this dissertation. First, a review of the literature on 
performance as a general construct is made. Subsequently, the similarities and distinctions in the 
literature between short-term versus long-term performance and financial versus market 
performance are examined. Once a clear understanding of the scope and nature of different 
dimensions of performance has been reached, I proceed with a review of the existing literature 
on the established links between strategy at the corporate level and the business unit level with 
different dimensions of performance. The final section of this chapter focuses on establishing the 
role of corporate controls in the successful execution of business unit strategies. Similar to the 
concept of “fit” between macro controls and diversification, which has been proposed earlier in 
the literature (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1989), this dissertation emphasizes the significance of 
“fit” between controls that are put in place by corporate headquarters and the strategies that are 
pursued by executives at the business unit level and the effect of this “fit” on business unit 
performance. 
 
5.2 Performance as a Construct 
Most literature in the area of strategic management has conceptualized firm performance 
as one of three alternatives: uni-dimensional, multi-dimensional, and a collection of multiple 
constructs covering a broad domain of empirically related and unrelated firm outcomes; although 
the uni-dimensional approach has often been rejected by scholars as too simplistic (Glick, 
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Washburn, and Miller, 2005). However, despite the consensus on the rejection of one alternative, 
scholarship is yet to reach convergence over one form of conceptualization of the construct.  
While performance has been a source of much debate, there has been little disagreement 
over its connection to firm effectiveness (Glunk and Wilderon, 1996), which re-emphasizes the 
multidimensional nature of firm performance. Such multiple dimensions have been suggested to 
relate to a firm’s stakeholders, its competitive position, and the temporal frame of assessment of 
performance in a business unit (Devinney, Richard, Yip, and Johnson, 2005). However, a 
generally acceptable conceptualization of the construct has not been made, despite urgings by 
some researchers in this area (Glick, Washburn, and Miller, 2005).  
Past research has identified three conceptually distinct types of performance dimensions 
as financial and other accounting reports, market valuations, and key informant descriptions 
(Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, and Moesel, 1993). Furthermore, Rowe and Morrow (1999) have 
identified the firm performance dimensions as reputation, market dimension, and financial 
dimension. However, despite the recognition of performance as a multidimensional construct and 
the identification of several corresponding dimensions, most strategy researchers take firm 
financial performance as the core of the domain of possible dimensions (Venkatraman and 
Ramanujam, 1986).  
 
5.2.1 Financial Performance 
In most literature on the construct of performance to date, the emphasis has been on the 
financial and accounting performance of firms. Accounting reports dominated early research on 
firm performance, with market-based performance becoming more popular by the mid-1980s 
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(Glick, Washburn, and Miller, 2005; Hawawini, Subramaniam, and Verdin, 2003, Hoskisson et 
al., 1993; Lubatkin and Shrieves, 1986). 
Most criticism that has been directed towards the dominance of financial performance 
measures has related to its failure to predict future firm performance. This has been the reason 
why in the past decades more and more researchers have become interested in considering the 
other dimensions of firm performance as being as important as the financial dimension. For 
example, Meyer (2005) has criticized the use of cash flow as a measure of efficiency when 
economic performance should in fact involve anticipation and promise. This shortcoming in the 
financial dimension of firm performance is most evident in stock markets, when “the buy- and 
sell-side analysts are surprised when stock prices show a persistent enhancement following a 
firm’s announcement of intentions to buy back stock regardless of the firm’s subsequent failure 
to follow through” (Westphal and Zajac, 1998) or “when researchers show that stock prices are 
sensitive to the particular framing of adverse earnings announcements” (Hutton, Miller, and 
Skinner, 2003). 
Another criticism on placing too much importance on the accounting and financial 
dimension of firm performance has been directed towards the nature of the accounting reports 
themselves. This criticism has stated that accounting data are not straightforward, as 
demonstrated by Arthur Andersen, Canary Capital Partners, and SEC regulators tracking mutual 
fund breakpoint discounts (Glick, Washburn, and Miller, 2005). 
The operationalization of performance by strategic management researchers has typically 
been done in terms of existing accounting ratios (e.g., ROA, ROS, ROE, ROI) or market-based 
measures such as Sharpe’s measure, Treynor’s measure, Jensen’s alpha, and Tobin’s q (Rowe 
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and Morrow, 1999; Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986). To estimate the level of financial 
performance of a firm, both types of performance measures — financial and market — have 
been used in past research (Rowe and Morrow, 1999). This has led some researchers to suggest 
an “implicit consensus” between researchers on market performance and accounting 
performance for the two dimensions of a firm’s financial performance (Rowe and Morrow, 
1999). 
There have also been some attempts to use subjective measures when operationalizing 
firm financial performance (Rowe and Morrow, 1999; Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; Dess and 
Robinson, 1984; Fryxell and Wang, 1994) as a possible third dimension. 
Accounting-based measures of firm financial performance are the most popular in the 
strategic management literature (Barney, 1997). The pros and cons of the popularity of 
accounting-based measures give reasons for their popularity among strategy researchers. 
According to Rowe and Morrow (1999), while cynics would suggest that the reason for the 
popularity of accounting measures is that the data is easily available for publicly traded firms, 
others contend that accounting numbers are important because managers use them when making 
strategic decisions, and because they actually provide insights into economic rates of return 
(Horowitz, 1984; Jacobson, 1987; Long and Ravenscraft, 1984). Rowe and Morrow (1999) 
further suggest that the use of accounting-based measures is related to the relationship between 
independent and dependent variables in firm performance. Moreover, it has been suggested that 
accounting-based measures are most suitable to measure firms’ short-term performance, as they 
refer to the current financial state of the firm (Rowe and Morrow, 1999).  
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The use of accounting measures for firm performance has proven to be very acceptable 
among strategy researchers in measuring firm performance. In studies that have focused on 
retrenchment, which refers to the practice of eliminating unnecessary costs and assets that are not 
productive (Lim, Celly, Morse, and Rowe, 2013), it has been noted that accounting measures 
have been widely used by firms to measure whether the turnaround has been successful (Rowe 
and Morrow, 1999). Some researchers have taken this as support for the validity of accounting-
based measures as the measurement for firms’ short-term performance, particularly since 
retrenchment has generally been found to yield short-lived effects (Rowe and Morrow, 1999; 
Morrow, Busenitz, and Johnson, 1997). 
 
5.2.2 Market Performance 
Another dimension of the performance of a firm is the market value associated with the 
organization. Although widely accepted as one of the dimensions of firm financial performance, 
market value has not been as popular as accounting-based measures. This has been the case 
particularly with market analysts, who have taken issue with market value as a measure of 
performance that has roots in both the present and the future (Glick, Washburn, and Miller, 
2005), making identification of its sources and the significance of those sources very difficult. 
Since the 1980s there has been an increasing tendency towards using market-based 
dimensions as a more appropriate dimension of a firm’s performance. This can be seen in the 
work of many strategy researchers in later years, as strategy researchers have begun to rely on 
market-based measures of performance, either alone or in conjunction with accounting-based 
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measures, when assessing a firm’s financial performance (Rowe and Morrow, 1999; Hoskisson, 
Hitt, Johnson, and Moesel, 1993; Hoskisson, Johnson, and Moesel, 1994). 
The appropriateness of market value as a strong dimension of firm financial performance 
has also been a subject for debate. This is due to its reliance on information other than archival 
sources, which are not entirely objective. Therefore, some researchers have suggested a firm’s 
market value to be only appropriate as a starting point, but not an entirely reliable measure to go 
forward on (Glick, Washburn, and Miller, 2005). 
Rowe and Morrow (1999), based on the research done by Bentson (1982), Fisher and 
McGowan (1983), and Watts and Zimmerman (1978 and 1990), concluded that the increase in 
the use of market-based measures of firm performance was partly in response to micro-
computers becoming more available, making calculations of market-based measures easier, and 
partly because of the criticisms that have been voiced toward the excessive use of accounting-
based measures. The theoretical basis of this approach was also suggested to be the result of 
market-based measures’ higher ability to reflect a firm’s current and future financial performance 
(Rowe and Morrow, 1999). 
Seth (1990) has noted that there is a major difference between the accounting-based 
measure and the market-based measures. He notes that “market-based measures are intrinsically 
different from accounting-based measures because market-based measures focus on the present 
value of future streams of income, whereas accounting-based measures focus on past 
performance.” 
While sales and growth in sales have generally been understood as accounting measures 
for performance, they do not represent the profitability of a firm. Firms with higher costs of 
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production and lower price offerings are able to extract less value from the market (Barney and 
Peteraf, 1993). However, growth in sales, under certain conditions, can also represent a relative 
gain in market share, which has been considered as a dimension of market performance. 
Therefore, past research has focused on growth in sales as an indication of firm market 
performance (White, 1986). 
 
5.3 Corporate Performance and Business Performance 
Corporate performance is assessed on the basis of the value that is created as the result of 
the operations of a firm’s multiple business units and as a consequence of their aggregate 
performance. With the emergence of corporations with multiple businesses, the assessment of 
performance at the corporate level and the business unit level has become of interest to many 
researchers (Bowman and Helfat, 2001). However, differences in strategies that are pursued at 
the corporate level have resulted in differences in value-creation mechanisms. While related 
diversified corporations make every attempt to leverage economies of scope that result from 
shared activities to create synergistic value (Teece, 1982; Hoskisson, 1987), unrelated diversified 
firms should count on the individual performance of each of their business units.  
The presence of corporations in multiple product markets has made it extremely difficult 
for strategy researchers to make performance assessments at the corporate level using 
dimensions other than financial performance. This can be found in the overwhelming tendency to 
measure performance at the business level when conducting research on the relationship between 
corporate strategy and performance (e.g., Rumelt, 1974, 1991; McGahan and Porter, 1997; 
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Bowman and Helfat, 2001). This dissertation takes a similar approach, conducting performance 
analysis at the business unit level.  
 
5.4 Business Strategy and Business Performance 
The relationship between business strategy and business performance is one of the best-
established relationships in the strategic management literature. Past theoretical work has 
suggested that firms can achieve superior competitive positions over their direct rivals through 
committing themselves to pursuing certain strategic orientations (Porter, 1980). There have been 
different positions taken by researchers on the feasibility of combining more than one strategic 
orientation in order to achieve a competitive advantage. While some have argued for this 
possibility (Miles and Snow, 1978; Hill, 1988), others have taken strong positions against it 
(Porter, 1980).  
Past empirical research has often made attempts to measure the business-related effects 
compared to other existing effects that influence business-level performance (Bowman and 
Helfat, 2001). Most studies have shown business-level effects, industry effects, and corporate 
effects to be the most influential in defining the success or failure of a single business unit 
(Rumelt, 1991; Carroll, 1993; Ghemawat, 1994; Ghemawat and Ricart Costa, 1993; Hoskisson, 
Kim, and Hill, 1993; McGahan and Porter, 1997). Later empirical studies have found certain 
categories of strategy to be mutually exclusive (Thornhill and White, 2007), and others to be 
strongly dependent on one another in generating superior performance (Uotila et al., 2009). 
However, while there has been much done to establish the link between business-level strategy 
and business-level performance, there has been little done to understand the role that corporate 
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controls play in defining the relationship. This shortcoming partly relates to the negligence of 
controls in defining business-level strategy and the consideration of business unit strategy as an 
exogenous factor. Therefore, the significance of a “fit” between the controls implemented by the 
corporation on business units and business unit strategy remains mainly unexplored.  
 
5.5 Fit Between Business Strategy and Corporate Controls 
Performance at the business level of a business unit not only depends on the strategic 
orientation of the business unit, but also on the “fit” between different organizational factors that 
can have effects on business unit performance. The concept of “fit,” which was initially 
developed in behavioural organizational research (Venkatraman, 1989), has also been used to 
explain the relationship between corporate controls and the practices that are exercised at the 
micro level of business units (Rowe and Wright, 1997; White, 1986). Such arguments suggest 
that in order to maintain efficiency in business units and achieve superior performance, micro-
level practices must conform to the requirements of controls at the macro level. This results in 
the relationship between a corporate headquarters and a business unit affecting the business 
unit’s subsequent performance. Past research has found a fit between business unit strategy and 
the internal organization of the corporation to influence business unit performance, where higher 
business unit autonomy leads to market performance (i.e., growth in sales) and less autonomy, 
and tighter controls leads to higher short-term financial performance (White, 1986). 
When a business unit is subject to financial controls, divergence from practices that have 
a fit with an operational excellence strategy can result in the occurrence of a misfit between 
corporate controls and practices at the business level (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1989; Rowe and 
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Wright, 1997; White, 1986). Such divergence, in turn, can result in the initiation of a conflict 
between the business unit and its corporate parent. The resulting conflict can often be an 
antecedent to variations in a firm’s financial performance during a shorter time period and the 
inability of mutual communication of decision justification between the business unit and the 
corporate headquarters. This lack of communication could subsequently affect the willingness of 
the corporate headquarters to allocate additional resources or to leverage its corporate resources 
to the advantage of the business unit.  
Also, when a firm is pursuing a product differentiation strategy, its costs can often be 
reduced through synergies that are created as a result of economies of scope within the 
corporation. In unrelated diversified corporations, where financial controls are the primary 
means of managing business units (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1989; Goold, Campbell, and 
Alexander, 1994), the lack of existence of such relationships can result in a misfit between 
micro-level practices and macro-level controls (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1989). Such a misfit 
can often result in less competitiveness at the business unit level and subsequent lower business 
unit performance. Therefore, business unit performance subsequent to the choice of strategy can 
also be affected by controls associated with different corporate strategies. Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 7a: The interaction between the strategic direction of a business unit 
and the corporate controls that it is subject to influences its subsequent financial 
performance; business units pursuing operational excellence strategies will 
exhibit higher financial performance when subject to a stronger emphasis on 
financial controls, and business units pursuing product leadership strategies 
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will exhibit higher financial performance when subject to a stronger emphasis 
on strategic controls.  
Hypothesis 7b: The interaction between the strategic direction of a business unit 
and the corporate controls that it is subject to influences its subsequent market 
share performance; business units pursuing operational excellence strategies 
will exhibit higher market share performance when subject to a stronger 
emphasis on financial controls, and business units pursuing product leadership 
strategies will exhibit higher market share performance when subject to a 
stronger emphasis on strategic controls.  
  
5.6 Summary 
Performance has often been the dependent variable of interest in the literature of strategic 
management. Much research has been conducted to determine the relationships between various 
organizational factors and business unit performance. The influence of corporate effects on 
business performance, however, has largely remained unclear and subject to debate. Meanwhile, 
differences in business unit strategy have been found to explain a significant part of variance in 
business unit performance (e.g., Thornhill and White, 2007; McGahan and Porter, 1997).  
The role of “fit,” however, between corporate factors and business strategy has not fully 
been addressed in past literature. Despite some researchers pointing to fit between other 
organizational factors (Rowe and Wright, 1997), this notion has not been considered for  
business strategy. In this chapter, it has been argued that the performance of a business unit has a 
strong connection to the fit between corporate controls and business unit strategy. This means 
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that businesses pursuing product leadership strategies have a better chance of achieving superior 
performance if they are subject to strategic controls, instead of financial ones.  
In this chapter, a review of the literature on performance was conducted. Since this 
construct has often been questioned on validity, different perspectives on two main dimensions 
of this construct — financial performance and market performance — have been reviewed. 
Subsequently, arguments to support the proposed hypotheses were advanced.  
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CHAPTER 6: METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
6.1 Theoretical and Methodological Approach 
Understanding the effect of corporate strategy on business unit performance has been 
found to be more complex than initially expected. Hence, methodological differences in 
assessing the relationship have been diverse, resulting in findings that have been conflicting at 
times (e.g., Rumelt, 1974, 1991; McGahan and Porter, 1997; Bowman and Helfat, 2001). Some 
of the differences in results have stemmed from differences in the conceptualization of the 
relationship, while others have been founded on methodological dissimilarities (Hoskisson and 
Hitt, 1990). 
This dissertation has made an attempt to address the relationship at both levels. The 
theoretical model that has been proposed in previous chapters puts forward a new theoretical 
conceptualization of the relationship between corporate strategy — instead of corporate effects 
— and business strategy, and subsequently business unit performance. The proposed model of 
this dissertation posits that corporate strategy influences strategy at each business unit through 
controls that are implemented for each business unit. Therefore, this dissertation conceptualizes 
business unit strategy not as nested within corporate effects or as separate from corporate effects, 
but as influenced by corporate strategy. This dissertation also unpacks the corporate effects 
construct, theorizing the indirect link between corporate strategy — as part of the corporate 
effect’s construct — and business unit strategy. In doing so, the theoretical representation of the 
relationship acknowledges the mediating role of corporate controls within the proposed 
relationship, while accounting for the moderating effects of three corporate variables: number of 
business units, size of corporate headquarters staff, and background of the corporation’s CEO. 
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 However, the contributions of this dissertation are not limited to the conceptualization of 
this phenomenon, but also include measurements of corporate controls, which had remained a 
theoretical concept without operationalization in previous research. 
The philosophical approach in this study is one that is deductive, where the theoretical 
conceptualization of the phenomenon has been conducted by the researcher and the data is 
collected and analyzed in order to ensure the falsifiability of the proposed theory. The result of 
this dissertation is a theoretical perspective that extends previous theoretical conceptualizations 
of the phenomenon of the influence of corporate strategy on business unit strategy, which was 
still falsifiable and could be subject to further empirical testing.  
 
6.2 Quantitative Sample and Data Collection 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, this dissertation entails analysis of quantitative data 
collected through archival secondary sources. Therefore, an important component of this 
dissertation and its findings rely on measures that are used to operationalize the variables that are 
included within the theoretical model. Previous methodological approaches in research on 
corporate strategy have often resulted in the utilization of dichotomous variables, which have 
resulted in misconceptions, particularly where boundary conditions within categories were 
present (e.g., Hoskisson and Hitt, 1988; Hough, 2006; Rumelt, 1974). The methodological 
approach that has been applied in this dissertation has made every attempt to transform existing 
categorical variables into ones that are continuous without violating previous conceptualizations, 
while maintaining validity (Schwab, 1980) and relevance (Nagle, 1953). Such variables include 
those that are used to determine the corporate strategy pursued by the corporations; corporate 
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controls that are designed and implemented by the corporate headquarters and at the business 
level; and strategies that are pursued at the level of the business unit. Using continuous variables, 
the statistical analysis is conducted through ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (Cohen and 
Cohen, 1983; Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken, 2003). In what follows, the methodological 
approach to measure and utilize each of the variables included in the model is reviewed in brief.  
The data that is used for this dissertation comes from reports that have been developed by 
the Industrial Development and Renovation Organization of Iran (IDRO). IDRO, which was 
established in 1967, serves as the responsible entity that oversees industrial development in 
Iranian organizations. IDRO provides services to many Iranian private and public sector 
organizations. As of 2009, it has also owned and operated 290 major Iranian corporations, after 
having privatized over 140 other corporations in the preceding years. It still remains Iran’s 
largest and most influential industrial entity. This study uses data from 193 corporations under 
IDRO’s umbrella, either owned by IDRO itself or subscribing to its services. The dataset also 
includes data from 2,704 business units or divisions that operate under these 193 corporations. 
To ensure that the effect of exogenous influences on observed variables remains minimal, data 
from the years 1998 to 2000 have been included in the sample. This decision ensures that the 
period falls within one single presidential administration period following the 1997 election. The 
decision to limit the data to 2000 was to avoid possible influences resulting from consequences 
of terrorist events of September 2001 on the observed performance variables.  
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6.2.1 Corporate Strategy  
To study the effect of corporate strategy on other organizational factors, it is necessary to 
present appropriate measures for the variable. In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, a comprehensive 
review of the literature on corporate strategy was conducted. The concept of corporate strategy 
that is discussed in this dissertation revolves around the approaches that corporations have 
towards diversification. In this section, measures that are used for the purpose of this dissertation 
are briefly discussed.  
Traditional approaches in research on corporate strategy have often utilized Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes to measure the corporate strategy that is pursued (Hoskisson 
and Hitt, 1990). However, research on the subject evolved to adopt categorical approaches in 
determining corporate strategy, assuming market structure to be a more salient factor in 
influencing firm performance than the strategies that are pursued at a corporate level (Hoskisson 
and Hitt, 1990).  
As mentioned earlier, the measurement of diversification strategy that is pursued by 
corporations has evolved a great deal over time. One of the earliest measurement approaches 
used a simple count of industries that corporations operated in, their specialization ratio, and an 
interaction between these two factors to develop a measure of diversification (Gort, 1962). 
Further developing this approach, Arnould (1969) also accounted for the share of corporations’ 
output within each of the industries in which they had a presence, as well as the concentration 
measure of each industry. However, the uni-dimensionality inherent within such measurements 
of diversification resulted in the development of other measures for diversification in 
corporations. Most notable of such measures has been Rumelt’s (1974) categorical approach 
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towards diversification, which extends Wrigly’s (1970) initial classification, proposing nine and 
later seven categories for diversification.  
It has been suggested that the main difference between Rumelt’s (1974) 
operationalization and previously developed measures (e.g., Gort, 1962; Arnould, 1969) exists in 
the categorical approach taken by Rumelt. This approach uses careful conceptualization of the 
phenomenon, operationalizing corporate strategy through subjective and objective observations 
and data instead of the continuous measures used by others (e.g., Gort, 1962; Arnould, 1969), 
where simple objective and uni-dimensional information is used (Montgomery, 1982). However, 
despite minor relative advantages over one another and under certain circumstances, empirical 
findings of research using each of these different approaches have often yielded similar results 
(Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990).  
While past measures of diversification did serve the objective of measuring the degree of 
diversification, they did not distinguish between different diversification strategies that are 
pursued by firms. Most notably, they failed to measure the variation in relatedness, or 
unrelatedness, of business units across corporations. To address this shortcoming, Jacquemin and 
Berry (1979) developed an entropy measure for diversification.  
The entropy measure of diversification not only measures the degree of diversification, 
but also the degree to which the business units are related. The entropy measure provides its 
output in the form of three separate indices: index of related diversification (DR), index of 
unrelated diversification (DU), and index of total diversification (DT=DR+DU) (Palepu, 1985). 
Since this approach provides the researcher with the ability to make the distinction between 
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corporate strategies, it is used in this dissertation with certain modifications in order to 
accommodate this dissertation’s methodological approach.  
As indicated, the entropy measure for diversification provides three separate indices that 
are often used by researchers as dichotomous variables, when analyzing the data. This often 
results in the loss of valuable information in the presence of boundary conditions. To avoid this 
loss and to provide a continuous measure for the analysis of data in this dissertation, consistent 
with the approach validated and used in past research (Markides, 1995; Hoskisson and Johnson, 
1992), a new measure is defined by dividing the related diversification index (DR) by the total 
diversification index (DT). Since DT is the sum of DR and DU, it implicitly carries the value of 
DU. Therefore, the new measure provides a measure that not only incorporates DR, but also DU. 
Subsequently, to make comparison possible, the Z-scores for the newly developed variable are 
utilized, after summation of a constant to avoid the possibility of negative values. The new 
measure (DRZ) is then used as the continuous measure for corporate strategy in this dissertation, 
with lower DRZ being unrelated diversification and higher DRZ being related diversification.  
 
6.2.2 Span of Corporation 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the ability of a corporation to implement its corporate controls 
in business units is moderated by the number of businesses or product segments that its business 
units are involved in. Earlier measures of diversification have often used simple counts of 
business units in order to determine the level of firms’ diversification (e.g., Gort, 1962). To 
measure the span of a corporation, a similar approach is taken in this dissertation and after 
appropriate controls that are discussed later, the number of business units — i.e., wholly owned 
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subsidiaries of the corporation with distinct legal and organizational identities and with profit 
and loss reporting mechanisms — that form the corporation is used as the measure for this 
variable.  
 
6.2.3 Relevant Experience of the CEO 
As previously argued, the CEO of a parent company is considered to hold primary 
responsibility for corporate performance. Therefore, the CEO has the role of the ultimate 
decision maker within a corporation. Building on findings of the upper echelons theory 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984), this dissertation also measures parent companies’ CEOs’ expertise 
on the basis of past involvement as directors of businesses with industry classifications similar to 
those of the focal corporations. In addition, the educational background of each individual CEO 
is assessed to understand if it is relevant to each of the business units of the corporation.  
To collect data for this measure, existing data from the CEO backgrounds of Iranian 
corporations that subscribe to the services of Industrial Development and Renovation 
Organization of Iran is used. The data, which has been provided through organizational archives, 
is based on the educational backgrounds and employment histories of CEOs that manage IDRO-
sponsored corporations.  
To operationalize this variable, a measure has been developed for each business unit of 
the corporation. For each business unit, individual CEOs of the corporation with experience 
and/or educational history relevant to the industry of the business unit are coded as “1,” while 
those with no prior experience or education related to that business unit are coded as “0.” 
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6.2.4 Size of Corporate Headquarters 
As one of the moderating variables of the theoretical model of this dissertation refers to 
the size of the corporate headquarters, a similar approach to that taken by Kroll, Walters, and 
Wright (2008) is adopted, where a simple count of the number of staff that forms the corporate 
headquarters is used.  
 
6.2.5 Corporate Controls 
Corporate controls are put in place by corporations in order to ensure that the decisions 
made and actions taken at the level of business units are in line with what is perceived to be in 
the best interests of the corporation. The best interests of the corporation, as explained earlier in 
this dissertation, are assessed on the basis of meeting short-term and long-term economic 
objectives. The main responsibility for making decisions at the level of a business unit largely 
lies with the highest-ranking executive in that business unit. Therefore, it is logical to assume 
that corporate controls are one of the most effective tools employed by corporate headquarters to 
influence the behaviour of their business units’ CEOs.  
Corporate controls are important means for organizations to ensure that the performance 
of business units are in accordance with predefined expectations. Past research has focused on 
the level of autonomy that has been provided to different organizational units (e.g., White, 1986; 
Vancil, 1979) or to the organizational levers that facilitate control (Simons, 1994). The degree of 
autonomy represents the degree to which an organization allows for latitude in decisions to be 
made in a more decentralized manner by executives in charge of different business units. 
However, unless methods of evaluating performance are identified, the degree of autonomy 
alone is not indicative of the type of control that is exercised in a corporation. An implication of 
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the performance of business units as the focal point of interest by practitioners and researchers is 
the prominence of diagnostic systems in conducting evaluations. Building on past research, this 
study uses data from business units of Iranian corporations to capture characteristics such as 
autonomy, horizontal interaction between business units, locus of decision making, and focus of 
performance evaluation.  
To operationalize the measure for corporate controls, retrospective data collected by 
IDRO on Iranian corporations subscribing to its services and licensing is used for the years 
between 1998 and 2000. The data, which are retrospective in nature, have been collected through 
surveys using a 7-point Likert scale from business unit managers. The surveys contain items 
such as “level of interaction between divisions,” “level of interaction between business units and 
the corporate headquarters,” “degree of resource sharing between business units and divisions,” 
“degree of capability sharing and transfer among divisions,” “level of information sharing,” 
“level of knowledge by corporate managers regarding processes of business units,” “willingness 
to accept risk in favour of long-term performance,” “spending on R&D, employee training, 
capital and equipment, and market research,” “level of emphasis on monitoring 
market/operational/financial data,” “degree of openness in communication between corporate 
and division managers,” “method of performance evaluation for employees,” “level of emphasis 
on cost reduction,” “use of financial data as the criterion for performance,” “degree of 
competition among divisions,” and “degree of focus on short-term ROI, cash flow, revenue 
growth, and market share as the criteria for evaluating performance” (Hitt, Ireland, Hoskisson, 
Rowe, and Sheppard, 2006). This data captures different aspects of corporate controls such as 
autonomy, diagnostics, and ongoing processes within a corporation, which is consistent with 
102 
 
dimensions previously identified and proposed in past literature (e.g., Gonvidarajan and Fisher, 
1990; Hoskisson and Hitt, 1988; White, 1986; Vancil, 1979).  
In order to validate the measure for corporate controls, the data from business units is 
split in half and exploratory factor analysis (EFA) is conducted on one half of the data to identify 
emerging factors. Since the sample size is larger than 300, factor loadings greater than 0.4 are 
considered as acceptable. As expected, survey items emphasizing approaches such as 
“interaction among business units,” “interaction with corporate headquarters,” and “resource 
sharing with other business units” load highly on the strategic controls factor. Those with 
emphasis on approaches such as “risk avoidance” and “financial evaluation of performance” load 
higher on the financial controls factor. Then, the items for emerging factors are checked against 
existing definitions for each type of control such as strategic controls and financial controls. The 
averages of items are then used to develop new measures for strategic controls and financial 
controls.  
To develop a unique variable that captures both types of controls, the ratio of the 
developed measures is used; the measure for strategic controls is divided by the measure of 
financial controls. The ratio is standardized and centred before being used. The developed 
measure captures both types of controls. Higher values indicate a stronger emphasis on strategic 
controls and lower values signal a stronger emphasis on financial controls. This variable is 
measured for every business unit, and varies for each of the business units within a corporation. 
The summary of factor loadings for items measuring controls has been included in Table 6.1. 
As mentioned, the sums of items from emerging factors are used to construct two new 
factors: strategic controls and financial controls. The alpha value for strategic controls is 0.71 
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and for financial controls is 0.76. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is then performed to test 
for distinctiveness and uni-dimensionality of the factors, which reveals a GFI=0.941 and a Chi-
square value of 925.51. Convergent validity is checked (CV>0.5) for with CV (ξStrategic 
Controls)=0.502 and CV (ξFinancial Controls)=0.56. The discriminant validity of the controls variable is 
also checked. With covariance set at 1, the analysis reveals a worsening in fit, which 
demonstrates that the unconstrained model has a better fit. This fulfills the discriminant validity 
criterion for controls.  
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Table 6.1: Factor Loadings for Controls 
 
 
Note: Items in bold have been used to construct the corporate controls measure.
Item Factors Strategic Controls Financial Controls 
Interaction among divisions 0.639 -0.031 
Interaction with corporate HQ 0.631 0.004 
Sharing resources among divisions 0.612 -0.038 
Transfer of core competencies among 
divisions 
0.402 -0.033 
Information sharing among divisions 0.399 -0.042 
R&D expenditures 0.384 -0.013 
Management training 0.327 -0.008 
Market research 0.295 -0.018 
Open communication between corporate and 
division 
0.139 -0.004 
Employee evaluation based on financial 
results 
0.073 0.872 
Least cost behaviour -0.037 0.592 
Risk avoidance 0.043 0.379 
Competition among divisions -0.114 0.363 
Focus on ROI -0.002 0.252 
Capital channelled to higher financial 
performers 
-0.024 0.201 
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6.2.6 Business Strategy 
There have been many methods proposed for determining or measuring business-level 
strategies. To measure business unit strategy, this dissertation builds on Thornhill and White’s 
(2007) research. Using the data collected by IDRO on organizations that have subscribed to its 
services and licensing, this dissertation uses the 14 items that have been used to distinguish 
business strategy for each of the business units.  
The data collected by IDRO was collected using surveys with responses provided by 
business unit managers. The 14 items on the survey are similar to those on the Canadian 
Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) and include items such as “undertaking research and 
development,” “developing new products/services,” “developing new production/operating 
techniques,” “expanding into new geographic markets,” “total quality management,” “improving 
product/service quality,” “reducing labour costs,” “using more part-time, temporary, or contract 
workers,” “reducing other operating costs,” “reorganizing the work process,” “enhancing labour 
management cooperation,” “increasing employees’ skills,” “increasing employees’ 
involvement/participation,” “improving coordination with customers and suppliers,” and 
“improving measures of performance.” 
Similar to the method pursued by Thornhill and White (2007), exploratory factor 
analysis, followed by confirmatory factor analysis, is conducted to identify distinct strategy 
factors for one half of the data set, and to construct two factors using the sum of values for their 
items. Since the sample size is larger than 300, factor loadings greater than 0.4 are considered 
acceptable. The alpha values for the two constructed factors — product leadership and 
operational excellence — are 0.79 and 0.70, respectively. As expected, items focusing on 
dimensions such as “R&D investment” and “development of new products or services” load 
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highly on the product leadership factor, while items emphasizing “reducing operating costs,” 
“reducing labour costs,” or “improving production techniques” load highly on operational 
excellence. The summary of factor loadings for the items used to measure business unit strategy 
has been included in Table 6.2.  
Confirmatory factor analysis is undertaken to identify the factors as distinct. The analysis 
also reveals that both operation excellence and product leadership meet the requirements for 
convergent validity (CV>0.5), with CV (ξOperational Excellence)=0.51 and CV (ξ Product Leadership)=0.69. 
The discriminant validity of the business unit strategy variable is also checked. With covariance 
set at 1, the analysis reveals a worsening in fit, which demonstrates the unconstrained model to 
have a better fit. This fulfills the discriminant validity criterion for business unit strategy.  
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Table 6.2 Factor Loadings for Business Unit Strategy 
 
 
 
 
Note: Items in bold have been used to construct the business unit strategy measure. 
Item 
Factors 
Operational 
Excellence Product Leadership 
Undertaking R&D -0.287 0.845 
Developing new products/services -0.332 0.820 
Developing new production/operating 
techniques 
0.811 -0.337 
Expanding into new geographic markets 0.103 0.255 
Total quality management 0.423 0.144 
Improving product/service quality 0.029 0.010 
Reducing labour costs 0.831 -0.352 
Using more part-time, temporary contract 
workers 
0.545 -0.2156 
Reducing other operating costs 0.752 -0.344 
Reorganizing the work process 0.354 0.012 
Enhancing labour management cooperation 0.072 0.112 
Increasing employee skills -0.125 0.331 
Increasing employee 
involvement/participation 
0.223 0.023 
Improving coordination with customers and 
suppliers 
0.312 0.361 
Improving measures of performance 0.451 0.314 
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6.2.7 Financial Performance 
The measurement of financial performance in the majority of past research has been done 
through financial and accounting indicators. The most commonly used measures for financial 
performance in past research have been ROA, ROE, and ROI (Glick, Washburn, and Miller, 
2005). In line with past research, I also adopt a similar approach, using ROI as the measure for 
financial performance of the firm. The reason to choose ROI over ROA and ROE is solely based 
on the availability of data. The calculation of ROI, expressed as a percentage, is done internally 
within IDRO and is based on the following ratio: 
 
 
Net proit after interest and tax
Total investment assets
 
 
To account for the temporal element in the relationship between business strategy and 
firm financial performance, the accounting measures from the subsequent year to the 
measurement of business strategy are employed. The data that is required for this variable is 
collected through the sections of annual reports of the IDRO-sponsored corporations that 
explicate annual ROI for each business unit.  
 
6.2.8 Market Performance 
Unlike the case for financial performance, measuring market performance is not as 
simple for wholly owned business units. There have been different measures proposed for the 
measurement of market performance in past literature. Such measures have included Sharp’s 
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measure, Treynor’s measure, the appraisal ratio (Alexander and Francis, 1986; Bodie, Kane, and 
Marcus, 1993; Hoskisson et al., 1994; Rowe and Morrow, 1999), and Tobin’s Q (Devinney et al., 
2005).  
However, due to limitations on obtaining data on market indicators that relate to wholly 
owned business units, it is difficult to estimate their market performance through any of the 
market performance measures that are available. Therefore, in line with past research (White, 
1986), growth in sales is used to measure the market performance of each business unit. To 
obtain this measure, the revenue of each business unit is assessed compared to the total revenues 
generated in the subsequent year, and the ratio from t-1 to t (the subsequent year to measuring 
business strategy) is used to measure the market performance of the firm.  
 
6.2.9 Control Variables 
Several variables have been controlled for during data analysis for this dissertation. The 
control variables include those at both the corporate and the business levels. In what follows, a 
description of the control variables and the justification for their selection are provided. 
 
6.2.9.1 Business-level Control Variables 
Size of Business Units 
 Business units that are too small in size are controlled, since they do not engage much of 
the information processing capacity of the corporate headquarters and would only inflate the 
ability of the corporate directors to monitor their business units. To operationalize this control, 
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two steps are taken. First, consistent with the European Union’s (EU) definition of small 
businesses, business units with less than 50 members are eliminated from the dataset. The 
selection of the EU standard is made due to its acceptance as an appropriate definition by IDRO. 
For the remaining business units, the logarithm of the number of employees from each business 
unit is used. 
  
Industry Effects  
  Industry effects have also been controlled. Industry effects refer to industry-level 
influences that lead to explained or unexplained business-unit-level effects. Industry effects may 
have complex effects on the performance of business units and on the logic through which they 
operate. As a result, industry effects are controlled for to avoid complications in the validity of 
my findings. To complete this dissertation, industry effects (i.e., the membership of business 
units in their respective industry sectors) have been controlled for for each of the business units 
of corporations. The dataset used in this dissertation consists of business units that belong to 33 
different industries.  
To operationalize the control of industry effects, dummy variables corresponding to the 
number of industries are used. To include industry effects within the correlation matrix, the 
structural model for this dissertation is constructed within the SmartPLS environment and a 
latent variable for industry effects is created. Then, the influence of industry effects on other 
dependent variables is included in order to operationalize the control variable. The resulting 
effect is included in the correlation matrix. 
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6.2.9.2 Corporate-level Control Variables 
Family Structure 
  Another variable that is controlled in this study is corporations with family structures. 
Although many such corporations experience similarities in issues related to the management 
and control of their businesses, they undermine some of the underlying logic within agency 
theory literature (Zahra, 2003; Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson, 1997) which stands as an 
important theoretical foundation of this dissertation. Therefore, every attempt is made to control 
for such corporations in the analysis of the data. To operationalize family structure as a control 
variable, a dummy variable is used (1=non-family structure and 0=family structure). 
Corporations with boards of directors consisting of 50% or more first-degree (i.e., parents and 
grandparents; brothers and sisters) or second-degree relatives (i.e., first and second cousins; in-
laws) are identified as corporations with family structures. The data for this variable is provided 
by IDRO within the dataset.  
 
IDRO Ownership 
  While the majority of corporations included in this study are only subscribers to IDRO’s 
licensing and services, there are instances where IDRO takes the role of the institutional owner 
of the corporation and its business units. Although IDRO-owned corporations are still operated 
and evaluated based on profit or loss, the nature of their interactions with IDRO and their 
ownership structure result in complexities that go beyond what is generally the case for private 
or public companies. Therefore, to eliminate the threat of effects from such complexities, IDRO 
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ownership is controlled for throughout the dataset. A dummy variable is used to capture 
ownership of the corporation by IDRO (1=non-IDRO ownership and 0=IDRO ownership).  
 
Geographic Dispersion 
 Corporations with business units in different countries are controlled for to avoid 
possible influences that exist because of the limitations of the corporate parent to implement and 
execute its desirable controls. To operationalize geographic dispersion as a control variable, a 
dummy variable is included in the dataset, which indicates if a corporation owns and operates a 
business unit with over 50 employees outside of Iran’s borders (0=international expansion and 
1=non-international expansion).  
 
Corporate Effects 
 To avoid complications resulting from corporate-level influences other than corporate 
strategy, corporate effects have been included as a control variable. Corporate effects include 
factors such as structure and reward systems, among other less identified corporate-level factors. 
Therefore, to avoid positive or negative influences on business-unit-level variables, which could 
affect the validity of findings, corporate effects have been controlled for in this study. To 
operationalize corporate effects as a control variable, a similar approach to industry effects is 
used: 193 dummy variables, which corresponds to the number of corporations, are used to 
connect each business unit to its corporate parent. To include corporate effects within the 
correlation matrix, the structural model for this dissertation is constructed within the SmartPLS 
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environment and a latent variable for corporate effects is created. Then, the influence of 
corporate effects on other dependent variables is included in order to operationalize the control 
variable. The resulting effect is included in the correlation matrix. 
 
6.3 Summary 
In this chapter, a detailed description was provided of the methodology used for the 
measurement of variables included in this dissertation’s theoretical model. The sources for data 
used in this research were also explained and discussed in detail. In addition to the main 
variables, control variables were also discussed for justification. In what follows in Chapter 7, 
the results and findings from analysis of the hypothesized relationships will be presented. Then, 
findings from Chapter 7 will be discussed in Chapter 8.  
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CHAPTER 7: DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
7.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, the results of the statistical analysis of the dataset used for this dissertation 
are presented. To maintain clarity of the process, the results have been presented on a 
hypothesis-to-hypothesis basis. The methods used for the analysis consist of linear regression 
and analysis of variance (ANOVA) techniques. For the analysis related to each hypothesis, the 
quantitative findings have been presented first. In the sections that follow, each hypothesis has 
been tested twice, using different techniques in order to ensure the robustness of the results. In 
addition to the hypothesized relationships, the direct relationships between variables used in this 
study are also measured for further robustness. The presentation of quantitative findings of each 
section is then accompanied with a description of the findings. In addition to the findings that 
directly relate to the hypothesized relationships, several exploratory statistical tests are 
conducted. The results of these exploratory tests are included in the final section of this chapter 
and are discussed thoroughly in Chapter 8.  
To test the hypotheses, in each case the dependent variable is regressed on the 
independent variable using linear regression techniques. To test for moderation, the interaction 
effect between independent and moderator variables is used for the regression. In each step, all 
necessary controls including the direct relationship between the moderator and the dependent 
variable are taken into consideration. To test for mediation, the method used in this study follows 
the three-step approach proposed by Barron and Kenny (1986).  
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The findings of this dissertation have been presented in the following format: First, the 
different approaches for data analysis have been explained. Second, I have proceeded by 
providing descriptive statistics of the data, followed by preliminary testing of the data consistent 
with past research (e.g., Thornhill and White, 2007). Third, the analysis of data has been 
conducted using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for the hypothesized relationships. 
Finally, the summary of results has been presented, before a discussion of findings in Chapter 8.  
 
7.2 Preliminary Analysis 
  To test the hypotheses, two different methods are used. First, I conduct the statistical 
analysis using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression in SPSS. While the data consists of 
two levels, limitations within group sample size (i.e., number of business units corresponding to 
each corporation) inhibit the use of hierarchical linear modeling (HLM), which requires a 
minimum of 25 subjects at each level, as the statistical method for data analysis. Therefore, all 
corporate-level factors are disaggregated to the business unit level. Subsequently, all corporate 
effects are (through inclusion of corporate parent information) regressed onto all dependent 
variables in the model. Prior to conducting the statistical analysis, a series of statistical tests are 
conducted in order to determine the factors that are to be used in the analysis. These factors are 
particularly important to the measurement of business unit strategy, since the survey used in the 
study contains various items that are related to each business unit strategy type. In order to 
determine the items used in the study, an approach consistent with the one used in previous 
research (Thornhill and White, 2007) is used. An exploratory factor analysis (EFA), followed by 
a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), is conducted on 18 of the factors that were listed in the 
“Strategy” section in the survey. As a result, the items from the two emerging factors (each with 
116 
 
eigenvalues greater than 1) are used to construct a new measure for each type of business unit 
strategy. Since the survey used a similar 5-point Likert scale, the new measure is constructed 
through averaging the responses to the survey and to the specified items.  
  As explained in Chapter 6, a similar approach to measurement of business unit strategy is 
used for measurement of controls implemented by corporate headquarters on each of the 
investigated business units. The factor analysis leads to two emerging factors. A review of the 
factors reveals similarities to the definitions provided for strategic and financial controls. Similar 
to the approach taken to measure business unit strategy, the ratio for the average of items for 
emerging factors is used to construct a new measure that focuses on controls implemented by 
corporate headquarters on each of the business units.  
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  N Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Span 2704 18.34 9.096 3 41 
DR 2704 0.6559 0.2977 0.16 1.39 
DU 2704 0.8798 0.5531 0.23 2 
DT 2704 1.5358 0.3839 0.61 2.24 
HQ Size 2704 35.90 21.37 6 89 
BU Strategy Ratio 2704 1.25 0.8774 0.2 4.5 
Controls Ratio 2704 0.974 0.0092 0.5 4.143 
Table 7.1: Descriptive Statistics 
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 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Corporate Strategy 1     
2. Controls 0.217** 1    
3. Span 0.067* -0.216** 1   
4. HQ Size 0.115** -0.203** 0.456** 1  
5. CEO Experience 0.043 0.024 -0.012 0.005 1 
a Standardized coefficients are reported 
N=2704 (corporate strategy, span, HQ size, and CEO experience are measured for a total of 193 corporations. Controls are 
measured for each individual subsidiary for a total of 2,704).  
* p<.05 
** p<.01 
*** p<.001 
Table 7.2: Correlations Among All Corporate-level Variables a 
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 1 2 3 4 
1. Controls 1    
2. Business Unit Strategy 0.033** 1   
3. Financial Performance -0.024 0.033** 1  
4. Market Performance 0.113** -0.024 0.318** 1 
a Standardized coefficients are reported 
N=2704 subsidiaries (business units) 
* p<.05 
** p<.01 
*** p<.001 
Table 7.3: Correlations Among All Subsidiary-level Variables a 
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7.3 Ordinary Least Squares Regressions in SPSS 
  Table 7.1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the dataset and the variables included 
in the proposed theoretical model. Using the Correlate function in SPSS, the correlation matrix 
for the variables included in the model, including the interaction terms, is generated. The detailed 
correlation matrix can be found in Table 7.2 and Table 7.3.  
 
7.3.1 Test of Hypothesis 1 
  The first hypothesis (H1) of this study predicts that related diversified corporations are 
more likely to employ strategic controls as their primary mechanism of control on their business 
units. On the other hand, Hypothesis 1 also predicts that unrelated diversified corporations are 
more likely to emphasize the use of financial controls as their primary control mechanism.  
            To test this hypothesis, I conduct OLS regression between the variables “corporate 
strategy” and “controls.” The SPSS statistical analysis yields the results indicated in Table 7.4.  
On account of the way that the controls variable has been operationalized in this study 
(i.e., the use of a ratio that captures both financial controls and strategic controls with higher 
values indicating a stronger emphasis on strategic controls), a positive and significant 
relationship between the two variables (corporate strategy and controls) should lend support to 
the hypothesized relationship.  
With an adjusted R2 of 0.24, the results indicate a significant relationship (P<0.05) to 
exist between the diversification strategy pursued by corporations and the controls that have been 
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implemented by investigated corporations on their business units. The analysis also demonstrates 
a positive standardized B coefficient that is equivalent to 0.047 (see Model 2, Table 7.4). 
Based on these values, we can conclude that the hypothesized positive relationship 
between corporate strategy and corporate controls (Hypothesis 1) has been supported, based on 
the statistical analysis of the data.  
 
7.3.2 Test of Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 of this study focuses on the positive moderating effect of the size of 
corporate headquarters (HQ size) on the relationship between corporate strategy and the type of 
controls that corporations implement on their business units. Based on the hypothesized 
relationship, ceteris paribus, larger corporate headquarters should increase the likelihood of 
corporations pursuing related diversification employing strategic controls, while smaller 
corporate headquarters should minimize the likelihood. This hypothesis suggests that while 
related diversified corporations are expected to put stronger emphasis on strategic controls 
compared to unrelated diversified corporations (H1), those related diversified corporations with 
larger staff in their corporate headquarters are likely to put even stronger emphasis on strategic 
controls relative to related diversified corporations with smaller staff in their corporate 
headquarters.  
To test this hypothesis, the OLS regression from SPSS is used to conduct the statistical 
analysis of the effect of the interaction between HQ size and corporate strategy on controls. 
Table 7.4 summarizes the results of the regression analysis. 
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The results of the analysis lend support to the hypothesized relationship (p<0.05) with a 
B coefficient of 0.09 (Table 7.4, Model 4). Therefore, we can conclude that the hypothesized 
relationship has been supported by the data. To interpret the results, I use the approach proposed 
by Aiken and West (1991) to plot the significant interactions. For Hypothesis 2, Figure 7.1 
shows stronger emphasis on financial controls relative to strategic controls in corporations with 
smaller corporate headquarters staff compared to corporations with larger corporate headquarters 
staff. In addition, for corporations pursuing related diversification there is a stronger emphasis on 
strategic controls when there is a larger number of staff at corporate headquarters. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 7.1: Effect of Interaction Between Size of HQ and Corporate 
Strategy on Controls 
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Independent Variables 
 
 
Model 1 
 
 
Model 2 
 
 
Model 3 
 
 
Model 4 
 
 
Control Variables 
    
Corporate Effects 
Size of Business Unit 
0.13* 
0.12* 
0.13* 
0.12* 
0.13* 
0.12* 
0.13* 
0.12* 
Family Structure 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 
IDRO Ownership -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Industry Effects -0.04* -0.04* -0.04* -0.04* 
Geographic Dispersion 0.07* 0.07* 0.07* 0.07* 
     
Effect of Corporate Strategy on Controls     
Corporate Strategy  0.047* 0.049* 0.065* 
     
Moderators     
Number of Business Units (Span)   -0.15* -0.23* 
Size of HQ Staff   -0.02* 0.03* 
CEO Background   0.07 0.03 
     
Interactions     
Span × Corporate Strategy    -0.08* 
Size of HQ Staff × Corporate Strategy    0.09* 
CEO Background × Corporate Strategy    0.06* 
     
R2 0.22 0.24 0.28 0.31 
∆ R2  0.02 0.04 0.03 
Table 7.4: Results of Regression Analysis of the Relationship Between Corporate Strategy 
and Controls and the Moderation of the Relationship by Span, CEO Background, and Size 
of HQ Staff a 
a Standardized coefficients are reported 
N= 2704 (corporate strategy, span, HQ size, corporate effects, family structure, IDRO ownership, geographic dispersion, and CEO experience are measured 
for a total of 193 corporations. Controls are measured for each individual subsidiary for a total of 2,704).  
* p<.05 
** p<.01 
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7.3.3 Test of Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 of this dissertation suggests a positive moderating role for the expertise 
and/or background of the corporate CEO on the relationship between corporate strategy and 
controls. This means that business units that are operating in an industry within the area of 
expertise of the corporate CEO (i.e., CEOs with relevance of educational background or prior 
work experience in the area) are more likely to implement and exercise strategic controls. The 
moderating role of CEO expertise is tested using the interaction term between the independent 
variable, corporate strategy, and relevance of the CEO’s background and work experience to the 
area in which each business unit is performing. As a result of choosing this approach, different 
business units of the same corporation can receive different evaluations based on the degree to 
which they are aligned with their corporate parent’s CEO’s background and expertise.  
The results indicate that the interaction between CEO expertise and corporate strategy 
significantly influences the controls that are implemented by corporations on their business units 
(P<0.05). With an R2 of 0.31, the statistical analysis also reveals a B coefficient of 0.06 (Table 
7.4, Model 4).  
Following Aiken and West’s (1991) approach, I have plotted the significant interaction 
for Hypothesis 3 in Figure 7.2. The plot shows a stronger emphasis on financial controls relative 
to strategic controls when the corporate CEO lacks expertise or background relative to the 
industry to which a business unit belongs. In contrast, when the CEO possesses expertise or 
background in the area of a business unit’s operation, strategic controls become more prominent. 
However, Figure 7.2 also shows CEO expertise and background to be less utilized when 
corporations increase diversification into unrelated businesses and more utilized when business 
units are more related. Based on findings from the statistical analysis, I conclude by finding 
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support for the hypothesized moderating effect of CEO expertise on the relationship between 
corporate strategy and corporate controls.  
 
 
 
 
 
7.3.4 Tests for Hypothesis 4 
Through Hypothesis 4, this study has suggested that the number of business units 
controlled by a corporation has a negative moderating effect on the ability of corporations to 
implement strategic controls. In such cases, corporations tend to lean towards a stronger 
emphasis on financial controls relative to strategic controls. Based on this hypothesis, 
corporations with a smaller number of business units (smaller span) are more likely to have a 
stronger emphasis on strategic controls versus financial controls, when compared to corporations 
with a larger number of business units (greater span), ceteris paribus.  
Figure 7.2: Effect of Interaction Between CEO Expertise and 
Corporate Strategy on Controls 
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To test this hypothesis, the effect of the interaction of the number of business units 
(span) with corporate strategy has been tested on corporate controls that have been 
implemented on each of the business units. After controlling for the effect of other moderating 
variables, the statistical significance of the moderating effect is tested using SPSS. With those 
results, the statistical analysis is conducted. The results can be observed in Table 7.4, Model 4.  
Aiken and West’s (1991) approach has been followed to plot the results from this 
moderating effect in Figure 7.3. The plot shows that the association of relatedness and emphasis 
of strategic controls is stronger when the corporation manages a smaller set of business units. In 
contrast, corporations with a larger number of business units demonstrate a weaker emphasis on 
strategic controls compared to corporations with a smaller number of business units.  
 
Accounting for the control variables, the results indicate that the number of business units 
owned and operated by each corporation has a significant and negative moderating effect on the 
relationship between corporate strategy and corporate controls (P<0.05, B=-0.08).  
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7.3.5 Tests for Hypotheses 5 and 6 
A main objective of this study has been to reconceptualize strategy at the business unit 
level as endogenous to corporate strategy. Hypothesis 5 of this dissertation suggests that controls 
mediate the relationship between corporate strategy and business unit strategy. Hypothesis 6 
suggests that a stronger emphasis on strategic controls relative to financial controls by the 
corporate headquarters as the primary control mechanism increases the likelihood of business 
units pursuing product leadership as the business-unit-level strategy. Also, Hypothesis 6 suggests 
stronger emphasis on financial controls relative to strategic controls to be associated with a 
higher likelihood of pursuing operational excellence as the business-unit-level strategy. In order 
to test Hypothesis 5, the four-step approach proposed by Barron and Kenny (1986) is used.  
Figure 7.3: Effect of Interaction Between Number of Subsidiaries 
(Span) and Corporate Strategy on Controls 
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For the first step of the analysis, the direct relationship between corporate controls and 
business unit strategy (mediator and dependent variables) has been investigated. The results of 
the analysis, which have been included in Table 7.5, Model 2, indicate a significant relationship 
(p<.01, B=0.16), which satisfies the first requirement for Barron and Kenny’s (1986) mediation 
analysis, while lending support to Hypothesis 6.  
To complete my test of Hypothesis 5, another step is taken to test the direct relationship 
between corporate strategy and business unit strategy (independent and dependent variables). 
The results from Model 3 in Table 7.5 also indicate a significant relationship between corporate 
strategy and business unit strategy (p<.05, B=0.29). My previous analysis for Hypotheses 1 (the 
relationship between the independent and mediator variables in the mediation relationship) 
based on Table 7.4 (Model 2) has demonstrated a significant relationship between corporate 
strategy and controls (p<0.05, B=0.047), which satisfies another step for the mediation analysis. 
Therefore, I proceed to the final step of the mediation analysis, which tests the simultaneous 
effects of corporate strategy and controls on business unit strategy. The results, which have 
been included in Table 7.5, Model 4, demonstrate that both variables (corporate strategy and 
controls) have significant effects on business unit strategy, simultaneously (p<.05, B=0.21 for 
corporate strategy and p<.05, B=0.14 for controls), which supports a partial mediation 
hypothesis and, therefore, Hypothesis 5.  
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Independent Variables 
 
 
Model 1 
 
 
Model 2 
 
 
Model 3 
 
 
Model 4 
 
 
Control Variables 
    
Corporate Effects 0.14* 0.14* 0.14* 0.14* 
Size of Business Unit 0.17* 0.16* 0.16* 0.16* 
Family Structure 0.21* 0.19* 0.19* 0.19* 
IDRO Ownership 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Industry Effects 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Geographic Dispersion 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
     
Effect of Controls on Business Unit Strategy     
Controls  0.16*  0.14* 
     
Effect of Corporate Strategy on Business Unit Strategy     
Corporate Strategy   0.29** 0.21* 
     
     
R2 0.122 0.123 0.13 0.15 
∆ R2  0.001 0.01 0.02 
Table 7.5: Results of Regression Analysis of the Relationship Between Controls and 
Business Unit Strategy a 
a Standardized coefficients are reported 
N= 2704 (corporate strategy, span, HQ size, corporate effects, family structure, IDRO ownership, geographic dispersion, and CEO experience are measured 
for a total of 193 corporations. Controls are measured for each individual subsidiary for a total of 2,704).  
* p<.05 
** p<.01 
*** p<.001 
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For robustness, I also conduct the Sobel test to evaluate the mediation effect (Preacher 
and Hayes, 2004). The Sobel test derives a t-statistic based on the comparison between the 
magnitude of the indirect effect and its standard error of measurement (Sobel, 1982) using the 
following relationships: 
 
t = (αβ) ⁄ (Standard Error) 
and  
Standard Error = √(α2 σ2β + β2σ2α) 
 
Based on the t values for the relationship between corporate strategy and controls 
(t=21.563) and the simultaneous effect of corporate strategy and controls on business unit 
strategy (t=3.294), the Sobel test supports the mediation relationship (p<0.05). Interpreting these 
results, and consistent with Barron and Kenny (1986) and Sobel (1982), I can conclude that I 
find support for partial mediation of the relationship between corporate strategy and business 
unit strategy by controls that have been implemented on business units. Therefore, I find 
additional support for the hypothesized relationship in Hypothesis 5.  
 
7.3.6 Test of Hypothesis 7a and 7b 
Hypotheses 7a and 7b of this study suggest the fit between business unit strategy and the 
type of controls to which each business unit is subject influence financial performance and 
market performance at the business unit level. According to these hypotheses, business units that 
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are subject to financial controls are more likely to demonstrate higher financial performance and 
market performance if they pursue strategies in line with operational excellence. On the other 
hand, if pursuing product leadership as the business unit strategy, higher financial performance 
and market performance will be more likely if the business unit is subject to strategic controls.  
To test these hypotheses, OLS regression is used to measure the influence of the 
interaction between controls and business unit strategy on the financial performance and market 
performance of the business units. The results corresponding to the analysis can be found in 
Table 7.6 (Model 4) and Table 7.7 (Model 4).  
The results included in Table 7.6 and Table 7.7 indicate a significant moderating role for 
controls in the relationship between business strategy and financial performance (p<0.05, 
B=0.09) and a marginally significant moderating role for controls in the relationship between 
business unit strategy and market performance (p<0.1, B=0.02). To further evaluate the 
significance of the tested hypotheses, I proceed to examine the plots for the hypothesized 
moderation relationship.  
Aiken and West’s (1991) approach has been followed to plot the results of the analysis 
for the moderation effects hypothesized in H7a and H7b in Figure 7.4 and Figure 7.5. The plot 
in Figure 7.4 demonstrates the importance of the fit between business unit strategy and controls 
implemented over business units to the subsequent financial performance of business units. 
Figure 7.4 shows that business units pursuing product leadership achieve higher financial 
performance when they are subject to a stronger emphasis on strategic controls. However, the 
plot does not show a significant difference to exist in financial performance for business units 
that pursue operational excellence strategies. Interestingly, an examination of the plot in Figure 
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7.4 shows that subject to a stronger emphasis on strategic controls, business units that pursue 
operational excellence strategies exhibit a marginally higher financial performance compared to 
those that are subject to stronger emphasis on financial controls, which counters the prediction 
of the hypothesis. Therefore, only partial support can be reported for H7a.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Similar to steps taken for H7a, moderation plots are used to further examine the findings 
of the test for H7b. While the statistical analysis for H7b shows marginal support for the 
hypothesized relationship, an examination of Figure 7.5 yields interesting results. The findings 
show that the difference between market share performance is larger for business units pursuing 
operational excellence strategies compared to those that pursue product leadership. The results 
show that, counter to the hypothesized relationship, being subject to strategic controls is 
associated with marginally higher performance for business units that pursue operational 
Figure 7.4: Effect of Fit Between Controls and Business Unit 
Strategy on Financial Performance 
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excellence. Therefore, and based on an examination of Figure 7.5, it can be concluded that 
although interesting findings are revealed, no support can be given to H7b.  
 
 
 
 
 
7.4 Summary 
Chapter 7 contains the statistical tests for this dissertation’s hypotheses. The findings lend 
support to most of the hypotheses. However, the analysis reveals the mediation relationship in 
Hypothesis 5 to be partial and not full. Also, of the two hypotheses relating business unit strategy 
to performance, one is not supported and the other is partially supported. All other hypotheses 
have been supported. Additionally, my analysis reveals controls to be a partial mediator in the 
relationship between corporate strategy and business unit strategy. The summary of hypotheses 
and results can be found in Table 7.8.  
Figure 7.5: Effect of Fit Between Controls and Business Unit 
Strategy on Market Performance 
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Independent Variables 
 
 
Model 1 
 
 
Model 2 
 
 
Model 3 
 
 
Model 4 
 
 
Control Variables 
    
Corporate Effects 0.06* 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 
Size of Business Unit 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Family Structure -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
IDRO Ownership -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
Industry Effects 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.02 
Geographic Dispersion 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
     
Effect of Business Unit Strategy on Financial Performance     
Business Unit Strategy  0.11* 0.14* 0.16* 
     
Moderator     
Controls   0.06 0.07 
 
Interactions 
    
Controls × Business Unit Strategy    0.09* 
     
R2 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.12 
∆ R2  0.01 0.02 0.03 
Table 7.6: Results of Regression Analysis of the Relationship Between Business Unit 
Strategy and Financial Performance and the Moderation of the Relationship by Controls 
 
a Standardized coefficients are reported 
N= 2704 (corporate strategy, span, HQ size, corporate effects, family structure, IDRO ownership, geographic dispersion, and CEO experience are measured 
for a total of 193 corporations. Controls are measured for each individual subsidiary for a total of 2,704).  
* p<.05 
** p<.01 
*** p<.001 
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Independent Variables 
 
 
Model 1 
 
 
Model 2 
 
 
Model 3 
 
 
Model 4 
 
 
Control Variables 
    
Corporate Effects 0.05* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 
Size of Business Unit 0.07* 0.06* 0.04* 0.04* 
Family Structure 0.06* 0.04* 0.02 0.02 
IDRO Ownership -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Industry Effects 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Geographic Dispersion 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
     
Effect of Business Unit Strategy on Market Share Performance     
Business Unit Strategy  0.36* 0.36* 0.30* 
     
Moderator     
Controls   0.14* 0.08* 
 
Interactions 
    
Controls × Business Unit Strategy    0.02 Ɨ  
     
R2 0.03 0.11 0.11 0.12 
∆ R2  0.08 0.00 0.01 
Table 7.7: Results of Regression Analysis of the Relationship Between Business Unit Strategy 
and Market Performance and the Moderation of the Relationship by Controls 
 
a Standardized coefficients are reported 
N= 2704 (corporate strategy, span, HQ size, corporate effects, family structure, IDRO ownership, geographic dispersion, and CEO experience are measured 
for a total of 193 corporations. Controls are measured for each individual subsidiary for a total of 2,704).  
Ɨ p<0.1 
* p<.05 
** p<.01 
*** p<.001 
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Hypothesis P Result 
H1:  Corporations that pursue related diversification are likely to put a stronger 
emphasis on strategic controls versus financial controls as their primary mechanism of 
controlling their business units. Conversely, corporations that pursue unrelated 
diversification are likely to put a stronger emphasis on financial controls versus strategic 
controls as their primary mechanism of controlling their business units. 
p<0.05 Support 
H2:  The size of the corporate office (i.e., the number of corporate staff) moderates the 
relationship between corporate strategy and corporate controls; under the condition of a 
larger corporate office, there will be a stronger effect between a corporate strategy of 
related diversification and the emphasis on strategic controls, while under the condition 
of smaller corporate offices there will be a weaker effect. 
p<0.05 Support 
H3:  The corporate CEO’s relevance of past experience relative to a business unit 
moderates the relationship between corporate strategy and corporate controls; in the 
presence of a corporate CEO who possesses relevant expertise related to a business unit, 
there will be a stronger relationship between related diversification and emphasis on 
strategic control. 
p<0.05 Support 
H4:  The number of business units owned by a corporation moderates the relationship 
between corporate strategy and corporate controls; the positive relationship between 
related diversification and emphasizing strategic control will be weaker when the 
number of business units is greater. 
p<0.05 Support 
H5:  The influence of corporate strategy on business strategy is mediated through 
corporate controls. 
p<0.05 
for all 
paths 
Support for 
Partial 
Mediation 
H6:  Business units that are subject to a stronger emphasis on strategic controls are more 
likely to pursue product leadership strategies than business units that are subject to a 
stronger emphasis on financial controls, while business units that are subject to a 
stronger emphasis on financial controls are more likely to pursue operational excellence 
strategies than business units that are subject to a stronger emphasis on strategic 
controls. 
 
p<0.05 Support 
H7a:  The interaction between the strategic direction of a business unit and the corporate 
controls that it is subject to influences its subsequent financial performance; business 
units pursuing operational excellence strategies will exhibit higher financial 
performance when subject to a stronger emphasis on financial controls and business 
units pursuing product leadership strategies will exhibit higher financial performance 
when subject to a stronger emphasis on strategic controls.  
P<0.05 Partial Support 
H7b:  The interaction between the strategic direction of a business unit and the corporate 
controls that it is subject to influences its subsequent market share performance; 
business units pursuing operational excellence strategies will exhibit higher market share 
performance when subject to a stronger emphasis on financial controls and business 
units pursuing product leadership strategies will exhibit higher market share 
performance when subject to a stronger emphasis on strategic controls. 
-- Not Supported 
 
Table 7.8: Summary of Tests of Hypotheses 
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CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION 
 
8.1 Introduction  
Corporate strategy and its influence on the performance of business units has been the 
focus of many researchers during past decades. However, its role and significance have often 
been found to be trivial when aggregated within the corporate effects construct, particularly 
when compared to the business unit effects construct. Therefore, I developed a theoretical model 
to reconceptualize the mechanism through which corporate strategy influences business unit 
strategy. Through this dissertation, I disaggregated the corporate strategy and corporate control 
variables from the corporate effects variable normally used, and I disaggregated the business unit 
strategy variable from the business unit effects construct. In addition, I suggested and tested 
hypotheses that conceptualize business unit strategy as endogenous to corporate strategy through 
the mechanism of controls implemented on each of them by the corporation. 
In my arguments, which build on past research (e.g., Hoskisson, Hill, and Kim, 1993; 
Hoskisson and Hitt, 1994), I proposed that corporations’ ability to implement different control 
structures on their business units rests on their available capacity to process information. 
Therefore, corporations with higher capacities are capable of enforcing controls that are more in-
depth and comprehensive than simple and objective financial controls. To capture information 
processing capacity in corporations, I focused on factors such as corporate strategy, span (i.e., 
number of business units controlled by the corporation), CEO experience (i.e., relevant 
experience and/or education of the corporate CEO in regards to the industry in which each 
business unit operates), and HQ size (i.e., the number of staff that form the corporate 
headquarters).  
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Further, I proposed and tested relationships to establish the link between controls 
implemented by the corporation and business unit strategy (i.e., strategy pursued by each of the 
various business units of the corporation). I argued that in cases where a stronger emphasis of 
financial controls relative to strategic controls exists, business units are more likely to adopt 
business unit strategies that are in line with operational excellence. In contrast, I argued that 
business units subject to a stronger emphasis of strategic controls are more likely to emphasize 
business unit strategies that fall into the product leadership category.  
In this dissertation, I developed and tested a theoretical model of relationships that define 
the influence of corporate strategy on the performance of business units. The graphical 
presentation of the findings for these tests of the theoretical model has been summarized in 
Figure 8.1.  
 
8.2 Discussion of Analysis 
This dissertation has set out to reassess the importance of corporate strategy in the 
performance of business units. To complete this study, the relationships between corporate 
strategy, corporate controls, business unit strategy, and business unit performance and the 
relationship between corporate strategy and corporate controls moderated by span, HQ size, and 
CEO experience were investigated. In sections that follow, I provide a brief review of each of the 
variables included within the model and the discussion of findings related to each of the tested 
relationships involving them.  
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Corporate Strategy Controls Business Unit Strategy 
Number of 
Subsidiaries 
CEO Experience 
Market 
Performance 
Financial 
Performance 
Size of HQ 
S 
S S 
S
* 
S 
PS 
Per
NS  
S: Supported 
NS: Not Supported 
PS: Partial Support 
*: Support for partial mediation found 
Figure 8. 1: Summary of Findings 
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8.2.1 Corporate Strategy 
The main aim of this dissertation is to revisit corporate strategy and to investigate its 
influence and role in the performance of business units. A review of past literature shows 
conflicting results, leading to different conclusions on the importance of corporate strategy, 
especially when this construct is aggregated with the corporate effects construct (e.g., Rumelt, 
1982, 1974; McGahan and Porter, 1997; Bowman and Helfat, 2001). Therefore, I considered that 
there was a need to revisit the concept and to reconceptualize and examine the role of corporate 
strategy within corporations.  
To achieve this objective, I constructed my theoretical model such that corporate strategy 
and business unit strategy are not independent factors, but rather one where corporate strategy 
influences business unit strategy. However, there was the need to conceptualize a mechanism 
that can properly explain and predict such relationships. Building on work from the area of 
agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1994, 1976; Macey, 1997), I theorized a substantial role for 
controls in the relationship between corporate strategy and business unit strategy. To establish 
the relationship between corporate strategy and corporate controls, I built on the literature about 
information processing capacity in organizations (e.g., Hoskisson, Hill, and Kim, 1993; 
Hoskisson and Hitt, 1994). 
The majority of past research focusing on corporate strategy has faced challenges in the 
measurement of the construct. Although the development of the entropy measure (Palepu, 1985; 
Jacquemin and Berry, 1979) introduced a significant leap forward in that regard, it resulted in the 
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adoption of the same categorical approach that was used by earlier studies. To resolve such 
challenges, and to avoid the loss of valuable explanatory power in the boundary points of each 
category, and consistent with approaches in past research (Markides, 1995), I developed a ratio 
that measures the degree of related diversification relative to total diversification. As all 
components of this new variable had already been validated (Hoskisson et al., 1993), it did not 
face any challenges from the point of validity. This variable was later used in linear regression 
techniques to measure the strength and significance of the hypothesized relationships concerning 
corporate strategy.  
 
8.2.2 Corporate Controls 
The notion of corporate controls has been repeatedly identified as a main concern for 
corporate headquarters. However, the difficulty of measurement of controls has led to its 
exclusion from most empirical studies. The access of this study to a proprietary dataset provided 
the unique opportunity to develop a measure that captures many elements that could be defined 
as characteristics of financial controls and strategic controls. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) 
was conducted on one half of the dataset, and the items for emerging factors were used in a 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) on the other half of the dataset and, once confirmed, were 
compared against definitions from literature and then used to construct a continuous variable that 
represents the emphasis of one type of control relative to the other. This measure was then used 
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to test the hypotheses that relate corporate controls to corporate strategy, business unit strategy, 
and business unit performance.  
The ability to measure corporate controls allows this study to take a further step in 
unpacking the notion of corporate effects as studied in much past literature. Corporations employ 
various mechanisms to ensure that their business units perform in line with corporate 
expectations and meet designated overall objectives. Corporations may subscribe to more 
subjective and in-depth assessments of processes, decisions, and strategies of their business 
units, or may put their emphasis on more objective quarterly or annual financial reports. Any 
mechanism employed by corporate headquarters follows the objective of ensuring that the best 
interest of the corporation is not compromised. However, corporations are not without 
constraints in pursuing their objectives. A main constraint for corporate headquarters that inhibits 
the depth of their corporate controls results from their ability to process information required to 
efficiently perform this task.  
The main objective of this dissertation is to investigate the effect of corporate strategy on 
business unit strategy through corporate controls. Therefore, corporate controls have been 
theorized to have a mediating role in the relationship between the two aforementioned variables. 
However, this study has also proposed moderating roles for other factors such as span, CEO 
experience, and HQ size in the first part of the mediation relationship. The second part of the 
mediation model focuses on the effect of controls on business unit strategy.  
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8.2.3 Business Unit Strategy 
Much of the past literature in strategic management has focused on the importance of 
business unit strategy and its effect on business unit performance (e.g., Uotila et al., 2009; 
Thornhill and White, 2007; Hill, 1988). Business unit strategy has been recognized as one of the 
most important determinants of performance alongside industry-level factors and influences. 
When compared to business unit strategy, most past research has focused on corporate effects 
instead of corporate strategy, and has identified the influence of corporate effects to be trivial. 
Not only has past research failed to deconstruct the notion of corporate effects and to distinguish 
corporate strategy, it has also followed a common thread in conceptualizing business unit 
strategy as a factor independent from corporate-level influences (e.g., McGahan and Porter, 
1997; Bowman and Helfat, 2001).  
One of the main contributions of this dissertation has been to reconceptualize business 
unit strategy as endogenous to corporate strategy. To achieve this objective, as described earlier, 
corporate controls was hypothesized to mediate the relationship between corporate strategy and 
business unit strategy. Therefore, this study sets out to unpack our understanding of corporate 
effects and better explain the mechanism through which corporate-level factors influence 
strategy and performance at the business unit level.  
To measure business unit strategy, an approach consistent with previous studies was 
selected, where a new measure was constructed from items of distinctive factors of an 
exploratory analysis. The items of the measure were compared carefully against definitions that 
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distinguish each category of strategy. Subsequently, the ratio measure was developed for use in 
the analysis.  
 
8.2.4 Effect of Corporate Strategy on Controls 
The analysis of the direct relationship between corporate strategy and corporate controls 
showed support for the hypothesized relationship. In the sample, corporations that were more 
relatedly diversified (i.e., higher ratio of related diversification to total diversification measures) 
demonstrated a tendency to implement corporate controls, with a stronger emphasis on strategic 
controls (i.e., higher ratio of strategic controls to financial controls ratio). In my arguments 
throughout this study, I suggested that corporate controls other than sole financial controls are 
required to realize the advantages associated with related diversification. Thus, my supported the 
hypothesis that corporations emphasize strategic controls to ensure that cost and other 
efficiencies can be realized when they pursue related diversification.  
The findings of this dissertation also supported the other side of the previous argument. 
The significant relationship found suggests that corporations pursuing higher levels of unrelated 
diversification put stronger emphasis on financial controls. However, this relationship was 
moderated by span. As the number of business units increased, corporations demonstrated the 
tendency to put a stronger emphasis on financial controls and to lessen their exercise of strategic 
controls. Conversely, ceteris paribus, corporations with fewer business units demonstrated that 
they are likely to put a stronger emphasis on strategic controls than those with more business 
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units. In addition, there was a stronger emphasis on strategic controls relative to financial 
controls when the corporation was pursuing related diversification and less of an emphasis on 
strategic controls relative to financial controls when pursuing unrelated diversification. 
Interestingly, the balance of controls favoured strategic controls over financial controls, whether 
the corporation was pursuing related or unrelated diversification (see Figure 7.3). This finding 
suggests that business unit managers in corporations supervised and/or owned by IDRO perceive 
that their corporate parents favour a slighter emphasis on strategic controls relative to financial 
controls and that this emphasis is accentuated for corporations pursuing related diversification. 
The effect of corporate strategy on corporate controls was also moderated by the size of 
the staff that constituted the corporate headquarters (HQ size). The statistical analysis showed a 
significant and positive moderating role for HQ size. This meant that, ceteris paribus, a larger 
HQ size increased the tendency of corporations to emphasize strategic controls, while a smaller 
HQ size led to more corporations emphasizing financial controls. This finding is also consistent 
with the hypothesized relationship and the supporting arguments. This effect is accentuated for 
corporations pursuing related diversification (see Figure 7.1) 
In my arguments, I suggested that a larger number of staff in corporate headquarters can 
increase the capacity of the corporate headquarters to process information. As a result, when HQ 
size is larger, the ability of the corporate headquarters to process information is greater. This 
further increases the ability of the corporation to implement strategic controls. Not surprisingly, 
this finding was supported by the analysis.  
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While the corporate headquarters and their staff are instrumental to the processing of 
information, the ultimate task of decision making rests with the corporate CEO. As argued in 
previous chapters, corporate CEOs are more likely to pay attention to details of operational 
activities in business units that perform within industries compatible with their education and/or 
work experience. The findings from the analysis also support these arguments — business units 
operating within industries related to the background and/or experience of the corporate CEO 
were more likely to be subject to greater emphasis on strategic controls. In contrast, when the 
corporate CEO had no expertise related to the industry of the business unit, the likelihood of 
implementation of financial controls increased. This moderating effect was amplified when the 
corporation was pursuing related diversification (see Figure 7.2).  
The findings of this dissertation provide strong support for the arguments proposed. 
Higher levels of information processing capacity can be achieved through more populous 
corporate headquarters and/or having a corporate CEO who has industry expertise take charge. 
On the other hand, the increased span of a corporation can lead to more of the information 
processing capacity of corporate headquarters being utilized. The findings also confirm that the 
availability or unavailability of information processing capacity is a crucial factor in selecting the 
control systems used to control business units.  
 
8.2.5 Effect of Corporate Controls on Business Unit Strategy 
Corporate controls represent the mechanisms through which corporations ensure that the 
operations of business units and decisions made by their directors remain fully aligned with the 
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expectations set at the corporate level. They also ensure that the overall best interests of the 
corporation receive full primacy. In this study, I argued and hypothesized that corporate controls 
also influence the decisions of business unit managers to select one type of strategy over another. 
The findings of this study generally support the hypothesized relationships. My findings indicate 
that business units that are subject to financial controls demonstrate a higher likelihood of 
pursuing strategies that are in general considered to fall into the operational excellence category. 
At the other end of the spectrum, business units subject to strategic controls are more likely to 
adopt strategic orientations that resonate well with product leadership.  
My findings are also an affirmation of predictions made by agency theorists. Managers at 
the business unit level show the tendency to comply with requirements set by corporate 
headquarters. While not investigated in this study, one can argue that motives for such 
compliance stem from managers’ interest in preserving their own best interests. While not 
surprising, the context of findings provides us with a better understanding of the underlying 
processes of business unit strategy.  
 
8.2.6 Mediating Role of Controls 
While the effect of corporate strategy on corporate controls and the effect of these 
controls on business unit strategy were tested separately, I also tested to see whether full or 
partial mediation exists. As suggested throughout this dissertation, an important contribution has 
been to conceptualize the effect of corporate strategy on business unit strategy through the 
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mechanism of corporate controls. Investigating this relationship is not possible unless a 
mediating role is considered for these controls.  
The results of the analysis for mediation generally support the hypothesized relationship. 
I found not only a direct and significant relationship between corporate strategy and business unit 
strategy, but also an indirect and significant effect that takes place through corporate controls. 
Therefore, the findings of this dissertation take a desired step in explaining the dimensions of 
corporate effects that influence business unit strategy and performance.  
While the partial mediation found in this dissertation is supportive of the hypothesized 
relationship, it would be interesting to understand the mechanism behind the direct influence of 
corporate strategy on business strategy, which has led to the observed partial mediation. One 
explanation could reside in the fact that business unit managers normally have prior membership 
within the corporate headquarters. This, in turn, could lead to an alignment of the strategic 
directions of the corporation and the business unit, even when control mechanisms are not fully 
developed. Another possible explanation for a partial mediation effect is that I only 
disaggregated corporate strategy and controls from the corporate effects construct. This still 
leaves corporate structure and corporate rewards aggregated with corporate effects. 
 
8.2.7 Fit Between Controls and Business Unit Strategy 
Although this study proposes business unit strategy to be influenced by corporate strategy 
through controls, business unit managers can still exercise their judgement of appropriate action 
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and pursue strategies that are not in line with the controls to which they are subject. However, as 
I hypothesized, it is more likely for business units that ensure the fit between controls and 
business unit strategy to achieve higher performance. The findings of this study lend partial 
support to one of these hypotheses, and no support to the others. 
My findings reveal that while the fit between business unit strategy and corporate 
controls has a significant effect on business unit financial performance, it does not have a similar 
effect on market performance. To further examine the effect of fit on market performance, I 
allowed for a lagged measurement of market performance twice, each time for one year. While 
the results were not significant, they demonstrated improvement. Therefore, the observed results 
could be attributed to the limited time frame (five years) of the data.  
An interesting point in my findings for the importance of fit reveals the superior role of 
strategic controls compared to financial controls in subsequent business unit performance. While 
the hypothesized relationship predicted a better fit for operational excellence strategies than 
financial controls, further examination of my findings demonstrated that when business unit 
managers perceive that they are subject to a balance of strategic and financial controls with a 
slightly greater emphasis on strategic controls, then business units have higher financial and 
market performance, although the difference in financial performance is not significant (see 
Figures 7.4 and 7.5). 
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8.3 Summary 
The findings of this section stress the importance of fit between business unit strategy and 
controls in business units. Business units that pursue a business unit strategy that does not fit 
with the corporate controls that they are subject to can suffer in their financial performance, 
especially if they are pursuing product leadership (see Figure 7.4). Such negative outcomes can 
result from conflicts between the business unit and corporate parent, or from the lack of support 
for strategic decisions made at the business unit level.  
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CHAPTER 9: LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
9.1 Introduction 
As is the case for all research, this dissertation is not without limitations. The limitations 
of this dissertation are mainly the result of the characteristics of the dataset and the 
methodological approach selected for data analysis. Throughout this dissertation, I have made 
the attempt to minimize the effects from these limitations on the validity of my findings. While, 
in my opinion, I have met success in achieving this objective, there still remains much room for 
improvement should access to data with less limitations be made possible. In what follows, I 
provide a list of limitations along with proper justifications and suggestions for improvement.  
In addition to limitations, I also suggest improvements for this dissertation that can be 
completed by future researchers. As will be discussed in this chapter, most limitations are the 
result of limitations in the dataset. However, the unique nature of the dataset itself provided a 
degree of richness that distinguishes this dissertation from previous research. My aim is to 
identify opportunities to make improvements without compromising the value of this 
dissertation.  
 
 
 
 
 
152 
 
 
 
 
9.2 Limitations 
One limitation is that the dataset used for testing the hypotheses was limited to 
corporations with wholly owned business units and therefore did not include holding companies. 
While there is little business-unit-level research on the differences between holding companies 
and corporations, it seems logical to assume that the ownership stakes in business units would be 
the source of various differences at the level of business units, particularly in the area of 
corporate controls, as perceived by business unit managers. This dissertation, therefore, fails to 
capture the differences when the business unit is not a wholly owned business unit.  
The other limitation of this dissertation is its reliance on data that entirely belongs to 
companies within Iran. Due to the private nature of wholly owned business units, access to their 
financial and other data is very difficult in most parts of the world. There are very limited 
sources that grant researchers access to data on the business units of corporations. However, 
when access is possible, it is often impossible to trace business units back to their corporate 
parents. 
 In addition, during the time that this dissertation was in progress, PIMS database, one of 
the main sources of business-unit-level data that had been used for research in the past (e.g., 
White, 1986), was completely unavailable. The IDRO data used in this study, although 
belonging to Iranian industries, provided one major advantage over other available databases: it 
allowed access to very detailed and comprehensive data at the corporate and business unit levels. 
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In addition, it provided proprietary access to survey data that evaluated the relationship between 
each business unit and its corporate parent.  
Another limitation of this research, which is rooted in the limitation just addressed above, 
is the use of cross-sectional analysis instead of a longitudinal study. While I agree that a 
longitudinal study would normally provide more valid conclusions for research such as this, as 
mentioned before, the constraints posed by the structure of the Iranian economy would lend little 
value, if any, to the validity of the findings in this dissertation. To minimize the limitation of the 
cross-sectional approach, I used data from different years and lagged performance outcomes to 
account for strategic decisions taking effect. 
The approach used for the measurement of business unit strategy and corporate controls 
is also the source of another limitation of this research. As mentioned throughout this 
dissertation, I followed an approach in past research (Thornhill and White, 2007) to measure 
business unit strategy. I also replicated the same steps to measure corporate controls. For both 
measurements, I relied on data that had been collected through surveys completed by business 
unit managers. A limitation of this approach is that it is based less on objective measures found 
in archival data and, instead, relies more on retrospective data, which could raise questions of 
reliability. To minimize the effect of this limitation, whenever possible, I used proxy variables 
such as the number of meetings between corporate directors and business unit directors, the 
number of correspondences throughout the year, and content analysis of some of the 
correspondences. I then compared findings from these investigations with the results of the 
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surveys. In the investigated cases, a higher interaction between the corporate headquarters and 
the business unit, which signals a stronger emphasis on strategic controls, was associated with 
similar findings in the surveys. These comparisons have shown convergence and have provided 
further assurance regarding the reliability of the survey data.  
 
9.3 Directions for Future Research 
The limitations of this research also open up opportunities for future research. As 
mentioned earlier, a main limitation of this dissertation is its reliance on data that belongs to 
corporations from Iran. While the limitation of single-country data has existed in much past 
research, the specification and characteristics of Iran’s economic structure may raise questions of 
external validity. Therefore, one avenue proposed for future research is replication of this study 
in countries with economic structures that are more compatible with market economy conditions. 
However, such a task may prove to be very challenging, as access to data similar to what has 
been used in this dissertation will be extremely difficult in the less centralized economies of 
North America, Europe, and Southeast Asia.  
When completing this dissertation, I encountered many instances of unique institutional 
pressures that defined economic dynamics within Iran. While my intention has been to develop 
and test a more generalizable theory on how corporate strategy influences business unit strategy 
and business unit performance, there are many opportunities to investigate the Iranian setting on 
the basis of its unique institutional arrangements. For institutional theorists, this provides a 
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unique opportunity to build on data that has been collected for this research and to provide a 
better look into the differences in institutional logics and their precursors. This approach will 
also allow for a better understanding of the nature of the corporate parent–business unit 
relationship and the logic through which the corporation and its business units operate. 
Consequently, this approach could allow one to redefine outcome variables such as performance 
to better fit with the objectives of managers in other contexts.  
A main construct of interest in this dissertation is corporate controls. To develop the 
corporate controls variable, I used survey data that was made available through IDRO. The 
surveys, which were completed by managers of business units, however, could be subject to 
limitations that can be addressed in future research. Firstly, although I tried to validate surveys 
through triangulation methods (e.g., comparing with meeting notes, content analysis of 
correspondences), they still lack the richness that can be achieved through face-to-face 
interviews. The surveys include many aspects of financial controls and strategic controls that 
have already been discussed in past literature, but because of the more subjective nature of 
strategic controls it is possible that they may not encompass the notion of strategic controls 
completely. Therefore, a study that builds on qualitative data from face-to-face interviews may 
prove to be more suitable for this purpose. Secondly, while the pressure of corporate controls is 
felt mostly by business unit managers, their development and implementation are done through 
corporate headquarters. In this dissertation, I managed to include only one side of the story — 
that of the business unit managers. Therefore, the study in this dissertation could benefit from 
improvements in research designs that also capture the perspective of the corporate headquarters.  
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CHAPTER 10: CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
10.1 Introduction 
This dissertation explores the influence of corporate strategy on business unit 
performance through investigating the relationship between corporate-level strategy and business 
unit strategy. Through its findings, this dissertation provides several theoretical contributions to 
the field of corporate strategy. Additionally, the methodological approach used in this 
dissertation provides contributions through better construct measurement. While the theoretical 
contributions will help redefine the previously theorized relationships, the methodological 
contributions will allow future researchers to apply measures that are better rooted in theory and 
more relevant to the topic of interest.  
Besides contributions to theory and methodology, the findings of this dissertation have 
implications for practice. The discussion of findings provides practitioners with a better 
understanding of factors critical to the success of the implementation and execution of corporate 
strategy and the design of corporate structure. This is especially true for the corporate 
headquarters that implements corporate strategy. In what follows, I provide a more detailed 
elaboration of the contributions made by this dissertation.  
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10.2 Contributions to Theory 
The vast literature on corporate strategy is overwhelmed with conflicting findings that 
stress or undermine the significance of corporate strategy on business unit performance. Much of 
this discrepancy has arisen from confusion due to the interchangeable use of corporate 
strategy/corporate effects and business strategy/business effects. This confusion has in part 
resulted from the lack of consensus on an adequate and universally accepted definition of 
corporate strategy as a construct. As a result, studies comparing influences from the corporate 
level and the business level lack enough common ground which make a proper comparative 
assessment of their findings not possible.  
In this dissertation, I have made an attempt to clarify corporate strategy as a construct of 
interest before approaching empirical evidence. Through an extensive review of past and 
contemporary literature, I have defined corporate strategy as a construct. Building on the works 
of Dundas and Richardson, (1988), Grant (1995), and Collis and Montgomery (1998), I define 
corporate strategy as a corporation’s choice for value creation through related or unrelated 
diversification. Subsequently, I have distinguished between studies building on findings resulting 
from measurement of corporate effects and those that have used corporate strategy as their 
construct of interest.  
Besides the interchangeable use of effects and strategy — whether at the corporate level 
or business level — past research has often failed to establish the relationship between corporate-
level and business-level factors and has instead focused on comparing their effects on business-
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level outcome variables such as performance (e.g., Bowman and Helfat, 2001; McGahan and 
Porter, 1997; Rumelt, 1982). Such studies have often conceptualized corporate-level factors and 
business-level factors as independent from one another, which has resulted in the attenuation of 
the effects of factors from one level (the corporate level) and exaggeration of influences from the 
other (the business level).  
Consequently, much confusion has resulted in the corporate strategy literature regarding 
the modest significance of corporate strategy because of the conceptualization of business-level 
strategy and corporate strategy as exogenous variables that are comparable. As explained earlier, 
the confusion has increased because corporate strategy has not properly been distinguished from 
corporate effects and its constituents such as strategy, structure, control, and reward systems.  
In this dissertation, I have taken the step of distinguishing corporate strategy as a 
constituent of corporate effects and business strategy as a constituent of business effects. In 
addition, I have conceptualized the role of corporate controls in the effect of corporate strategy 
on business unit strategy.  
As explained earlier, in this dissertation I have conceptualized the role of corporate 
controls in the influence of corporate strategy on business unit strategy. While some researchers 
have pointed to the significance of corporate controls in the management of corporations (e.g., 
Hoskisson and Hitt, 1994; Hoskisson, Hill, and Kim, 1993), the mechanism through which 
corporate controls plays such a role has remained ambiguous.  
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In this dissertation, I have built on research related to agency theory and information 
processing theory to conceptualize a mediating role for controls in the relationship between 
corporate strategy and business strategy. The statistical analysis that has been conducted in this 
dissertation lends further support to this conceptualization. As a consequence of this approach, I 
have also made a contribution to the area of research on corporate strategy through confirming 
its role as a significant determinant of business-unit-level performance.  
 This dissertation also contributes to our understanding of the role of information 
processing capacity (IPC) in the management and performance of corporations. While it has been 
generally accepted that IPC is important, there has been very little work done to conceptualize 
the mechanism through which it exerts its influence. In this dissertation, I have focused on IPC in 
corporate headquarters and its interactive effect with corporate strategy on corporate controls 
mechanisms developed and selected. While I focus only on three aspects that influence IPC, it is 
an initial step towards establishing IPC as a constituent of theoretical frameworks in future 
corporate strategy research.  
 
10.3 Contributions to Methodology 
There are also several methodological contributions offered by this dissertation. Firstly, 
following the steps taken by Hoskisson and Johnson (1992) and Markides (1995), this 
dissertation has taken the approach of transforming the indices for diversification that are 
provided by the entropy measure (Jacquemin and Berry, 1979; Palepu, 1985) into a continuous 
160 
 
 
 
 
variable that encompasses both dimensions of related and unrelated diversification. While the 
approach itself is not novel, it has further enhanced the aforementioned works through the use of 
DT instead of DU in the denominator to capture the full extent of diversification in the developed 
measure. Additionally, this dissertation also takes a step towards making full use of the 
developed continuous measure instead of the categorical approach used in past research (e.g., 
Markides, 1995). 
Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, this dissertation has proposed a new 
measurement for corporate controls. While the notion of corporate controls has been present in 
much of the corporate strategy literature, measurement challenges have inhibited researchers 
from measuring them. As a result, corporate controls have remained as a conceptual notion in 
most studies. I have utilized IDRO’s dataset to develop a corporate controls measure that is 
consistent with aspects of strategic controls and financial controls identified in past research. To 
conduct the measurement, I have followed the steps taken by Thornhill and White (2007) for the 
measurement of business strategy on the basis of a survey. This approach has allowed me to 
construct an instrument to measure corporate controls and to utilize it for testing the hypotheses 
of this dissertation.  
 
10.4 Implications for Practice 
The findings of this dissertation also have implications that could contribute to the 
practice of corporate strategy. The main contribution of this dissertation is in providing insight 
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into the importance of information processing capacity in the ability of corporations to 
effectively control performance at the level of their business units. Based on the propositions in 
this dissertation, corporations can increase their control capabilities through increasing the level 
of expertise in their headquarters, or increasing the number of staff that form the headquarters. 
However, this dissertation acknowledges that its findings may be more relevant to unrelated 
diversified corporations than to those that are related diversified.  
Another contribution in this dissertation for practice is the significance of the role of “fit” 
between a firm’s corporate controls and business unit strategy in the performance of its business 
units. The implication of the propositions in this dissertation might discourage corporations with 
tight financial control from engaging in the acquisition of businesses in industries where 
exploration is vital to their performance, or in businesses that are considered to be the product 
leaders in their relative product markets. This dissertation suggests that the misfit between 
corporate controls and business strategies in such cases could negatively affect the performance 
of the business unit. However, this research also contributes to a better understanding of the 
importance of strategic controls to the successful performance of business units. My findings 
show that while the fit between controls and strategy is most critical for achieving financial 
performance in business units that pursue product leadership, strategic controls play a more 
prominent role than financial controls in achieving higher financial or market share performance 
for all business units.  
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CHAPTER 11: CONCLUSION 
 
Since 1962, when Gort presented the earliest measure for diversification, many attempts 
have been made by scholars to investigate the significance of the effect of diversification on the 
performance of business units. Up until 1974, when Rumelt presented a categorical approach to 
distinguish between various types of diversification, the measures lacked the necessary richness 
that would account for differences in the diversification approach pursued by corporations. An 
example of this shortcoming would be corporate strategy. To respond to the question of whether 
corporate strategy does or does not matter, past research has witnessed an evolution in the 
research methodologies employed. At the same time, we have continued to witness conflicting 
findings by researchers. This has resulted in the significance of corporate strategy in business 
performance remaining ambiguous.  
While methodological techniques in the measurement of corporate strategy have evolved, 
little focus has been put on the conceptualization of the relationship between corporate strategy 
and business unit strategy. Interestingly, the role of corporate controls that connect the business 
units to their corporate parents has been very little investigated. Consequently, only the role of 
corporate effects as a homogeneous influence on business unit performance has been studied.  
This dissertation has aimed to take a more curious look into corporate effects, unpacking 
the construct in order to understand the role of corporate controls and respond to the research 
question, “How does corporate strategy influence business unit performance?”  
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In order to respond to the aforementioned question, this dissertation has revisited the 
theoretical foundations that underlie the corporate controls literature. Most notably, it has drawn 
from the literature on agency theory to re-conceptualize corporate controls and theorize it into a 
model that relates corporate strategy to business unit strategy in corporations.  
The theoretical arguments in this dissertation provide several sets of hypotheses. The first 
set of hypotheses establishes the link between corporate strategy and business unit strategy. To 
formulate these hypotheses, the economic logic for value creation in each type of corporate 
strategy has been built on. Also, the notion of bounded rationality, resulting from limitations in 
information processing capacity, has been used to hypothesize the moderating effects on the 
previously hypothesized relationships.  
The second set of hypotheses establishes the link between controls and business unit 
strategy, built on the foundations of agency theory, information processing theory, and the upper 
echelons perspective. The arguments preceding these hypotheses, assuming the role of the 
business unit CEO as the responsible individual for determining the business unit strategic 
orientation, suggest that CEOs tend to pursue the business strategy that conforms best to the 
controls mechanisms put in place by their corporate parent.  
Finally, this dissertation concludes with hypotheses that examine the requirement of “fit” 
between business strategy and corporate controls in order for the business unit to demonstrate the 
desirable performance. Once again, drawing on the existing literature on controls, it has been 
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suggested that conflict between strategic orientation and corporate controls could result in 
business units’ underperforming.  
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